SUJNA GOKULJI ZÂLÂ VEDÂNTA PRIZE ESSAY FOR 1984.

MOTTO.

॥ एकं सद् विप्रा बहुधा वदन्ति ॥

That which is one : Sages call it variously.

(Rigveda I. 164. 46.)

एकं सन्तं यं बहुधाहुर्मतिभेदात्

तं संसारध्वान्तविनाशं हरिमीडे ॥

16328

(हरिस्तुति :)

My worship to that Supreme Being—one Eternal Ens—whom sages describe in a variety of ways through diversity of intellect.

CENTRA[illegible]OGICAL
LIBRA[illegible]LHI.
Acc. No. 16328
Date 23/2/59
Call No. 149.409 5 4/Mal I

PREFACE

To the Second Edition.

———:O:———

THIS edition is merely a reprint, with a few verbal alterations here and there, of the first edition published by the University of Bombay. During the intervening period the author has won another prize from the same endowment for the best translation into English of the first half of the Advaitabrahma siddhi which is being simultaneously published.

It may be noted that the first edition recieved cordial reception at the hands of Native Sanskrit Scholars like Messrs, A. B. Dhruva, K. H. Dhruva and some of my friends in the Indian Civil Service *e. g.* Messrs. W. Doderet, O. Rothfeld, who acknowledged their appreciation of the essay through private letters. As the control over the distribution of copies of the first edition vested in the University of Bombay (I having been supplied with a dozen copies only), I was not able sufficiently to bring the book to the notice of that section of our intelligent public which takes interest in our ancient philosophy and literature.

I may mention that it is through the liberality of a learned patron of mine, who combines scholarship with a generous heart and who with an admirable reticence has desired me to keep his name behind the curtain, that the public at large gets this opportunity of judging of the merits or demerits of the Prize essay through the issue of this second edition.

My gratitude is due to that worthy patron whose generosity though silent is noted in indelible figures in the psychic world. I am also thankful to Mr. Nânâlâl Bhaushankar, a careful student of Vedânta, who read the first proofs of this edition and thereby saved me many valuable hours in my all engrossed public life as Mamlatdar of a heavy charge like Daskroi.

Ahmedâbâd,
27th July 1909.

N. D. MEHTA.

PREFACE.

To the First Edition.

It is nearly six years since I take up this pen to write a preface to an essay which was completed on 22nd July 1896, and submitted to the University of Bombay in September following with a *motto* printed on the frontispiece. During this long period the aspects of my private and public life have considerably changed, and I am taking up the subject with the delight of a parent seeing his offspring after a lapse of time. It will not be amiss here to say that I am not responsible for the extraordinary delay in the publication of this essay, for until the University has decided the result of open competition, I cannot be expected to publish it. It was in February last that the University of Bombay, following the recommendation of the Judges appointed for the purpose, declared in its Notification No. 2230, dated 12th idem, that the prize had been awarded to me.

It was in 1895, when I was Senior Dakshiṇâ Fellow in the Gujarât College, Ahmedabad, that I collected materials for the essay which was meant to be sent in open competition for the Sujña Gokulji Zâlâ Vedânta Prize for 1894, which had remained unawarded at the M. A. Examination of that year. I joined the Revenue Department in January 1896. The reader can easily imagine how hard must be the task of the author to succesfully undertake a literary work on abstruse metaphysics while doing active service as a subordinate in a Department which is proverbially hardworked, and where he was then totally a novice. It was, however, done with vigour, and I must here express my deep gratitude to my then official superior, the late Râo Sâheb Chhaganlâl Bhudharji, who encouraged me by giving all possible help in the discharge of my official duties for a month or so, when I was actively engaged in my literary work.

I may mention, by the way, that I was then insufficiently acquainted with the metaphysical portion of Vedânta, and it was possible that I might commit some mistakes in handling the subject. I was, however, careful in my study. I faithfully followed the various authors whom I read, and did not venture to criticise them until I got hold of the pith of their argument.

Another difficulty which came in my way was the rendering of the Sanskrit scholastic thoughts into modern English. I tried my best to make myself intelligible even at the sacrifice of literary polish. In the rendering of important Sanskrit technical terms, I have followed the leading Oriental scholars. Words, the exact English equivalents of which are not found, are retained in their original form in the essay, and explained in an appendix at the end of the book. In another appendix a list of authors and works consulted is given.

A few words with respect to the method of treatment adopted in the essay will be useful to the general reader.

The work is divided into four chapters based upon the four headings under which the subject-matter of Vedânta naturally falls. Each chapter contains as many sections as there are doctrines, which are marked with roman numerals. These sections contain sub-divisions marked with small alphabetical letters, which treat of the differences of the respective doctrines. The introduction is meant to acquaint the reader with the growth of S'ânkara Vedânta, and the historical causes which led to the doctrinal differences in S'ankara's system.

The Judges, in their remarks which are printed *in extenso* in Appendix C, observe *inter alia* :—

" The essay should be published and I would suggest that, to increase its usefulness to students of Vedânta, the author should, at the end of each paragraph, give a reference to the passages of the Siddhântalesa in such an edition

as in the Vizianagram Series, the translation or substance of which is contained in that paragraph." (R. G. Bhândârkar.)

"At the time of carrying the essay through the press, transliteration will have to be attended to with care, and it is hoped that amendments will be made where doubtful places are marked in pencil." (A. V. Kâthavate.)

The above valuable suggestions have been acted on as far as possible. It may, however, be noted that if I were to write an essay now, the result would be different with the growth of my knowledge during the past six years. To make wholesale corrections will be to deprive the public of the opportunity of appreciating the merits of a juvenile work in its original shape. I have therefore given slight touches to passages which were ambiguous.

In conclusion, I should express my thanks to my present official subordinates Messrs. Tâpishanker Mayârâm Bhat and Gokuldâs Motilâl, who were kind enough to make a copy of the essay for the press after office hours.

N. D. MEHTA.

Kâlol, 27th May 1902.

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

Page.

Preface to the second edition... ... ... v.

Preface to the first edition. ... ... vii—ix

Introduction. ... ... xiii-xxi

CHAPTER I.

Categories of Vedânta.

Preliminary. 1

Section I.—Definition of Brahman. 3

„ II.—Nature of Brahman's Causality; what kind of Brahman is the cause of the world? 5

„ III —How is Nescience (Mâyâ) the cause of the Universe? 13

„ IV.—Nature of Jîva and Îśa 15

„ V.—Is Jîva one or many? 30

„ VI.—Nature of Brahman's creatorship. ... 33

„ VII.—Nature of Brahman's omniscience... 34

„ VIII.—Nature of the Witnessing Soul or Sâkshin. 37

CHAPTER II.

Harmony of Physics and Metaphysics.

Section I.—The doctrine that the phenomenal world is illusory is not opposed to perception... 43

„ II.—The consistency of the doctrine of superiority of Scripture over perception... ... 49

„ III.—The doctrine of Reflection. 53

„ IV.—Theory of dream—

Part I.-Fictitious nature of dream phenomena. 56

„ II.-Substratum of dream phenomena... 58

„ V.—Doctrine of Illusion—

Part I.—दृष्टिसृष्टिवाद 63

„ II.—सृष्टिदृष्टिवाद... 65

„ III.—Illusory objects can fulfil practical efficiency... 63

„ VI.—The conditions of Self. 70

Page.

CHAPTER III.

Means of realising Brahman.

Section I.—Holy duties—

Part I.—Their usefulness 75

,, II.—What holy duties are useful in the production of knowledge? 78

,, III.—Persons qualified for the performance of holy duties and attainment of knowledge.... 79

,, II.—Renunciation—

Part I.—Its service to Gnosis 82

,, II.—Who are privileged to renounce the world?... 85

,, III.—Methods of realising Brahman... 88

,, IV.—Instrumental cause of the realisation of Brahman. 90

,, V.—Dispeller of Ignorance. 93

,, VI.—The ultimate fate of the last modification of mind embracing Brahman... 100

CHAPTER IV.

Liberation.

Section I.—The residuum of Ignorance, the sustainer of liberation in a living state 104

,, II.—Cessation of Ignorance. 105

,, III.—Conception of the *Summum Bonum*... ... 108

,, IV.—Attainment of self-bliss... 110

,, V.—Nature of the released Soul. 111

CONCLUSION 120

Appendix A.—Technical terms of Vedânta used in the body of the essay 121

,, B.—List of works and authors consulted... 123

,, C.—Remarks of the Judges appointed for the examination of the competitive essays. 125

VEDÂNTA SIDDHÂNTA BHEDA:

Or an account of the Doctrinal Differences among the Various Followers of S'amkara'cha'rya.

INTRODVCTORY REMARKS.

'Know thyself' is the ultimate appeal of all the orthodox and heterodox systems of Indian philosophy. Inquiry into the nature of Self was a stirring principle in the Indian soil, which has put to motion all the reflective minds from ancient times. The great cosmogonical hymn* of the Rigveda which is so much celebrated for the loftiness and uniqueness of its thought is one of the so many links of a long chain of philosophical compositions of the pre-Rigvedic Âryas which have survived the lapse of 3,000 years. The Rigveda—the most ancient repository of Indian thought and culture—presents a grave picture of a Rishi reflecting upon the cause of the universe and the problem of life. His speculations will, no doubt, excite the sneer of a matter-of-fact man of the nineteenth century. But a man, who cares to discern the beauty of ancient literature, should follow the sound piece of advice given by Hume: 'Nor it is ever permitted to judge of the civility or wisdom of any people, or even of single persons, by the grossness or refinement of their theological principles. On this account, all the absurdities of the pagan system of theology must be overlooked by every critic, who would pretend to form a just notion of ancient poetry.' Thus there is no wonder when one Ṛishi says that the universe is born of the great golden egg.

These semi-philosophical reveries of ancient Âryas assumed a somewhat mythic and elaborate form in the Brâhmaṇa period. Ultimately they obtained a more definite shape in the Upanishads—the everlasting monument of Indian

---

* नासदीयसूक्त. Rigveda X.

philosophical speculations and the fountainhead of all subsequent springs of philosophy. These Upanishads, then, are the most ancient relics of Indian Philosophy on which the founders of all the subsequent systems of philosophy and sectarian theology lay their claim as supporting their own theories. They inaugurated a new era in the sacred literature of the Hindus. The ancient divinities of the Vedas came to be regarded as mere names of the one vivifying principle, *viz.* Brahman; the world was looked upon as phenomenal or illusory; the individual soul was raised from his limited condition to the universal position by becoming absolutely one with the Supreme Being; the Vedic ceremonial, though not completely banished from the sacred pale, had its importance lessened, since it did not lead man to the *summum bonum*. Men being free from sacerdotal activity, which when examined from its results was practical indolence, had their minds directed to other fruitful investigations. The great questions—'Who am I?' 'Whence have I come?' 'What is the nature of the external world?' 'What is its relation to me?' &c.—where asked in every home, and different answers were given according to different mental capacities. For the solution of these problems, men being conscious of their limited capacity took resort to the Upanishads which were regarded as revealed documents. This practice led to the composition of philosophical episodes of the Mahâbhârata such as the Gîtâ and Sanatsujâtîya. It was the pressing demand for the solution of these problems which led to the foundation of the six* orthodox schools of Indian Philosophy, and six† heterodox systems which put aside the authority of the Veda on this great problem of life. Thus the inquiry into the nature of

---

**viz.* (1) Nyâya, (2) Vaiśeshika, (3) Sânkhya, (4) Yoga, (5) Pûrva Mîmânsâ, and (6) Uttara Mîmânsâ or Vedânta.

†*Viz.* (1) Materialistic school of Chârvâka, (2) Nihilism of the Mâdhyamikas, (3) the school of idealism of Yogâchâra, (4) that of Presentationists by Sautrântika, (5) that of Representationists by Vaibhâshikas, and (6) the system of the Jainas.

Self, the principal burden of the Upanishads, led to peculiar results. It led on the one hand to the sublimity of the Vedânta, mysticism of the Yoga, dualism and partial atheism of the Sânkhya,* subtlety of reasoning and atomism of Nyâya-Vaiśeshika and on the other to the nihilism of the Mâdhyamikas, idealism of the Yogâchâras, momentary flux of both the subjective and objective worlds of the other two schools of Buddhism, scepticism of the Digambaras and gross materialism of the Chârvâkas. Subsidiary to this inquiry Nyâya-Vaiśeshika, investigated the truths of physics, metaphysics and logic. And, alas! the dualistic philosophy of the Sânkhyas, which in itself is the most lofty and closely allied to the philosophy of the Upanishads, falling into the hands of uncultured men of mediæval ages gave birth to the abominable immorality of S'âktism. Thus almost all the aspects of the Indian speculative mind, bright as well as dark, are traceable to the simple and innocent philosophy of the Upanishads.

The Upanishads, Brahma Sûtras, and Bhagavadgîtâ are the so-called Prasthâna-trayî or the three authoritative works on which the Vedânta philosophy is based. The Upanishads are crude and unsystematic in their form. A partial review of them without the help of commentaries will show to the reader that no systematic philosophy can be deduced from them. But the subtlety of the Brâhmanic mind found in the long run a system in the inconsistent speculations of the Upanishads. This system is embodied in the Brahma Sûtras, whose reputed author is Bâdarâyaṇa. These Sûtras or aphorisms form the last of the six orthodox systems of Indian Philosophy. They in themselves are completely obscure. The author, however, is on that

*The Sânkhya system is regarded as *partially* atheistic for two reasons: (1) Kapiladid not deny the existence of God, but simply opined that God could not be proved (ईश्वरासिद्धेः) by argument and (2) he himself admits the existence of a Vyavasthâpaka Îśvara, *i. e.* God, who at the time of creation puts nature into order or brings about cosmos from chaos.

account not to be reproached. Because in ancient times all kind of learning was imparted orally by the teacher to his pupils. The aphorisms were useful inasmuch as they helped the memory of the pupils who had grasped the whole truth of a science in a traditional manner. The Gîtâ, too, rather required great efforts to remove inconsistency.

These three works have been revered from remote times, and no religious reformer can make his theories agreeable to, and impressive on, the popular mind, unless he shows them in harmony with the teaching of these works. Hence numerous commentaries were written, of which many are extant up to this time. The oldest commentaries that are extant on those works are those of S'ankarâchârya, a well-known* Brâhmana of the south who flourished at the end of the sixth century of the Christian era. Many commentators preceded S'ankara as the latter alludes to them on various occasions. But their gloss failed to stand against the the glare of S'ankara, and not a single ray of it is left to posterity.

An impartial critic, on a careful study of S'ankara's commentary on the Upanishads, will not fail to notice that if any consistent system of philosophy can be deduced from them, S'ankara's Kevalâdvaita Vedânta makes the nearest approach to it. S'ankara was not the first teacher of that Vedânta, for an unbroken series of its teachers preceded him of whom Gauḍapâda–the reputed author of the Mâṇḍûkya-Kârikâs–is conspicuous. But it required the deep genius, coupled with youthful enthusiasm and moral rectitude of S'ankara to produce a lasting impression on the Indian mind. India is indebted to that great thinker for exciting genuine love of philosophy and freedom from sacerdotal slavery. That S'ankara was not an innovator of a new system of Vedânta, but the faithful interpreter of the Upanishads, &c., is a subject irrelevant to the present topic. Suffice it to say that in this

Vide K. T. Talang on S'ankar's date Indian Antiquary Vol. II p. 95 as modified by his subsequent views in the journal of the Bombay Royal Asiatic Society Vol 17 part II no 47 of 19-3-1889.

essay we are concerned with that kind of Vedânta philosophy which goes after his name. The principal features of that philosophy will be delineated at great length in the body of this essay.

S'ankara died living a life of 32 years spent mostly in philosophical controversy, and left behind him a system which received great elucidation at the hands of his followers. S'ankara attempted to remove the mist which concealed the true doctrine of Vedânta, and in so doing he left some of his doctrinal points in obscurity. But he was sufficiently explicit in laying down the fundamental principles of his system. They are beautifully summarised in the following couplet:—

श्लोकार्धेन प्रवक्ष्यामि यदुक्तं ग्रन्थकोटिभिः ।
ब्रह्म सत्यं जगन्मिथ्या जीवो ब्रह्मैव नापरः ॥

"I express in half a verse what has been said in crores of works :—Brahman is real, the world is phenomenal, and the soul is none else than Brahman."

Thus the reality of the absolute Brahman, unreality of the world and identity of the Individual soul with Brahman are the cardinal doctrines of S'ankara's Vedânta. In establishing these doctrines S'ankara has left no stone unturned. The principal proof on which the correctness of these principles is based is the testimony of the Veda; Reasoning or *Tarka* is auxiliary to the Veda. Having established the connection between the *Karmakânda* (the Ritualistic Veda) and *Jñânakânda* (Philosophical Veda), S'ankara proceeds to examine the Upanishads from beginning to end. By the help of the six* traditional modes of interpretation, the purport of those compositions is deduced in the abovementioned doctrines. Now comes the work of reasoning. The truth

*They are:—(1) The unity of thought in the beginning as well as in the end (उपक्रमोपसंहारैकवाक्यता), (2) reason (युक्ति), (3) repetition (अभ्यास), (4) persuasive expressions (अर्थवाद), (5) uncommon nature of the proof (अपूर्वत्व), and (6) fruit (फल).

which has been comprehended by hearing with the help of the six modes referred to above, is verified by arguments *pro* and *con*, or in technical phraseology *manana*. The chief warning that S'ankara gives in the mode of reasoning is that it should be based upon the premises of the Veda. No independent inquiry into the nature of Brahman, the cause of the world, and soul, will be fruitful, as reasoning is unstable in its very nature. The Scriptures supply the working hypothesis which is to be verified by experience. when the mind is freed from scruples as regards the Vedânta doctrines, the aspirer is advised to practise deep meditation (निदिध्यासन) which results in intuitive consciousness (अनुभव or साक्षात्कार) of his identity with the Universal Spirit. The unreality of the world—the non-self—is then practically comprehended. When he has realised this final truth, he is free from the shackles of the world. His miseries are completely annihilated, and uninterrupted bliss, the essence of Self which knows no increase, is revealed to him. This is the *summum bonum*, freedom from Sansâra in a living state, which is so gorgeously depicted in Śankara's works.

The reader will easily find from the above rough sketch of Vedântic teaching according to S'ankara, that the subject of that philosophy naturally divides itself into four headings: (1) the agreement of all the Upanishad texts in proving the said three doctrines technically known as समन्वय—the business of Vedic testimony : (2) the non-opposition (अविरोध) of other means of right knowledge, and other systems of philosophy, to the same principles-the business of reasoning; (3) the means of attaining the end proposed, *viz.*, the realisation of the identity with the Supreme Being—the work partially of Vedic testimony and partially of reasoning (साधन) ; and (4) the nature of the end achieved, known as *Moksha*, which solely rests upon intuitive consciousness (फल).

As time elapsed, S'ankara's followers found it difficult to grasp Vedântic principles in the teeth of so prominent a proof

as perception. The conviction, however, of the correctness of them was not in the least weakened, as it was based upon the solid foundation of the Scriptures and the authority of S'ankara who was thought to be an incarnation of S'iva. In such a puzzling condition of mind they took resort to the deductive side of logic to make sure of their position. Abstruse arguments were found out to establish the veracity of Vedântic principles. In the meanwhile arose hostile systems of Vedânta such as those of Râmânuja and Vallabha which being mixed with popular religion were favourably regarded by the vulgar. Fierce controversies with the followers of the above teachers kept S'ankar's followers always on the watch to keep themselves furnished with polemic weapons. These controversies were more bitter than in S'ankara's time for two reasons:—(1) The 6th century in which S'ankara flourished was noted for factions in philosophy rather than in religion. It was a matter of no great moment in those days whether a man worshipped S'iva or Vishṇu; but whether he was an advocate of Kaṇâda's or Kapila's theory was a subject of difference. Besides philosophical aspects of Buddhism and Jainism were bitterly attacked, since they were common foes to Hinduism. (2) Ardent followers of Kaṇâda, Kapila, &c., gradually disappeared, Buddhism was totally banished from the soil of its birth, and Jainism made friends with or rather tried to convert Hinduism by introducing in it Paurâṇic mythology of the latter. They did not in the least lay claim on the three sacred works mentioned above. The position of S'ankara's followers was, therefore, of complete indifference towards them. But Râmânuja and Vallabha, who held sectarian views in religion and interpreted the said three works in keeping with them fell victims to the polemic shafts of S'ankara's followers, of whom Vidyâraṇya, Appaya Dîkshita, and Sadânanda are the chief.

To sum up, (1) the inclination of showing all logical accuracy and coherency in the teaching of S'ankara, (2) the rise of hostile Vedântic systems, and (3) passive position

towards the other schools of philosophy, are the chief causes which led to the formation of the subsequent Vedântic literature based upon S'ankara's teaching.

This body of literature is worked upon the principles of S'ruti and the teaching of S'ankara with the help of Naiyâyika phraseology. It, therefore, presents a striking resemblance to the Western Scholasticism, which was founded on the Bible and Aristotle. Bacon's criticism of Western Scholasticism is to a certain extent applicable to this Oriental Vedantic Scholasticism. 'If the wit of man,' says Bacon, 'work upon itself as the spider worketh his web, then it is endless, and brings forth, indeed, cobwebs of learning admirable for the fineness of thread and work, but of no substance or profit.' Bacon, no doubt, lived in a pre-eminently practical age, and hence it would be wrong for us to join him in a sweeping condemnation of all metaphysical speculations. We do not close our eyes to the incalculable advantage bestowed upon the practical or physical sciences by the investigation of the most abstruse problems of metaphysics. The science of the nineteenth century has received a new impetus and vigour by the study of Kantian philosophy. Nevertheless, an impartial critic cannot but notice, in the subsequent Vedânta, subtlety, puerility and obscurity—the principal defects to which all metaphysical speculations are prone. The subsequent Vedântic literature has rendered, however, a great service to the Sanskrit field of letters by furnishing accuracy of terms. Independent of philosophical merit, the study of this literature polishes the mind of the reader. He whose mind is permeated with this Vedântic subtlety will find new and new beauty in the lucid, simple and masculine exposition of Vedânta philosophy by S'ankara. David Hume in one of his essays compares the methods of shallow and abstruse thinking:—'The greater part of mankind may be divided into two classes: that of *shallow* thinkers, who fall short of the truth, and that of *abstruse* thinkers,

who go beyond it. The latter class are by far the most rare; and, I may add, by far the most useful and valuable. They suggest hints, at least, and start difficulties, which they want, perhaps, skill to pursue: but which may produce fine discoveries, when handled by men who have a more just way of thinking. At worst, what they say is uncommon; and if it should cost some pains to comprehend it, one has however, the pleasure of hearing something that is new. An author is little to be valued who tells us nothing but what we can learn from every coffee-house conversation.'

Appaya Dîkshita, who flourished in the middle of the 16th century, wrote a complete digest of the doctrinal differences among the followers of S'ankara, who preceded him. He was a man of vast erudition. He has written works on various branches of Sanskṛit literature. He was a great rival of Paṇditarâja Jagannâtha in the field of poetics, and though inferior to that great poet in point of genius was a better scholar than Jagannâtha. No eminent followers of S'ankara have lived after Appay Dîkshita with the exception of Sadânanda, the author of Vedântasâra, Sahasrâksha and two other works that are not yet published. He had no independent views in the dectrinal side of S'ânkara-Vedânta, but carried on fierce controversis with the followers of Vallabha at Jeypore and other places.

The following essay is chiefly based upon the most admirable digest of Appaya Dîkshita, called Siddhântaleśa. The works of the authors that are mentioned by him have been consulted, and the result of independent study of them has been embodied here. Where works were not available, the author of the essay was obliged to follow Appaya Dîkshita. The author has taken all possible care to avoid his personal reflections on the comparative merits of various doctrinal differences. The upholders of the differences are allowed, as far as possible, to speak in their own words so that the reader might impartially grasp what they have to say.

Dhandhuka, 22nd July 1896.

ERRATA.

	Incorrect.	Page.	Paragraph.	Line	Corrected.
1	Consistant	1	2	5	Constant
2	Reae	3	1	10	Real
3	Prevading	8	1	7	Pervading
4	Plurafity	11	5	8	Plurality
5	Or	13	5	3	Of
6	Matarial	13	5	4	Material
7	Indepeudent	14	4	3	Independent
8	Cause	14	4	5	The cause
9	End	15	1	1	And
10	In	15	2	9	Is
11	Characher	15	3	22	Character
12	Portiou	16	4	1	Portion
13	Jiva	17	3	1	Jivas
14	Jnst	19	3	6	Just
15	Or	19	3	26	Of
16	From	22	2	8	Form
17	Intelligauce	23	1	3	Intelligence
18	From	23	Foot not para	3	Form
19	Describe	26	3	1	Describes
20	Tha	28	1	1	The
21	Action	30	2	8	Actions
22	Nothiug	37	4	8	Nothing
23	Ou	43	Poetry line	7	Of
24	Perecption	46	2	3	Perception
25	Abjects	48	3	9	Objects
26	Made	55	1	3	Make
27	Knowlefge	57	4	7	Knowledge
28	Illunune	58	2	6	Illumine
29	Demorit	59	4	16	Demerit
30	Peoperty	61	9	5	Property

ERRATA

	Incorrect.	Page.	Paragraph	Line	Corrected.
31	Indidual	61	4	2	Individual
32	Hy	65	1	2	By
33	Cff	66	4	1	Of
34	Tht	67	4	11	That
35	Objeets	68	3	2	Objects
36	Pase	72	2	5	Page
37	Ar	77	4	8	Are
38	Therefor	80	2	7	Therefore
39	As	80	3	10	Has
40	Snbdivided	82	1	22	Subdivided
41	Leisrue	85	1	5	Leisure
42	N,ture	89	4	18	Nature
43	Rcal	91	4	6	Real
44	Inclded	91	7	2	Included
45	Dowu	95	7	2	Down
46	Ignorauce	95	5	15	Ignorance
47	Pice	97	2	16	Piece
48	Togethe	101	4	20	Together
49	Flnal	102	1	4	Final
50	Existance	107	2	16	Existence
51	Ignoranee	108	2	2	Ignorance
52	If	108	Foot note	2	It
53	Th,	111	3	22	The
54	Wat	113	2	11	What
55	Refl,etion	113	2	12	Reflection
56	Stans	113	2	18	Stands
57	Compelementary	117	1	8	Complementary
58	Casual	117	4	4	Causal
59	Identity	117	4	10	Identical
60	Relesed	119	2	11	Released
61	Nture	119	2	12	Nature
62	Absobed	119	2	12	Absorbed
63	Wich	120	1	9	Which
64	He	123		15	The

SUJNA GOKULJI ZÂLÂ-VEDÂNTA PRIZE ESSAY FOR 1894.

VEDÂNTA SIDDHÂNTA BHEDA:

Or an Account of the Doctrinal Differences among the Various Followers of S'amkara'cha'rya.

CHAPTER I.

Brahman, Mâyâ, Jiva and World—Unity in Variety.

"The great immediate interest of Philosophy is to put God again absolutely at the head of the system as the one ground of all, after He has been for a long time placed either as one finitude alongside of other finitudes, or at the end of them all as a postulate—which necessarily implies the absoluteness of the Finite."—Critical Journal.

Human mind presents itself in three different phases: (1). It begins with common-sense, and takes things as they appear to the senses. It does not inquire whether they are real or ideal; whether isolated in themselves or connected by some underlying principle. The majority of mankind never go, and are in fact, incapable of going beyond the common-sense-view of the world. They are of opinion that all knowledge comes from without, and the human brain passively receives impressions of the external things.

(2). After common-sense has attained sufficient growth, scientific understanding awakes in a thinking few. The world, which appeared to common-sense as a series of events coming one after another without any essential connection among themselves, now comes to be regarded as a consistent series of different phenomena linked together by the Law of Causation. Nothing is free; everything is bound up in

necessity. Given the necessary causes, the desired effect will follow. Men of science hold that the human mind cannot go beyond these phenomena and their unifying laws. What is the noumenon, the life-giving principle of those laws, is a point where the scientific understanding halts. Anything beyond these fleeting shows is *terra incognita.*

(3). The philosophical sense, then, comes to the rescue of the scientific despair, consequent upon the thinking ego being tied down by the shackles of necessity. The reflecting ego—the subject—has inner conviction that it is free, although it moves in a circle of external objects bound, as it were, by the law of necessity. The want of freedom under which it seems to labour is imposed upon it by an external principle called mind, which, as a rule, makes no discrimination between subject and object. The philosophical sense or reason tries to investigate the Principle of Unity, which is the point of reference of all different existences and which transcends the apparent diversity of things. All differences derive their meaning, their very existence from that truth of Identity of Subject and Object, which have been held up as antagonistic principles.

The Vedânta system starts after the physical interpretation of the world by Kaṇâda, and inquires into the nature of that metaphysical Principle of Unity. How it determines this Principle is foreign to our subject. The highest Category which it has found is called Brahman wherein Thought, Being and Bliss are one. That Category in its empirical aspect includes two minor Categories of Nature (प्रकृति-माया) and Spirit (पुरुष-जीव). Nature or Mâyâ takes within itself the material world both developed (व्याकृत) and undeveloped (अव्याकृत). The essence of Being is more predominant in Nature, the object, to which Spirit, the fountain of Thought, is related as Subject. The Bliss of Brahman though present everywhere is manifested in Spirit sometimes through Nature and sometimes through its Self.

The Vedânta does not object to the investigation of Nature wherein lies the possibility of infinite material progress. It allows the world of Nature a relative reality, and consequently the discoveries and inventions of physical science are welcome to it. Such attempts have been made by Kaṇâda. Bhâskarâchârya and others in this Indian soil which has been unreasonably stigmatized as a realm of philosophical dreaming. But the Vedânta lays more stress upon the investigation of the nature of spirit, as moral progress, the real wealth of rational beings, is to result from it. Besides, through gnosis Spirit, who is more akin to Brahman even in his migrating character, regains his unity (absolution) with the Highest Category whence he rose.

The present chapter will discuss the nature of the Categories mentioned above : (1) Brahman, the category of categories, (2) Mâyâ, nature, or nescience, (3) the material world, more allied to nature, and (4) Soul or Spirit, more akin to Brahman.

With a view to giving perfect moral freedom or Moksha Yâjñavalkya says to his devoted wife Maitreyî—" Self, Oh beloved, is to be seen, heard of and contemplated." This Self or Brahman, the life of all, is enjoined to be known in the Veda for those who seek Liberation. It is needless here to touch the dry distinctions that are drawn in the nature of that injunction. They would require more space than what is at our disposal. We shall, therefore, turn to the nature of Brahman, which is enjoined by the Scriptures to be known.

Section I.

Definition of Brahman.

Brahman, the object of inquiry, is defined as the cause of the creation, stability, and destruction of the universe.

It is now proposed to inquire whether each of the three properties (*viz.* powers of creating, preserving and destroying the universe) constitutes a separate definition or the three taken together form a single definition.

(*a*) The author of Kaumudî adopts the first view. Each of the said three properties being exclusively applicable to Brahman can form an independent definition.

A text* of Kathavallî expresses the rarity of the knower of Brahman. It is said there that Brâhmaṇa, Kshatriya and all other creatures endowed with intelligent nature are, as it were, Brahman's food ; nay, the God of Death is a condiment to his aliments. If we strip off the Vedic metaphor, the plain meaning is that Brahman is the cause of the destruction of both the intelligent and non-intelligent world, and consequently its knower in the phenomenal world is hard to get, *i.e.*, Destruction by itself constitutes a defining attribute of Brahman.

In conformity with the above Vedic import the three sections of the Brahmasûtras (*viz.* I. ii. 2; I. ii. 5 ; I. iv. 5) establish the powers of universal destruction, &c., as each constituting a sign for determining that the word "Âtman" occurring in those passages is the Supreme and not the Individual Soul.

It follows, therefore, that each property is a defining attribute of Brahman (सि. ले., page 9).

(*b*) Others maintain the other alternative and advance the following argument in support of their position :—

Brahman is both the material and instrumental cause of the universe. Now if only creation and preservation of the world were to proceed from Brahman, it may be mistaken that Brahman is merely the instrumental cause, for all instrumental causes are serviceable in the production and preservation of things. But when Brahman is said to be the principle in which the world is absorbed, one is convinced that it is the material cause as well.

Again if the definition were solely based upon the destructive power of Brahman, its instrumentality may be doubted.

---

* Kàthaka II. 24

In the production of a jar, a potter is an instrumental cause apart from earth, the material cause; and again in the preservation of a kingdom, a king is an instrumental cause apart from the people, &c., the materials of which the kingdom is composed. In like manner it may be supposed that the world owes its origin, and preservation to some other instrument than Brahman, the material cause. In order to free ourselves from this difficulty Brahman is regarded as the cause of the production and preservation of the universe besides that of destruction.

The three parts of the definition being thus essential to the material and instrumental aspects of Brahman, the full proposition enunciated at the beginning of this Section forms one whole definition of Brahman. The definition, however, that Brahman is the cause of the production, preservation and destruction of the universe gives an indirect notion (तटस्थलक्षण) of what Brahman is. Its direct or essential definition (स्वरूपलक्षण) is the following :—What is pure Thought, Being and Bliss is Brahman (सि. बे., page 10).

SECTION II.

The nature of Brahman's causality; what kind of Brahman is the cause of the world?

In the foregoing section it has been proved that Brahman is both the material and instrumental cause of the universe. Now material causes are of three kinds :—

(1). That which gives birth to an effect as an essentially different entity, *e.g.*, atoms of the Nyâya Vaiśeshika School (आरंभकोपादान).

(2). That which evolves out of itself an effect which is essentially one with it, *e.g.*, the Pradhâna of the Sánkhyas (परिणाम्युपादान).

(3) That which gives rise to an illusory phenomenon without undergoing any essential change, *e.g.*, a piece of rope mistaken for a snake (विवर्तोपादान).

It may be asked, under what class should we include Brahman, the material cause of the world? The reply which the Vedântins give is that it is of the third kind. Brahman does not create the world as an essentially different entity from itself like the atoms of the Vaiśeshikas; nor does it evolve itself into the world like the Pradhâna of the Sânkhyas. But it presents the world in itself without undergoing any substantial change. There are no two opinions on the point among the followers of Śankara, but Rámánuja and Vallabha make it a cardinal point of their doctrine that the world is the actual product of Brahman, that is, Brahman is really transformed into the world. This position of Śánkarádvaita should be thoroughly comprehended, for it is the lamp, as it were, which dispels the obscurity of some of the subsequent sections.

We arrived up to the point that Brahman is both the material and instrumental cause of the world, and that in the production of the world it does not undergo the slightest change. The long chain of causes is traced to Brahman, the first cause, and the knowledge of the essential nature of this Divine Principle makes the knower free from Saṇsára. This Principle appears in three different aspects :—

(1). God or Supreme Being who is the ruler of the phenomenal world.

(2). Jîva or the Individual Soul who is suffering from metempsychosis.

(3). Pure Intelligence, the Substratum of God; Jîva and the World.

A natural question arises at this stage of our inquiry :— Which kind of Brahman is the cause of this world?

(*a*). The followers of Sankshepa-Śârîraka are of opinion That Pure Brahman is the material cause of the world. They argue that the first aphorism (अथातो ब्रह्मजिज्ञासा ॥१॥) of the Brahmasûtras enunciates the desire of knowing that

Brahman from which, says the 2nd Sûtra (जन्माद्यस्ययतः॥२॥), the creation, preservation, and destruction of the world proceed. This definition must, therefore, apply to that Brahman which is put forth in the first Sútra as an object of enquiry. Brahman desired to be known, as opposed to Brahman desired to be contemplated, is Pure Intelligence and not Qualified one.

Hence passages of the Upanishads which mention that Qualified Brahman or God is the cause of the world imply that Pure Brahman is the material cause, for the latter is the noumenon of the former. Words signifying Demiurgus in such passages are to be understood in their secondary sense of Pure Intelligence; otherwise the import of the first two Sútras would be set at naught (सि. ले. page 10).

(*b*). The opinion of the author of Vivarana, however, is that Brahman, which* is environed by Mayá, and which is consequently omniscient, omnipotent, omnipresent, &c., is the material cause of the world for the following reasons :—

(1). Almost all the texts of the Upanishads, which deal with the creation of the universe, are at one in asserting that God—Qualified Brahman—is the cause of the world (*vide* (मुण्डक I. i. 9; मुण्डक I. ii. 3).

(2). In harmony with the above Vedic import the Bhashyakára, also, while commenting upon I. i. 20 and I. ii. 1. puts forth universality (सर्वात्मकत्व) of the First Principle consequent upon its being the cause of all (सर्वोपादानत्व), as a reason for restricting the word 'Purusha' to God. That Primeval Being or God is the material cause of all is deduced from Vedic texts like the following :—

"That Golden Being, who is perceived by his devotees in the orb of the sun.....is praised in the Rik and Sama

* मायाशबल.

Vedas.....He is the Ṛik, he is Sāman, he is Yajush, &c.—the whole of the Veda proceeds from him, &c." (छा.1.6 6.)

If Pure Brahman, which inheres both in the Supreme and Individual Souls, were the material cause of all, the universality (सर्वात्मकत्व) would not be a distinguishing sign of the Supreme from the Individual Soul. Because all-prevading Pure Brahman, when it is recognised as the material cause of all, would make the Intelligence of Jîva equally all-prevading, for it is practically one with it. Universality or all-prevading character would not, then, be the exclusive property of Îśa—God. But when God is regarded as the cause of all, universality is not shared in common by Jîva, for he is not one with God but with Pure Brahman. S'ankara, therefore, regards Qualified Brahman (*i. e.* God) as the material cause of all.

(3) The attempt of the author of Sankshepas'ărîraka to overthrow this* doctrine can be explained away in the following way :—

The author means to say that Brahman accompanied with Mãyã is not the material cause of the universe. In other words, Máyá is not to be inserted in the conception of the material cause of the world. But Brahman, which is free from Nescience and yet rules over it, is the cause. Sarvajña Muni, the author of Sankshepas'ărîraka, does not object to the theory that the Supervising Intelligence—Qualified Brahman—is the material cause of all. The fact that Sarvajña Muni has interpreted the word "that" in the great sentence "That art thou" as material cause of all, implies that he regards God as represented by "that" to be the cause of the universe and not the pure Brahman.

(4). This theory does not oppose the import of the first two aphorisms of the Brahma-Sûtras. Causation which actually belongs to God (Qualified Brahman) is capable of suggesting the nature of Pure Brahman, in the same way

* *Vide* View No. *(a)*.

as the proposition that the moon is on this branch of the tree enables the seer to observe the real moon in heaven. The second Sûtra, then, which defines Qualified Brahman, may be said to contain indirectly the definition of Pure Brahman, the object of inquiry put forth in the first Sûtra. (सि. ले., pages 10-11).

(*c*). The preceding view sets forth Îs'a—God—as the material cause of the whole world, and thereby ignores the fact that in some part of the world (*e.g*, mind) Jîva also is the material cause. This defect in the foregoing thinkers led other Vedántins to entertain a slightly different view.

A majority of these thinkers regard Mâyâ and Avidyâ as different, and hold that the five *gross* elements constituting the gross world are the transformations of Mâyâ which resides in God, while the subtle world of the individual, including mind, senses, &c., is the product of five subtle elements generated by Individual Ignorances (Avidyâs) and helped by *gross* elements produced by the Mâyâ of God. The gross objective world is, therefore, the effect of God or Qualified Brahman only; but the subtle subjective world is the effect of both God and Jîva.

This theory has one important reason in its favour, that it reconciles two apparently conflicting Vedic texts.

In the Pras'nopanishad VI. 5, the fate of the dying body of the released soul is thus described: 'These* sixteen constituents of the subtle body which rest in the soul, disappear in it when the individual realises the true nature of his self.' Again, in the Muṇḍaka III. ii. 7, it is said that the constituents disappear in their respective causes.

The first text will be intelligible when we regard the constituents of the subtle body as the direct products of the Individual Ignorance (Avidyâ) which vanishes together

* They are :—(1-5) five elements, (6) Vital air, (7) senses, (8) mind, (9) faith, (10) food, (11) strength, (12) austerity, (13) holy verses, (14) action, (15) worlds, and 16 name (*vide* P.U. VI, 4).

with its effects, at the rise of knowledge, in the common substratum, *viz.*, Self.

The second text, wherein the constituents are represented as being absorbed in their respective causes, implies that the portion of the gross elements which are the products of Mâyâ residing in God, is not annihilated by the knowledge of Brahman which dispels only the Individual Ignorance. This portion of gross elements, which are not annihilated, although it does not enter into the formation of the constituents of the subtle body, is a helping factor of the five elements which actually build up the subtle body. When the body of the released soul is dead, the particles of gross elements, which were mere helping factors in the building up of the organism, disappear in their respective elements.

Thus the material cause of the subtle subjective world is both God and Jîva, the substrata of Mâyâ and Avidyá, respectively. (सि. ले., page 11).

(*d*). A somewhat different view is held by a sect of the above thinkers, who maintain in common the doctrine of difference betweeen Mâyâ and Avidyá.

In the creation of the macrocosmic objective world (*i. e.* ether, wind, &c.), God alone is the material cause, just as in the creation of the microcosmic subjective world (mind, &c.) Jîva alone is the material cause. The great objective world is the product of Mâyâ, which resides in God ; while the small subjective world is the product of Avidyâ only which resides in Jîva. Avidyâ requires no help from the products of Mâyâ in the constitution of the subtle body. Consequently Jîva, the subtratum of Avidyâ, ought to be regarded as the sole material cause of the subtle subjective world.

The contradiction of the Vedic texts referred to in the preceding view may be thus explained :—

The first text, in which the constituents are described as being absorbed in Self, describes the situation from the standpoint of the released soul, in whose lofty view the

world as such does not exist apart from Brahman. The other text describes the same fact from the standpoint of the ignorant spectators, present at the time of death of the perfect sage. In their opinion the physical constituents are not the effects of Self, but of the gross elements (*i. e.* earth, &c.), which are regarded as real. It is quite natural that they imagine the absorption of the same constituents in their respective phenomenal causes.

S'ankara, too, reconciles the conflicting texts in the above manner, in the Brahma-Sûtras, IV. ii. 15.

Here, then, is the key to the difference. S'ankara's interpretation of the texts did not favour the foregoing view, which reconciled the contradictory Vedic texts in a different way. A new theory which regards Jîva alone as the material cause of the subtle subjective world is, therefore, proposed. But the chief objection to which this improved theory is open, is, that by regarding Jîva alone as the material cause of the subtle body, the upholders of the theory come in direct conflict with Vedic texts which lay down God as the material cause of mind, &c. (सि. ले. pages 11–12).

(*e*) Now those* who maintain the identity of Mâyâ and Avidyâ have to propound the same theory as the foregoing one, but on different grounds.

God is the material cause of the great objective world, and Jîva of the subtle subjective world. The subjective world is fictitiously cognised as one with the ego. Jîva is, therefore, the substratum of the subjective phenomena, and hence the material cause of them. In conformity with this view of the matter, S'ankara in the Introductory† Bhâshya describes 'the whole expansion of names and forms, the collected plurality of phenomena, as generated, set up, and imposed on the soul by Ignorance.'

---

* *Vide* Ânandagiri on S'ânkara Bhâshya. (Ânandâs'rama S. S.) p. 264.

† Known as अध्यासभाष्य.

The author of Vivaraṇa too, while accounting for the absence of omniscience in Jîva, who is absolutely one with Brahman, remarks that the objective world is commingled with the Intelligence of Brahman, for the latter is its material cause, and not with that of Jîva as he is in no way causally connected with the world. The objective world is, therefore, known in its totality by God only. The Intelligence of Jîva is, however, commingled with the subjective world, because with every part of it the ego is inseparably connected.

These remarks imply that Jîva must be the material cause of the subjective phenomena, else his inseparable union with them would be inexplicable. (सि. ले., page 12).

(*f*) The above theory is liable to the following criticism :—

The word 'material cause' when applied to Intelligence, whether pure, qualified, or individual, means that it is the Substratum of the phenomena which are the actual evolutes of nature, call it Mâyâ, Avidyâ or Prakṛiti.

Now when Mâyâ residing in God is admitted to be identical with Avidyâ, the real material cause of the subjective phenomena (परिणाम्युपादान), God ought to be regarded as the fictitious material cause (विवर्तोपादान) of them. It is a contradiction in terms to say that Mâyâ and Avidyâ are one and yet Jîva alone is the *Vivartopâdâna* of the subjective phenomena. Because those phenomena are the transformations of one dead principle called Mâyâ or Avidyâ whose substratum is both Jîva and Îs'a. Hence both Jîva and Îs'a should be regarded as the *Vivartopâdâna* of subjective phenomena, or Mâyâ and Avidyâ should be distinguished, or other conditions of Jîva and Îs'a should be pointed out.

Being dissatisfied, for these and similar other reasons, with the preceding theory, some Vedântins hold that Îs'a alone is the *Vivartopâdâna* of the whole empirical world

including practically existing subjective and objective phenomena. This view is corroborated by a Vedic text which declares:—" From that Supreme Being proceed vital airs, mind, senses (*i. e.* the practical subjective world), ether, air, light, water and earth which sustains all visible things (*i. e.* the practical objective world) " Muṇdaka II. i. 3.

Jîva is the material cause of the fictitious (प्रातिभासिक) world of dreams. Consistently with this theory the Bhâshyakâra interprets the Sûtra II. i. 28 as follows:—

" Just as multiform dreamy phenomena occur in the individual soul in his dreamy state, without changing his essential nature, so the world may appear in Brahman without the slightest change in it. " (सि. ले., page 12).

(*g*) The last view is that Jîva alone gives rise in himself to the notions of Îs'a, subjective world, objective world, &c., and consequently is the material cause of all. (सि. ले., page 12).

This theory of extreme idealism leaves no scope for the existence of Îs'a. The negation of Îs'a is diametrically opposed to S'ruti, Smṛiti, Reason, Brahmasûtras, Bhâshya, &c., which emphatically prove the existence of the Supreme Ruler of the phenomenal world. Besides, this doctrine does not supply us with a satisfactory explanation of bondage and freedom.

Section III.

How is Nescience—Mâyâ—the cause of the universe ?

In the past section Brahman has been established to be the material cause of the world in a variety of ways. But a text or the S'vetâs'vataropanishad (iv. 10) declares that Mâyâ is the matarial cause of the world and the possessor of Mâyâ is the great Lord. This means that the world is the direct effect of Mâyâ, the material principle, and that Brahman in his omnipotent character is the efficient cause, guiding Mâyâ. How is it, then, that Brahman is upheld to be the material cause in the teeth of this Vedic text ?

(*a*) The author of Padârthatattva-nirṇaya thus explains away the difficulty. As Brahman and Mâyâ are both the material cause of the world, there is no opposition with the scriptures. Reason and experience also support this view. The cause is found to inhere in the effect.

The world, which is an effect, is seen to possess both insentient character (जडता) and existence (सत्ता), the essential properties of Mâyâ and Brahman, respectively. In order to account for these two properties in the world, we are obliged to assume both Mâyâ and Brahman as its material cause. But there is this difference between the two :—

Mâyâ is the material cause in so far as it is actually evolved into the world; and Brahman in so far as it is the substratum of the phenomena of Mâyâ. It should not be objected that to regard a substratum of phenomena as a material cause is merely a technicality of Vedânta and would not, on that account, be universally accepted. Because the definition of the material cause (*viz*, that * which produces an effect in itself) is equally applicable to that which stands as substratum and that which is actually transformed into the effect (सि. ले., page, 12).

(*b*) The author of Saṅkshepa-Śârîraka, however, lays much stress upon the sole causality of Brahman. But as the unchanging Brahman cannot be an indepeudent cause, Mâyâ is supposed to be an intermediate cause (द्वारकारण). That which is not actually cause, but simply a conveying factor of the chief cause, is often found to inhere in the effect. As for instance, smoothness, &c., of earth, the actual material cause, are found existent in the jar, the real effect. They are the intermediate causes, so to say, acting between earth, the actual cause, and the jar, the real effect (सि. ले, page 13).

---

* स्वात्मनि कार्यजनिहेतुत्वम्.

(*c*) Vâchaspatimiśra denies this theory end makes Mâyâ only a helping factor (सहकारिमात्र) of Brahman in the production of the world. Brahman objectively referred to by Mâyâ which resides in individual souls (*i. e.*, which affects those souls only) shines in the shape of the non-intelligent world and thereby becomes the cause of it. Mâyâ in no way enters into the conception of the material cause (सि. ले., page 13).

(*d*) The author of Siddhânta Muktâvali literally follows the meaning of the S'vetâs'vatara text, and makes Mâyâ alone the material cause of the world. Brahman, the Absolute, is neither the cause nor the effect, for the same Upanishad (श्वे० VI. 8) says that nothing has preceded it, nothing has succeeded it; it has neither an effect nor an instrument to produce it. Those texts which mention that Brahman is the material cause are to be taken in their secondary sense, *viz.*, Brahman in the substratum of Mâyâ, the real material cause of the world, and hence it is spoken of as the cause of it (सि. ले., page 13).

Section IV.

Nature of Jîva and Is'a.

Brahman, the highest category, is described in its absolute character as Thought, Being and Bliss. In its relative universal characher it is the omniscient Ruler of the world; in its individualized character it is the so-called Jîva or the migrating soul. The cause of Brahman's relativity is known as Mâyâ. These three principles (Jîva, Îs'a and Mâyâ, which include all natural phenomena), which play so prominent a part on the relative platform, require further delineation of their nature. In the present section we shall take principal differences of opinion on the nature of Jîva and Îs'a

(*a*) They are thus described in the Prakaṭârtha-vivaraṇa :—

The reflection of Intelligence in Mâyâ, which has no beginning, which is indescribable, which is the source of the inorganic world, and which is connected only with Intelligence is called Îs'a or the Supreme Being. The reflections in numerous small portions of that Mâyâ, which are possessed of two powers of enveloping and projecting and which are known as Avidyâ, are said to be Jîvas (सि. ले, page 13).

It may be noticed here that in this view Mâyâ and Avidyâ are looked upon as one element, and are related with each other as the whole and its parts. The former is the adjunct (उपाधि) of Îs'a, the latter of Jîva.

(*b*) In Tattva-viveka, a chapter of Panchadas'î, the matter is thus elucidated :—

The primitive non-intelligent principle (मूलप्रकृति) which consists of three *gunas* (*primordia rerum*) has two forms, (1) Mâyâ and (2) Avidyâ, according to the text, 'That non-intelligent principle divides itself into two forms named Mâyâ and Avidyâ,' which are the reflectors, as it were, of Îs'a and Jîva, respectively.

Mâyâ is that portion of the primitive non-intelligent principle in which Pure *Sattva* is not subordinated to *Rajas* and *Tamas*. In other words, that portion in which Pure *Sattva* is predominant is called Mâyâ: whereas that in which *Sattva* is subordinated to *Rajas* and *Tamas* and is consequently impure, is known as Avidyâ. Reflections of Intelligence in Mâyâ and Avidyâ are Îs'a and Jîva, respectively (सि. ले. page 14).

(*c*) In some other place Mâyâ and Avidyâ, the reflectors Îs'a and Jîva, are thus distinguished :—

The primitive dead principle, which is essentially one, is called Mâyâ, when we take into account the predominance of its projecting power, and is called Avidyâ when we take into consideration the predominance of its enveloping power.

Thus the material principle of which the projecting power is superior to the concealing power is the limitting condition of Îs'a; and the same principle with its concealing power predominant is the limiting condition of Jîva. The Avidyâ which forms the limiting adjunct of Jîva is otherwise called Ajñâna.

That the projecting power is predominant in Îs'a follows from his being the creator of this great world. He is always conscious of his free state, and hence is untouched by the concealing power. Jîva, on the contrary, labours under ignorance of Brahman—his true nature—owing to the predominance of the concealing power of the material principle working in him. He is incompetent to create the great universe as he lacks the predominance of the projecting power (सि. ले., page 14).

(*d*) In Sankshepa-Śârîraka, the natures of Îs'a and Jîva are based according to the literal meaning of a vedic text, which declares that Îs'a has the cause (*i.e.*, Avidyâ, Mâyâ or Ajñâna) and Jîva has the effect (*i.e.*, mind, &c.) for his condition. Thus the reflection of Intelligence in the non-intelligent principle known as Avidyâ-Mâyâ-Ajñâna, the cause of the material world, is called Îs'a; and the reflection of Intelligence in mind, the subtle product of Avidyâ, is called Jîva.

Here it may be objected that the text referred to above speaks nothing of reflection. It simply says that Mâyâ-Avidyâ and mind are the limiting *conditions of Îs'a and Jîva, respectively. In other words, Intelligence limited by Mâyâ-Avidyâ and mind goes by the name of Îs'a or Jîva. What is, then, the propriety of inserting the idea of reflection?

To this it may be replied that Limited Intelligences differ at different places, for when one mind goes to heaven through the potency of merit, the Intelligence limited by it in that

* अवच्छेदकोपाधि.

place is different from that which was limited by it while it was on this earth. This will lead to two faults :-(1) destruction of the rewards of actions that are done (कृतनाश), and (2) occurrence of fruits of actions that are not done (अकृताभ्यागम). To explain these pregnant ideas, the Intelligence limited by a mind in heaven (*i.e.*, a Jîva) enjoys the fruits of actions that are performed by the Intelligence limited by the same mind on the earth (*i.e.*, another Jîva). The Jîva who did meritorious actions on the earth remained without reward, while the Jîva, who did nothing, enjoyed the fruits of those actions, *reductio ad absurdum*. To escape from this difficulty it cannot be argued that the Limited Intelligence goes wherever the mind, the limiting factor, goes. Because the motion of what is all-pervading is inconceivable. It is impossible to imagine that ether, for instance, goes with a jar wherever we remove the latter.

All these difficulties vanish away when we regard *not* the *Limited* Intelligence, but the *Reflected* one as Jîva. The Reflected Intelligence is inseparably connected with the reflector, *viz.*, mind. Consequently the identity of the ego, the enjoying soul, is maintained throughout (सि. ले, page 14).

In all the preceding views Jîva and Îs'a are both regarded as reflections. The difference of opinion was with respect to the reflectors. It is therefore clear that the Intelligence which stands as the original (बिंब) of which Jîva and Îs'a are the reflections (प्रतिबिंब) is that Brahman which is sought by an aspirer for absolution.

(*e*) In Chitra-dîpa, a chapter of Panchadaśî, an elaborate method for determining the nature of Jîva and Îs'a is resorted to.

Putting aside the triple division of Intelligence (*viz.*, Jîva, Îs'a and Pure Brahman), the author proceeds to make four divisions of it on the following analogy:—(1) Ether which is limited by a jar is called *Ghatâkâs'a* (Jar-limited ether);

(2) that which is reflected together with clouds, stars, &c., in the water contained in the jar, is called *Jalâkâs'a* (ether belonging to the water of the jar); (3) the unlimited ether is *Mahâkâs'a* (expansive ether); and (4) that which is reflected in particles of water which resemble spray and which are inferable as existing in the canopy of clouds, which hangs in the expansive sky, from the subsequent showers of rain, is called *Meghâkâs'a* (cloud-environed ether). The ether, or call it sky to make the simile more intelligible, is one and unbroken, and yet those aspects are designated as different. In like manner (1) the Intelligence which is limited by gross and subtle bodies, and which is unchanging like an *anvil* is called Kûtastha (Unchanging Intelligence); (2) that which is reflected in the mind which in consequence of its being falsely super-imposed upon that Kûṭastha corresponds to the water in that jar, is known as Jîva—the migrating soul; (3) the Unlimited Intelligence is Brahman corresponding to Mahâkâs'a; and (4) that which is reflected in the subtle impressions of minds (धीवासना) of all creatures, which exist in the cloud-like Mâyâ hanging in that Brahman, is called Îs'a or God. Thus, then, Jîva is the Reflected Intelligence in mind, and Îs'a is the Reflected Intelligence in Mâyâ-Ajñâna, tinged with the subtle impressions of minds of all creatures.

Further on in the same work the following remarks as regards the nature of Jîva occur :—

In every case of error (*e.g.*, a mother-o'-pearl mistaken for silver) there are two aspects of the phenomenon, (1) one refers to the phenomenal side, and (2) the other to the noumenal side. Both are however commingled and the mind conceives that there is one thing only. To apply this to the instance just alluded to, that part of the proposition "this is silver" which refers to "this" has reference to the common nature of the substratum (*viz.*, the mother-o'-pearl), while that which refers to "silver" is applicable to the falsely cognised thing (अध्यस्त). The whole proposition.

therefore, contains one general and the other special nature of the phenomenon. In the same manner, Jîva who shines as "I" in the unchanging Kûṭastha, the substratum of the two bodies, is the special aspect of the phenomenon of ego, the general aspect being Self (स्वयंत्व) invariably associated with all egoistic ideas. "I" is the false and "Self" is the correct aspect. The former is the so-called Jîva, the latter is the real soul. To put it otherwise, the individuality or ego is the Jîva, while the universality or under-lying self-consciousness is the Kûṭastha. The aspect which refers to "Self" is the same in the egoistic conceptions of all creatures; but the aspect which refers to "I" is different in all creatures. But the people at large make no distinction between Kûṭastha, the real soul, and Jîva, the fictitious soul. This distinction, which is necessary for the comprehension or identity with Brahman, is thus described in a chapter of the Bṛihadâraṇyakopanishad :

Yâjñavalkya says to his wife that the conscious being, who owes his existence to these elements, is destroyed when the environments formed by them, *viz.*, mind body, &c., are dispelled by the knowledge of Brahman. This means that Jîva as such, being a fictitious product whose characteristic is developed consciousness (विशेषविज्ञान), vanishes together with the subtle elements which sustained him. But further on the sage, with a view to remove misconception in the mind of Maitreyî as to the real nature of Self, declares that the soul is indestructible, meaning thereby that Kûṭastha, the substrate, which consists of pure consciousness (सामान्यविज्ञान) and on which the developed consciousness or sentient character of Jîva is based, knows no destruction.

Thus when the great Vedântic text—"I am Brahman"—teaches the identity of the individual soul and the Supreme Being, it should be clearly understood that she soul designated as "I"-the doer and enjoyer—is not one with Brahman, but the noumenal Self who is the basis of that "I" is

identical with Brahman. Thus " I " is to be deprived of its fictitious environments before establishing its identity with Brahman. To illustrate the matter let us take an ordinary instance of a rectified error:—" That which was thought to be a pillar is a man." Here the proposition does not mean that the pillar is one with the man. But it simply teaches that the knowledge of the man dispels the notion of the pillar, and the residuum of that idea of pillar is the same as man. In other words, the relation of subject and predicate is not based upon direct identity (मुख्यसामानाधिकरण्य), but upon the sublation of the falsity of the subject as such (बाधसामानाधिकरण्य).

If the above theory be found unsatisfactory, and the theory of Vivaraṇa of the direct identity between "I" and "Brahman" is found preferable, that "I" should be understood not in its primary sense of the migrating soul (Jîva), but in its secondary sense of the Unchanging Intelligence (Kûṭastha) which is absolutely identical with Brahman.

Now *Îs'a*, who is described as the reflection of Intelligence in the subtle impressions of the minds of all creatures residing in Mâyâ, is the same as Ânandamaya (the Soul consisting of Joy) described in the Mâṇdûkya as the principle which has uniform consciousness in sound sleep and which enjoys the finest pleasure. Because though the Upanishad begins with the inquiry of the stages of the Individual Soul, the Ânandamaya, the last step in the ladder, is not an aspect of the Individual Soul, for the next paragraph describes it to be the Lord of all—the omniscient and omnipotent Being. The Individual Soul has not got such powers; consequently the Ânandmaya aspect of the soul revealed in the stage of sound sleep is Îs'a and none else. But although Ânandamaya, *viz.*, God, is present in each Individual Soul, the latter is not omniscient, because the subtle impressions of the minds of all creatures which form the condition of the former are not directly cognizable by the latter, his condition or उपाधि being limited.

But the above view which regards the Ânandamaya of the sound sleep as God is objectionable on many grounds. The insurmountable difficulty which occurs in the very beginning is that all creatures cannot be imagined as falling in sleep at one and the same time; and so long as they do not unanimously fall in sleep, the subtle† impressions of their minds which necessarily require that sleep for their manifestation, cannot form the conditian of Îs'a, and consequently he cannot be said to be omniscient. Other minor objections, such as contradiction with the preceding paragraphs of the Mândûkya which deal with the Individual Soul, are too palpable to require mention

Being thus dissatisfied with this theory, the same author in another chapter of the Panchadas'î, called Brahmânanda, propounds a somewhat tenable theory that the *Ânandamaya of the Mâṇdûkya is the Individual Soul*, and that the omniscience, &c., described in the subsequent sentences are due to the essential identity of the Individual and Supreme Soul. To give a brief sketch of the elaborate theory, the mind which assumes a gross from in the waking state grows subtler and subtler, till the Individual falls into sound sleep. The Individual Soul, when he is inexplicably united with the gross mind, is called *Vijñânamaya*, for all works performed in the waking state require developed consciousness for their execution. The same soul inexplicably united with the subtlest state of mind in sound sleep is designated as *Ânandamaya*, for he is then free from all worldly cares and anxieties. The Vedic text which describes omnipotence, &c., in the *Ânandamaya* has its purport in the essential identity of the *Ânandamaya* with îs'a, and not in ascribing those qualities to the former. In other words, îs'a is included in the *Ânandamaya*, and hence omnipotence, &c., which really belong to the former are ascribed to the latter. In point of fact the *Ânandamaya is the Individual Soul and not the Universal one.* S'ankara, too, interprets the Kârikâs of Gaṇḍapâda, which form an expla-

†The mind which assumes the finest state in sound sleep and which then contains in a bud-like form all the impressions of actions, is designated here as the impression of mind (धीवासना).

natory treatise of the Mâṇḍukya, in the above spirit.*

To gather to a head all that has been said above, the present view maintains that Jîva is the Reflected Intelligence in mind and that Is'a is the Reflected Intelligance in the totality of the subtlest states of individual minds residing in

*Why was Ânandamaya regarded as one with Îs'vara in Chitradîpa, and what is its true nature will be clear from the following analysis of the teaching of Mâṇḍûkya :—

Brahman has four aspects, the first three being based upon the three states, while the last upon no condition, but called fourth (तुरीय) in consonance with the former fictitious three states. The first three are each subdivided into two—(1) Adhyâtma or Individual, and (2) Adhidaiva or Universal.

Let us take the universal side of Brahman and examine its three states-(1) that which is connected with Mâyâ, the most subtle from of the universe, at the time of the universal destruction is called Îs'a; (2) that which is connected with the subtle bodies of all creatures that are produced from the unquintified (अपंचीकृत) elements is called Hiraṇyagarbha Sûtrâtmâ, &c.; (3) that which is associated with the gross bodies of all creatures produced from the quintified (पंचीकृत) elements is called Virâṭ or Purusha. The fourth state, which in reality is no state, is the state of pure Brahman. Similarly, in our microcosm, the intelligent principle connected with the state of sound sleep which contains individualized ignorance, the basis of transmigration, is called Prâjña ; that connected with the subtle body in the dream state is called Taijasa; that which is connected with the gross body in the waking state is called Vis'va. The fourth which is free from all worldly environments is called Turîya, Prâtyagâtmâ, Kûṭastha, &c. The Prâjña of the state of sound sleep is otherwise called Ânandamaya.

Corresponding to these four stages the mystic expression Om is supposed to have four syllables, each representing a corresponding position of Brahman both in the macrocosm and microcosm. The four sounds are अ, उ, म and the indescribable vibration which is the essence of the whole. Now the purport of the Mâṇḍûkya is that an aspirer for absolution should contemplate the identity of 'A' Vis'va, and Virâṭ, 'U' Taijasa and Hiraṇyagarbha ; 'M' Prâjña or Ânandamaya, and Îs'vara ; and the essential vibration of Om, Turîya, and Pure Brahman. All these measures are devised in order that the devotee might grasp the Highest Principle which transcends all mundane character. The universal aspects of Brahman, which possess divine powers, are, therefore, represented as one with the corresponding individual aspects of it. The Ânandamaya state of the Individual Soul is then looked upon as one with the Îs'vara state of the Universal Soul.

Mâyâ. Again in the opinion of, Vîdyâraṇya the Ânandamaya of the sound sleep is identical with Îs'a; but the same author in another place entertains a more correct view that the Ânandamaya is an aspect of the Individual Soul (सि. ले., pages 14-16).

(*f*) In Drigdrisyaviveka, however, triple* forms of Brahmana are admitted. The Kûṭastha of the Chitradîpa is included in Jîva, who is of three kinds:—(1) Real (पारमार्थिक) (2) practical or phenomenal (व्यावहारिक), and (3) apparent or unreal (प्रातिभासिक). The real Jîva is that who is limited by the two bodies and corresponds to the Kûṭastha of the Chitradîpa. He is absolutely one with Brahman, because the Limited Intelligence is the same as the Unlimited one. The limiting adjuncts are phenomenal, but the Limited Intelligence is real.

The practical Jîva is the ego who identifies himself with the mind, and who consists of the reflection of Intelligence in the mind which has phenomenal existence in Mâyâ, the condition of îs'a. His identity with Brahman is not absolute but relative, for it depends upon the annihilation (बाधा) of mind.

The apparent or unreal Jîva is that who is present in the dream state and is transplanted upon the practical Jîva of the waking state. He is unreal, because when the individual awakes he vanishes together with the objects seen by him in the dream state.

Îs'a is the same as is described in the foregoing view, *viz.*, that Intelligence which is reflected in Nescience tinctured with the subtle impressions of the minds of all creatures (सि. ले., page 17).

So far we have dealt with the opinions of those who regard not only Jîva, but Îs'a as reflection of Intelligence. But in the opinion of the author of Vivaraṇa, Îs'a is the original (बिंब) of whom Jîva is the reflection. The pure Brahman is that

*Jîva, îs'a, and pure Brahman.

which inheres in both. In other words Îśa devoid of his relative character as the original (बिंबता) is pure Brahman.

(*g*) The attitude of Vivaraṇâchârya towards this point is as follows :—

A *Smṛiti text* declares that the *identity* of Jîva and Brahman cannot be shaken when ignorance which keeps up the false difference is completely annihilated. This implies that only Nescience is the cause of difference. Now two reflections are not possible without two reflectors. Consequently, Jîva and Îśa are not both reflections of a third thing, *viz.*, pure Brahman, but are related as reflection and original. In other words, *Îśa is the original of whom Jîva is the reflection fallen in Nescience.*

The freedom of Îśa and the necessity or bondage of Jîva can be fairly maintained on this theory. In the ordinary world we see that the original is free, whereas the reflection is dependent upon the reflector or mirror for its purity, &c. Just as a man seeing a variety of reflections of his own face in different mirrors diverts himself with them, so does Brahman, as it were, with the change and vicissitudes to which Individual Souls are subjected. The *aphorism which proves the power or freedom of God to create this diverse world repeats the same tale.

Nescience, which is one, and which is the condition of Jîva is evolved into mind in which Jîva is distinctly manifested. The light of the sun, though all-prevading is distinctly manifested in a mirror, so Jîva, who is all-pervading in consequence of Nescience, his condition, being present everywhere, is made manifest in mind. Thus, those passages which say that mind is the condition of Jîva are not altogether meaningless. As a matter of fact, the real condition is Nescience, for if mind were the condition of Jîva the conditioned soul being as large as mind, cannot rule over a

* लोकवत्तुलीलाकैवल्यम् (B. S. II. i. 33.)

variety of bodies when he becomes a perfect Yogin *i. e.*, an ascetic with occult powers. It is futile to say that the mind of the Yogin undergoes expansion through the virtue of his devotion, and that the conditioned soul is, therefore, able to exercise control over a number of bodies. Because the Bhâshya on the aphorism IV. iv., 15 distinctly lays down that when a Yogin exercises control over a number of bodies created by his unerring desire, each body is endowed with a separate mind. That is, the rule that a Yogin rules over a number of bodies with his single mind grown expansive is unfavourable to the teaching of S'ankara.

Again, in a reflection the difference only from the original is superimposed. Reflection *per se* is real, it being essentially one with the original. It is needless, therefore, to assume the existence of a real Jîva in the form of Mind-Limited Intelligence or of Kûṭastha, the substratum to the so-called Jîva, apart from Jîva as described here, with a view that he might be connected with absolution. The same Jiva (*i.e.*, the Reflected Intelligence) who was in a migrating condition enjoys absolution when the false distinction from the original Intelligence is extirpated. The Vedic text quoted in one of the preceding views in support of the existence of a principle like Kûṭastha has its import not in establishing the existence of a distinct principle from Jîva, but in asserting the fact that although the reflected nature of Jîva vanishes, his essential nature remains intact.

As to the nature of Îśa, the followers of *V*ivaraṇa are of opinion that the Intelligence *limited* by mind, &c., the conditions of Jîva, stands as the original of the Intelligence *reflected* therein. The former Intelligence is Îśa the latter is Jîva.

The Antaryâmi-Brâhmaṇa (B. U. VI. 7), which describe that God is present even in Jîva and all created objects, means to say that the Intelligence limited by Nescience and its products is the original of all the Reflected Intelligences (*i.e.*, Jîvas), and is therefore the ruler of all (सि. ते., pages 17–18).

(*h*) All the foregoing views make Jîva a kind of Reflected Intelligence. Now there are some who maintain that Jîva is not a *Reflected* but a *Limited* Intelligence, on the following grounds :—

(1) In the first place a thing devoid of form cannot cast reflection, much less can it cast reflection in an equally formless reflector. Both Intelligence and Nescience are substances devoid of form. Consequently reflection cannot originate from the former, nor can it be retained by the latter. The instances advanced by the opposite party to corroborate their views are altogether groundless. The reflection of the sky, the stock-example of the opponent, is a mere non-entity. It is not the sky that is reflected in the expanse of water, but the reflection is of the cluster of rays which pervade the canopy of heaven and give rise to the false notion of the reflection of the sky. The solar rays being possessed of colour are fit objects of reflection. The expanse of the sky, which is connected with the rays of the sun in a complicated manner, is falsely supposed to be reflected. In like manner the reflection or radiation of sounds (वर्ण) in the uniform vibration of a sounding body (ध्वनि), another example of the opponent, is an impossibility. The theory of Reflection being thus unable to hold water, *we conclude that Jîva is that Intelligence which is limited by mind, and that Îśa is the Unlimited Intelligence.*

(2) An objection was pointed out by the opponent to the present theory that the Intelligence which falls in the cosmos has numerous limitations, and hence Îśa, the Unlimited Intelligence, has no existence inside the universe—a conclusion contradictory to the teaching of the Antaryâmi-Brâhmaṇa, which lays down that the ruler is immanent and controls all things. This objection cannot be alleged against the present view, as the opponent's theory, too, is not free from it. Granting that Jîva is a kind of Reflection, the source of that Reflection must be supposed to exist outside the reflector. The real face, as for instance, is outside the

mirror which contains the reflection. Thus Îśa, the original of whom Jîvas are so many reflections, may be beyond the cosmos, the sum-total of created objects. The opposition with the Antaryâmi-Brâhmaṇa remains with full force in the adversary's position also.

(3) Tha faults that were alleged against the Doctrine of Limitation (*viz.*, th destruction of what is done and the advent of what is not done) are also applicable to the Doctrine of Reflection- The reflection which one mind contains must be due to the Intelligence which is adjacent to that mind. The reflections in the same mind should, therefore, vary at various places, the Intelligence which casts reflection being different. The unity of the migrating soul is, therefore, broken and the pleasures and pains which are experienced by us in our present life are either results without any cause or results of actions done by another soul (अकृताभ्यागम). In the same way, what we do in the present life will pass unrewarded, as the ego of this life will not continue in the next life (कृतनाश).

Even making Nescience, instead of mind, the reflector of Jîva, the opponent's theory is not freed from the said faults. Because the object of admitting Nescience as the reflecting condition is that the unity of the ego or migrating soul may not be broken, as its condition (*viz* Nescience) would then be all-pervading. The advocate of the doctrine of reflection might say that the mind which is capable of going from one place to another is like a circle of light on the surface of a pond wherein the vault of the sky is distinctly manifested. It floats in the lake-like Nescience and is a place for clear manifestation of Intelligence, which is duly reflected throughout the whole region of Nescience. The latter, unlike mind, remains motionless, and hence permanently retains the reflection of Intelligence.

To this it may be replied that all the above arguments of the opponent put forth in order to secure the unity of the ego will meet with similar arguments advanced by the

advocate of the Doctrine of Limitation. For in the opposite theory if the said faults are at all to be avoided, the oneness of Jîva throughout the universe ought to be admitted, otherwise in one part of Nescience one soul would be doing an action, the fruit of which will be reaped by another soul. Then what harm is there if the Doctrine of Limitation were admitted, where also a similar assumption might be made that the unity of the soul depends upon the oneness of Intelligence which none can deny, and of mind, its so-called limiting condition ? To put it in other words, just as in the Doctrine of the Reflection of Intelligence in Nescience or in mind the unity of the soul can be maintained only on the ground of immanence of uniform Intelligence, and not otherwise, so in the Doctrine of Limitation the unity of the ego can be upheld on the ground of the unity of Intelligence—the limited—and of mind, the limiting adjunct.

(4) Finally the Doctrine of Limitation is in keeping with the spirit of the Brahma-Sûtras, The three important Sûtras which describe the nature of Jîva are III. ii. 18, 19, and 20. In the first aphorism Îśa and Jîva are compared to the sun and its reflection. In the second the impossibility of the reflection of Intelligence is pointed out. The sun and water, in the instance, are both possessed of form and colour and are situated afar; whereas all-pervading Intelligence has no such distant object which can stand as its reflector. Nescience and mind which are ordinarily put forth as reflectors of Intelligence are by their very nature unfit to do that work, for both are formless and do not exist apart from Intelligence. Intelligence, therefore, can not cast its reflection either in Nescience or mind. In the third aphorism it is stated that the comparison with the sun and its reflection is not to be literally interpreted. All that is desired to be conveyed through the similarity is that just as the increase and decrease of the solar reflection follow like changes in the water and that the original sun remains untarnished, so pleasure, &c., of the soul are not his own, but are fictitiously superimposed upon him by

mind which is his limiting condition. Thus the purport of the last aphorism lies in the Doctrine of Limitation rather than in that of Reflection.

To conclude, then, the impossibility of the reflection of Intelligence, absence of contradictory arguments in the present theory, and the partial* admission of the Limited Intelligence even by the opponent, make the Doctrine of Limitation more favourable to some thinkers (सि. ले, pages 19-20).

(*i*) The last view is that Jîva is neither Reflected nor Limited Intelligence, but the unchanging Brahman itself goes by the name of Jîva when associated by the ignorance of itself. When Brahman realises its true nature through knowledge, it becomes the liberated soul. This view is illustrated by the fable of a prince. A prince when he was a mere baby, was carried away by a cowherd and was brought up in rural associations. All his action were, therefore, in conformity with his poor situation. After a lapse of time he was made acquainted with his royal descent. The moment he realised his high birth, he left off all his humble actions, went to his father and gained the reins of his kingdom. In the same way, Jîva who is the same as Brahman is made to recognize his native freedom by a compassionate and profound teacher. The world, then, no longer affects him with its usual concomitants, delights and sorrows.

Section V.

Is Jîva one or many?

In the last preceding section the common nature of Jîva or Îśa was discussed. The remaining sections of this chapter are devoted to the determination of the special features. Îśa has only one condition, and is consequently one. But with respect to Jîva it is asked, Is he one or many?

**Vide* the last para. of the preceding view where God is described as Intelligence limited by Nescience and its products.

(*a*). In reply to the above question some thinkers say that Jîva is one. Consequently only one body is possessed of sentient life. The rest are non-sentient like the bodies in a dream. That single Jîva, by whose vivifying influence one body is sentient, is the speculator of this phenomenal world through his Nescience (*vide* Section II, *g*.). The presence and annihilation of his Nescience are the causes of his bondage and freedom. In reality there are no other Jîvas suffering from bondage and enjoying freedom. The absolution of men like Śuka is like absolution of a person in a dream. All possible objections against this extraordinary theory find their solution in Mâyâ, which is capable of presenting inconceivable and contradictory phenomena (सि. ले., page 20).

(*b*) The above speculators regarded no other Jîva or Îśa than that single Jîva who is the speculator of this world. This view did not find favour with others, who maintained that there is a free and omniscient Being over and above that single Jîva known as Hiraṇyagarbha. The remaining sentient creatures are mere reflections of the real Jîva, *viz*., Hiraṇyagarbha, and as such are mere semblances of soul.

The points of difference between this and the preceding views are that the former made no room for God, while the latter did so ; the former admitted one Jîva with only one living body, whereas the latter, though it admitted unity of Jîva allowed the existence of a variety of living bodies which are as it were reflections of the single real Jîva* (सि. ले., pages 20, 21).

(*c*) In the above view one principal Jîva called Hiraṇyagarbha has been admitted. But at the same time it has been conceded that there are many minor reflected Jîvas who keep ordinary bodies alive and suffer from metempsychosis. The

*This theory is known as सविशेषानेकशरीरैकजीववाद.

objection to that theory is that as each world-period has its own Hiraṇyagarbha, it is difficult to settle which Hiraṇyagarbha is principal. Other thinkers, therefore, maintain that there is only one Jîva who vivifies many bodies simultaneously and that the distinction of principal and minor Jîvas is null and void. In this theory* the non-comprehension of each other's mental condition is due to the difference of bodies and not of soul. In the case of a Yogin, however, ruling over a number of bodies the direct perception of plearure and pain relating to those bodies is due to the mystic power derived from occult practices. His case therefore stands on a different footing and cannot vitiate the general argument that difference of bodies leads to the non-comprehension of each other's mental condition (सि. ले., page 21).

(*d*) No satisfactory explanation of individual bondage and freedom can be furnished by the foregoing three theories, which agree with one another on one point, *viz.*, unity of Jîva. A class of thinkers, therefore, hold a different view of the plurality of Jîva, based upon the multiplicity of mind, which is the limiting condition. Each mind with its own Intelligence (either reflected or limited) consistutes a distinct Jîva who migrates till the rise of knowledge. Other Jîvas continue in their ignorant states even after the liberation of a particular Jîva, for each is a different entity.

This theory follows by way of implication from the Bhâshya passage which gives Śuka as an instance of a liberated soul. Had there been one Jîva, there should have been no mundane existance since the liberation of a particular being *e g.* Suka. But the mundane existence with its concomitant evils is still asserting itself. It follows, therefore, that there are a number of Jîvas in a migratory condition for whom the teaching of Vedânta is useful (सि. ले., page 21).

---

* अविशेषानेकशरीरैकजीववाद.

Section VI.

Nature of Brahman's Creatorship.

After enunciating the desire of knowing Brahman, a definition of the knowable Brahman was proposed. The definition included the two aspects of Brahman: (1) its material causality and (2) instrumental causality. Subsidiary to this the nature of Mâyâ, Jîva and Îśa was discussed. Now let us again cast a glance to the original definition, where Brahman is called the creator of the universe. It is asked—What is the nature of his creatorship ?

(*a*) Some answer that it consists in the knowledge of the effects to be produced, the desire of producing them and action conformable to the effects.* This view is deduced from a Vedic text which says that Brahman reflected, desired and produced out of himself the whole world. This view of creatorship squares with that of Nyâya philosophy (सि. ले , page 22).

(*b*) In the preceding view, knowledge, desire and action constituted creatorship. It may be objected that desire and action are themselves mental products, and consequently in their production a new trio would be required. Again, the same elements of that second trio would require a third trio, and so on to infinity—a confusion *ad infinitum.* In order to avoid this perplexity, creatorship may be defined as the possession of knowledge suitable to the production of effects.† The objection alleged against desire and action cannot apply to knowledge, as it is not a product, but the essence of Brahman (सि. ले., page 23).

(*c*) Others define creatorship as the possession of knowledge in the form of reflection over objects to be created, which is

---

**i. e.*, in Sanskrit कार्यानुकूलज्ञानचिकीर्षाकृतिमत्त्वम्.

† कार्यानुकूलज्ञानवत्त्वम् ॥

requisite for their production.* The possession of knowledge merely conformable to the effects is not sufficient, for Jiva who possesses the knowledge of the substratum of a fictitious phenomenon, which (knowledge) is in keeping with that phenomenon, would be regarded as the author of it, although really he is not so. It is, therefore, necessary to modify the definition of creatorship as above, *i e.*, the creator should not have mere knowledge directly or indirectly connected with the effect, but should have the knowledge that a particular effect is to be created by him in a particular fashion (कर्तव्यालोचनरुपम् ज्ञानम्) (सि. ले., page 23).

The authorship of this extraordinary and illimitable world necessarily implies omniscience in the author. This leads us to the following section, the doctrine inculcated wherein is established in Brahma Sûtras I. i. 3.

Section VII.

Nature of Brahman's Omniscience.

The omniscience of Brahman, which is a necessary sequence of his being the creator of this wonderful world, is questioned on the ground that Brahman has no mind which is a means of attaining knowledge.

(*a*) Bhâratîtîrtha's explanation of the difficulty has been already given in Section IV (*e*). In his opinion the omniscience of God is possible, because he is conditioned by Mâyâ wherein float a number of subtle impressions of the minds of all creatures which have the universe of things for their object. He is, therefore, the witnessing soul or illuminator of *all* the subtle impressions of individual minds and is thus omniscient (सि. ले., page 23).

(*b*) The author of Prakaṭârtha maintains that just as Jîva has the modifications of his mind illumined by the

* कार्यानुकूलकर्तव्यालोचनरुपज्ञानवत्वम् ॥

underlying Intelligence capable of furnishing him with the knowledge of external things, so Brahman has the modifications of Mâyâ, which forms his condition, capable of producing a thorough knowledge of the whole phenomenal world when they are coupled with the reflections of the Light of Intelligence. As Mâyâ is co-extensive with the phenomenal world, and exists at all times, the past, present and future are *directly* revealed to God (सि. ले., page 23).

(*c*) The author of Tattvaśudhi, however, holds that knowledge of the phenomenal world of the past and future is not *direct*. For it is a rule that objects of the present time only are directly perceived by us; those of the past and future are known through memory and inference, both of which are indirect modes of knowledge. In other words, perception is restricted to the present time; it can never embrace infinity. There is no reason why this rule should be overlooked in the case of God, when His omniscience is not in the least disturbed by the directness or indirectness of knowledge.

The whole of the present world is *directly* cognized by God. This cognition leaves impressions in Mâyâ which is the condition of God. These impressions bring about the memory of the world when it becomes an object of the past. This process is repeated and Mâyâ becomes the storehouse of infinite impressions of past experience which produce the *indirect* knowledge of the past. Similarly the anticipation or inference of the future world (*i. e.*, the world to be produced after universal destruction) may arise on account of the modifications of Mâyâ, which are exact prototypes of the objects to be created, which owe their birth to the merit and demerit of Individual Souls, and which manifest themselves prior to the actual creation of the world (सि. ले., page 23).

(*d*) In the foregoing three views the omniscience of God was established through the admission of a medium (*viz.*, the modifications of Mâyâ or the totality of the finest

states of Individual mind). The admission of a medium in the case of God was based upon the assumption of a like medium in the case of Jîva.

The author of Kaumudî holds that God is omniscient, not in the sense of his being the author of all knowledge, but in the sense of his being the illuminator of all objects by means of his all-pervading Thought, which is his very essence. He does not require a means for knowing (*e. g.*, mind in Jîva) which throws light upon the objects to be known, but encompasses all objects by his essential Thought (स्वरुपज्ञान). The world of the past and future is not totally non-existent, but exists in a subtle form, like an erased and undeveloped picture on a board. It can, therefore, become the object of eternal and omnipresent Thought.

The assumption of the modifications of Mâyâ is opposed to the spirit of Vedic texts like the following :

" The whole of the world shines after him (मुण्डक II. ii. 10); there was that single and secondless Brahman only (छा. VI. ii. 1)."

These texts imply that the modifications of Mâyâ were non-existent before the creation, and that the world shines after Essential* Thought, and not after those modifications. Again, granting that God is omniscient through the modifications of Mâyâ, they ought to be regarded as permanently existing and not as objects to be created at the time of the creation—an unsatisfactory conclusion. It is meet, therefore, to admit that God is omniscient inasmuch as He is All-Thought which throws light upon the world. He is not a knower in the ordinary sense of the term, but he is all-knowledge itself. The Vedic text, which declares that God is the knower of all things, is another way of expressing that He is pure Thought embracing totality of things. In support of this theory, the advocate of it refers us to the

* स्वरुपज्ञान as opposed to वृत्तिज्ञान.

section of Brahma-Sûtras commencing from I. iv. 19, where Śankara advances the fact* of being a knower as a distinguishing mark of the Individual Soul (सि. ले., page 24).

(*e*) Vâchaspatimiśra agrees with the above view, but makes the following remarks :

If the Vedic text, which declares God as the knower of all things, is to be literally interpreted, the above theory does not present a contradiction. Both the theory and the literal sense of the text can be thus harmonized:

The Essential Thought is not a product of Brahman, like the modification of Mâyâ, but assumes the shape of an effect, when it is limited, so to say, by an object to be known. Brahman, with respect to that limited Essential Thought, may be regarded as the author of knowledge (विज्ञातृ). The Vedic text is quite right, because Brahman is the knower of all, *i. e.*, the author of all knowledge (सि. ले., page 24).

SECTION VIII.

The nature of the Witnessing Soul (साक्षी).

In Section IV we have frequently referred to that aspect of the Individual Soul or Jîva, which is absolutely one with Brahman, and which differs from the migrating ego —the doer and enjoyer—inasmuch as he is a passive looker-on of the conditions of that ego. That Witnessing Soul or 'consciousness,' as Professor Huxley represents it, 'is the inactive spectator of the world with which it has nothing to do and in which it falsely imagines itself to have the power to do anything.' We shall describe in this section various opinions as regards the Witnessing Soul.

(*a*) In the Kûṭasthadîpa, the unchanging Intelligence, which is the substratum of the phenomena of gross and subtle bodies, is designated as Sâkshin, because ‡ he ob-

---

* विज्ञातृत्व.

‡ साक्षादीक्षणान्निर्विकारत्वाच्च ॥

serves them and yet remains untouched by their effects. In the ordinary world, also, a witness is a person who knows the actions of others and yet remains indifferent.

The admission of this Witnessing Soul is not groundless, for when the action of the mind of the enjoying ego has ceased, the illumination of the two bodies must be due to some other Intelligence than that of the ego. The two bodies which are uniformly illumined (*i.e.*, imparted a kind of existence) all the while by the unchanging Intelligence which pervades everywhere, are made more intelligent by the modifications of mind which contain the reflection of the Intelligent ego.

Thus the Witnessing Soul throws light upon the two bodies even when they are not brightened by the modifications of the ego. This permanent cause of illumination is technically known as Sâkshin. It is the permanent contact of the light of this Sâkhin which makes egoism, &c, an unmistakable reality. Again, it is the constant presence of the Sâkshin which keeps up the identity of the seer in a series of mental ideas with respect to something other than the ego. As for instance, when a person contemplates the form of Vishṇu, the contemplating soul (*i.e.*, the ego or practical Jîva) is fully engrossed in the meditation unaware of his individuality. It is then a natural question —What principle was waking at the time of meditation which afterwards produces remembrance in the ego that he was engaged in contemplation ? The plain answer is that it was the noumenal Self known as Sâkshin.

It may be objected here that the illumination of the ideas of Vishṇu and of their fabricator, the contemplating soul, by Sâkshin, cannot account for the remembrance of the meditation by Jîva.* At the most it can justify remembrance in Sâkshin who formerly observed that occurrence.

* The word in this and the subsequent paragraphs means the practical ego who is the doer and enjoyer.

This objection may be answered on the ground that there is mutual* false attribution of identity. The Kûṭastha which is inexplicably mingled with Jîva, although different from him, is the inner soul, as it were, of Jîva. Consequently the experience by Kûṭastha may lead to the remembrance by Jîva who is thought to be one with the former.

The admission of mere Jîva cannot account for the passive state of a spectator in an individual. Jîva who is the doer and enjoyer cannot be at the same time the passive looker-on of his conditions. S'ruti texts emphatically describe Sâkshin as an unchanging spectator, and differentiate him from Jîva by declaring the former as a seer of the actions of the latter.§

In the Nâṭakadîpa, too, the same Sâkshin is described by the instance of a lamp standing on a stage. The lamp on the stage brightens equally the manager, the dancing girl, and the audience, and shines of itself even in their absence. In like manner, Sâkshin equally illumines Jîva, mind and objects, and in their absence in sound sleep shines of its own accord. Jîva corresponds to the manager of the stage, as he partakes in joy and sorrow, consequent upon the fulfilment and frustration of desires; the mind is the dancing girl, for it exhibits a variety of forms; and the objects resemble the audience, for, though they are near the manager-like Jîva, they do not partake in the joy and sorrow of the Jîva, just as the audience care little if the manager succeeds or fails in his representation.

This Sâkshin is the unchanging Intelligence which stands as substratum of the phenomenon of Jîva, who consists of egoism accompanied with the reflection of Thought. He, then, differs from Jîva inasmuch as he is not the doer and enjoyer, and also from Îśa inasmuch as he is a mere passive spectator and not the active creator of the world (सि. ले., pages 31-32).

---

* परस्पराध्यास. § साक्षीचेताकेवलोनिर्गुणश्च, &c. (श्वे० श्व०).

(*b*) In the Tattvapradîpikâ, Sâkshin is defined to be that pure Brahman which is the innermost Self of all creatures, and which, being the substratum of each individual soul, seems to be as many as there are Jîvas. God or Qualified Brahman cannot be Sâkshin as the epithets 'absolute' (केवलः) and 'devoid of qualities' (निर्गुणः) in the S'ruti text referred to above are inapplicable to him. Nor can Jîva as such be Sâkshin, because he is the doer and enjoyer of action and their fruits (सि. ले., page 32).

(*c*) In the Kaumudî, however, Sâkshin is described as a particular form of God, for a holy text of श्वेताश्वतर says that God is the sole divinity, concealed in all creatures and all pervading; he is the Self of all, the supervisor of actions, the abode of all objects, the witnessing Intelligence, pure and devoid of qualities. Thus we find from that text that 'Witness and Lord' are included in the epithets of God. That form of God, then which observes the activity and passivity of Jîvas and yet remains indifferent is called Sâkshin. He being unaccompanied by the creative and such other powers is directly perceptible to Jîva, and, being illuminator or imparter of existence to Individual Ignorance and its products residing in Jîva, is the inner Self of the ego. It is this Sâkshin who is described under the name of Pràjña in the Brahma-Sûtras I. iii. 42.

The author of Tattava-S'udhi, also agrees with the above view, and makes the following remarks :

Just as in the error 'this* is a piece of silver' the idea denoted by 'this,' although it actually refers to the shell wherein silver falsely appears has apparent application to silver, so in all the mental conceptions of the individual soul the invariable factor 'I' which really refers to the subject Sâkshin, who is one with Brahman, has an apparent and indirect reference to the ego or Jîva (सि. ले., page 33).

* 'This' refers to the mother-o'-pearl.

(*d*) So far we have dealt with those views which regard Sâkshin and Jîva as distinct principles. Now, there are two views which regard them as one and yet distinguishable.

Some maintain that Jîva himself, conditioned by Nescience, is Sâkshin, for he is essentially a looker-on, and not a doer.

It is only when Jîva falsely indentifies himself with mind, which is his subsequent developed condition, that he becomes the doer and enjoyer. Thus, Jîva has two aspects—one real, the other unreal, *viz.* (1) that of Sâkshin or passive spectator, and (2) that of Abhimânin or active doer and enjoyer.

The text referred to in the preceding view describes Brahman as Sâkshin, not in its native character, but in its identical character with Jîva. It is, therefore, in keeping with the present view.

(*e*) Others are of opinion that Jîva himself is, no doubt, Sâkshin, but not with Nescience as his condition. Because the soul conditioned by Nescience being all-pervading can illumine not only one's own mind, but those of other creatures also. This may lead to the direct cognition of the mental operations of other creatures also—a conclusion directly opposed to experience.

The upholders of this view, then, declare that Jîva with mind as his condition is Sâkshin. Such a Sâkshin being different in different creatures, the above difficulty does not occur. In sound sleep also, mind in a subtle form is admitted as existing. Consequently Sâkshin is present in all the three states.

It may be asked, what is, then, the distinction between the ego (प्रमाता) and Witnessing Soul (साक्षी)? Both of them are, according to this view, mind-conditioned Intelligence. In reply to this it may be said that property (विशेषण) and condition (उपाधि) are distinct things. The former is an *invariable* and distinguishing attribute, as blueness in a lotus. The latter is a *separable* and distinguishing attribute.

as a jujube flower standing in the vicinity of a marble, which owing to its presence seems to be red. Thus that aspect of Jiva which has mind as property is the ego, while that which has mind as condition is the Witnessing Soul (सि. ले., page 34).

We have now arrived at the close of our first inquiry. Just as all the Upanishad texts point to the same Intelligent Principle called Brahman, like needle to the north, so all the above differences of opinion, as regard the categories of Vedânta, fundamentally lead to the same goal, inasmuch as they are various modes of establishing the absolute nature of Self.

To recapitulate from the empirical standpoint, Brahman is the cause of this world (Sections I & II). In that capacity it is Omniscient and Omnipotent (Sections VI & VII). The absolute presents itself in three different aspects: (1) God, (2) Jîva, and (3) the world.

They have practical reality and can be distinguished from one another (Section IV). What leads to the differentiation of the Absolute is Mâyâ or Nescience of Western Philosophy (Section III). Jîva labours under apparent imperfection. The only means to reveal his perfection is the knowledge of the Absolute (Section V). There is, however, a free aspect of Jîva (called साक्षिन्) closely resembling the Absolute, which illumines all mental states. Herein lies his true glory (Section VIII).

From the Transcendental or Metaphysical standpoint, the world does not exist. Brahman is all in all. He has neither form nor instruments. He is not seen equal to, or greater than, anything. His transcendent power is heard of as unimaginably multifarious; omniscience and omnipotence constitute his very nature (श्वे. श्व., VI. 8.)

We now descend from this lofty summit to the basis—the world of our delights and sorrows—and undertake to show how the truth established in this Chapter joins hands with the realm of physics to which perception, with its long stored experience, has given undeniable reality.

CHAPTER II.

Harmony of Physics and Metaphysics.

And like the baseless fabric of this vision,
The cloudcapped towers, the gorgeous palaces,
The solemn temples, the great globe itself,
Yea, all which it inherits shall dissolve,
And like this insubstantial pageant faded,
Leave not a rack behind. We are such stuff
As dreams are made on, and our little life
Is rounded with a sleep.—Shakespeare.

The thing visible, nay the thing imagined, the thing in any way conceived as visible. What is it but a garment, a clothing of an higher, celestial, invisible, unimaginable, formless, dark with excess of bright.—Carlyle.

SECTION I.

The doctrine that the phenomenal world is Illusory, is not opposed to Perception.

In the last Chapter we said that the world is the outgrowth of Mâyâ-the world-evolving Fiction. It, therefore, takes the reality of Brahman, the Absolute. A query is started: How can the world be called illusory on the strength of the Veda and inference, when perception is diametrically opposed to that theory ?

(*a*) Tattvaśuddhikâra answers the question thus:—

Perception neither enables a person to cognise external things, like a jar, nor their existence, but it helps him to comprehend absolute *Being*, which inheres in those things and stands as the noumenon of the whole world. Hence perception, instead of being opposed, strengthens the theory of secondless Brahman, the pure Being.

It is a futile objection to say that, according to the above view, perception of things should take the form of Being and

not of their existence, *i.e.*, the form of the proposition which conveys the comprehension of external objects should be 'Being, Being,' and not 'a jar is, a box is.' Because just as in an ordinary case of delusion 'this is silver,' that part of the proposition which embraces 'this,' the substratum, is correct, whereas that which refers to 'silver' is false. So Being, which forms the basis in all perception, is real, while jar, &c., which appear, are illusory or phenomenal. In other words, pure Being becomes the object of perception *per se*, the external objects simply appearing as a phantom.

One might argue that in the instance advanced the false knowledge is after a time put down, but in the present case dualism persists all the while. To this it may be replied that the *impossibility* of *being perceived* is the reason why the appearance of jar, &c., is to be regarded as false. The impossibility of their perception can be thus established.

After the operation of the sense of sight, a jar appears as distinct from all other things, for neither doubt nor perverse knowledge occurs to the mind at the time of its cognition. In asserting that an object is, we do not assert that it is essentially related to other objects or to the Intelligence; on the contrary, in our first way of looking at things, each object seems to be isolated from all the rest, as well as from the mind that knows it. Even in cases of error (*e. g.*, a pillar mistaken for a man) distinction (भेद) of the falsely cognized thing (*i. e.*, man) is perceived quite free from doubt and mistake, *i. e.*, as long as the error lasts, the deluded person is perfectly sure that the thing he perceives is a man, an object different (भिन्न) from the rest of the world. *Now the distinction of a thing on account of its very nature can be directly cognized only when the objects to be differentiated (प्रतियोगिन्s) are comprehended

*When a jar appears as existent, it seems as it were totaly distinct from the rest of the world. The distinction has got the jar for its *Anuyogin* and the rest of the world for its *Pratiyogins*, the opposites.

at the same time. In other words, a thing cannot be said to have been cognized as different from others unless the latter simultaneously present themselves to the mind. The objects to be differentiated (प्रतियोगिन् s) from the object of perception (अनुयोगिन्) are incapable of being cognized simultaneously with the object of perception (*e. g.* घट), for time and space act as barriers. To put it more clear, the perception of a jar, which means the perception of its difference from the rest of the world, is possible only when the whole of the world *minus* the jar on the one hand, and the jar on the other, are directly present before the mind. Unless the whole range of things is present, the jar cannot be said to be existent, *i. e.*, a distinct entity. Such a knowledge of प्रतियोगिन् s is a physical impossibility. It follows, therefore, that the perception of the difference of the jar from the rest of the world is not a real cognition, but a false idea. The *direct* knowledge of distinction * with its both sides (*viz.*, jar and the rest of the world)being impossible, let us enquire whether its *indirect* knowledge in the form of memory is possible. Here also we find similar difficulties. Memory follows perception. Human knowledge is limited, and there are numerous things which have never come within the sphere of our experience. Mount Everest, as for instance, is not seen by me. There is, therefore, no impression left on the mind. Its memory is, therefore not possible. It being so, the difference of the jar from that mount cannot be the object of my memory.

To sum up, then, the distinction of the jar from other things (प्रतियोगिन् s) necessarily requires the direct knowledge of those things: those things are impossible to be perceived as shown above. The knowledge of the distinction is, therefore, not possible. Now it being so, things like jar, &c., connot be, truly speaking, perceived, for they are

* This is called a complex knowledge or विशिष्टविज्ञान.

totally dependent upon the knowledge of distinction. The isolated appearance of a jar, &c., is, then, a mere delusion. The right perception grasps only the all-pervading Being which knows no distinction. Perception is thus in no way at variance with the doctrine of Vedânta that the world is illusory (सि. ले., page 50).

(*b*) The author of Nyâyasudhâ solves the problem thus:—

Granting that jar, &c., are really perceived, perception is not opposed to the doctrine of distinctionless Brahman, because perception of jar, &c., does not comprehend their *independent existence*, but that which they owe to the substratum Brahman. It may be objected that according to this line of argument, the blackness of a jar would be ascribed to the substratum--*a reductio ad absurdum*. The objection may, however, be explained away on the ground that Brahman, Pure Being, is admitted on the strength of the Veda to be the material cause of the world, and hence the inference of Being in jar, &c., is quite plausible. The assumption of existence in jar, &c., apart from the Being of Brahman sacrifices brevity or uniqueness of reasoning and is gratuitous. The case is different as regards blackness, &c., for they cannot be ascribed to Brahman like Being. They should, therefore, be regarded as the essential properties of jar, &c., and not of Brahman (सि. ले., page 50).

(*c*) The attitude of the author of Sankshepaśârîraka with respect to the problem is as follows:—

Although we admit that perception comprehends the independent existence of external things, the theory of Vedânta is not in the least contradicted. Because perception does not satisfy the conditions of a means of right knowledge. The conditions are:—(1) the object of the proof should have been hidden by ignorance (अनधिगत), and (2) should be incapable of being sublated by other means of knowledge in future (अबाध्य). Now although objects of perception

fulfil the second condition, their antecedent concealment by ignorance is wanting. Jar, &c., are in themselves non-intelligent (जड) and consequently do not require ignorance for their covering. In other words, they are not only antecedently, but at all times enveloped by ignorance. Perception is, then, not a reliable proof, as it does not reveal what has been antecedently concealed. The Veda, however, is a valid proof, for Brahman, which is its object, is no doubt antecedently unrevealed (अनधिगत).

Vedic texts like "Self is to be seen" restrict that the proper object of inquiry (प्रमेय) is Brahman, and not the world, the latter being not *antecedently* unrevealed. Thus perception being not the means of absolute truth, it cannot conflict with the truth deduced from the Veda (सि. ले., page 50).

(*d*) Some are of opinion that even placing perception on the same level as scripture, there is no scope of contradiction. Perception, which is now admitted to have as much validity as scripture, can comprehend the existence of external things in one of the following forms:—(1) Genus or common characteristic running through all the individuals of a class; (2) Connection of different time and space with the object cognised, *e. g.*, now there is a jar on this spot; and (3) Essential nature of the object, *e. g*, here there is no jar. Here the existence that is denied is in the form of the essential nature of the thing. To make the point more clear, when I say that I perceived a jar, what I mean is that some essence (स्वरूप) extended in space and localated in time (देशकालसंबन्ध) appears to the senses and resembles other appearances which partake of a common nature (सामान्य). The existence of an outward thing that is comprehended has no other form than these threefold, or rather fourfold, sensations. Now, none of these forms of existence is opposed to the phenomenal character (मिथ्यात्व) of the world. For the upholders of the doctrine of unreality (मायावाद or मिथ्यात्ववाद) do not object to the genus,

connection with time and space, and essential nature of external things. What they do not admit is their unfitness of being sublated by higher knowledge (*i e.*, अबाध्यत्व). In other words, their *absolute* reality is the point of their denial and not their *relative* reality where there is sufficient room for the three forms of existence of outward things.

It is a vain argument to say that this unfitness of being sublated by higher knowledge, the point of contention, is the object of perception, *i. e.*, we do cognise by the help of perception that outward things are incapable of being put down at all times. Because perception which is invariably limited to the *present time* cannot ensure the unfitness of sublation of outward things *at all times.* Thus perception refers to the three * forms of existence of outward things; while scripture has to do with their unreality. The spheres of the two proofs being thus distinct, there is no longer any opposition सि. ले., page 51).

(*e*) Others solve the opposition between perception and scripture in the following manner:—

Both perception and scripture comprehend the unfitness of sublation (*i,e*, अबाध्यत्व) of their respective objects. But the distinction lies in the nature of that unfitness. Perception guarantees that outward things are real-unfit for sublation-so long as the knowledge of Brahman is not produced. Scripture on the other hand guarantees the reality (unfitness of sublation) for all times. In other words, perception embraces relative reality, while scripture refers to absolute reality of the respective abjects. The advocates of this view support their position by a quotation† from the Veda, where the whole world

---

**viz.*, (1) Genus, (2) Temporal and Spatial connection, and (3) Essential nature.

† प्राणा वै सत्यं तेषामेष सत्यम् (बृ० उ० II. III. 6.) Prâṇas or senses are real, and this Self is the reality of them too, *i.e.*, senses are real inasmuch as they are products of the five elements, which are relatively true; Self has better reality than that of senses because the senses (*viz*; elements of the latter) derive their very existence from him.

typified by Prāṇas is admitted as real and inferior to the perfect reality of Brahman.

Thus perception whose sphere of operation is the world of *relative* reality cannot contradict Scripture whose province is the world of *absolute* reality (सि. ले., page 51).

(*f*) The last view is that although perception is opposed to Scripture, the latter can check the former. Because* Scripture is faultless and has better validity than perception, which is likely to be mingled with fault. Smṛiti also lays down a rule that out of the three means of right knowledge (*viz.*, perception, inference and Scripture), Scripture enjoys the highest authority.

This rule of Smṛiti should not be restricted to those cases which are exclusively the subject-matter of Scripture, for in such cases there is no scope for the interference of perception, and thus the rule that Scripture is superior to perception would be wide of mark. It is reasonable, therefore, to admit that in cases where there is likelihood of the opposition of perception, Scripture has governing power (सि. ले., pages 51–52).

Section II.

The Consistency of the Doctrine of Superiority of Scripture over Perception.

A question is started : If Śruti is a superior proof, how is it that in texts like the following–यजमान: प्रस्तर: (the sacrificer is a stone), सोमेन यजेत (one should worship with *soma*)–secondary senses are adopted in order to set aside the opposition of perception ? To illustrate the question, in the first text the identity of the sacrificer with the stone follows from the literal sense. But this does not accord with the ordinary perception. In order that this contradiction may be set aside, the Mīmāṅsakas resort to the secondary power of words. The meaning, then, of the text is as below: Just as

* निर्दोषत्वात्परत्वाच्च.

the sacrificial stone is useful in the sacrifice, so the sacrificer is an essential item of the ritual. Both possessing the same attribute (*viz.*, usefulness), they are put in apposition to each other.* In the same way in the second text the first word is taken in the sense of सोमवता (*sc.* यागेन), and the complete sense of the sentence is that one should worship the deity or secure one's good by the performance of *soma* sacrifice.

Now all these methods of interpretation would never have been adopted, had there been no paramount power in perception.

The above argument is thus met with by Vâchaspatimiśra in his Bhâmati :

(*a*) Mere Śruti is not superior to perception, but that which is possessed of a definite import (तात्पर्यवती) has a controlling power.

This rule will make it clear that texts which contain censure or praise (अर्थवाद) and which having no independent import only help the principal injunctions (विधिवाक्यs) are inferior to perception in point of reliableness. Just as the point of a speaker is not in detached words, but in sentences formed of them, so the point of the Veda does not lie in persuasive expressions, but in injunctions which are supported by them. The texts quoted in the preceding paragraph being devoid of definite import are made to yield a sense conformable with ordinary experience.

The substance of Vâchaspatimiśra's long argument in his Bhâmatî is (1) that the texts which are possessed of definite import are superior to perception in point of validity ; (2) that subordinate parts and persuasive expressions which are devoid of import can produce authoritative sense only when they otherwise weaken the validity of the main injunctions. To put it more clear, the Veda while enjoining the perfor-

*The usual instance of this secondary power of words (गौणी वृत्ति) is अग्निर्माणवकः Mâṇavaka is fire, *i.e.*, both possess like attributes.

mance of certain rights, sometimes inserts subsidiary passages or epithets relating to persons or things which cannot become the objects of perception. Now if these personalities or things are such that if they are not admitted as really existing the Vedic injunction becomes meaningless. Subsidiary texts like these which are devoid of import should be regarded as proving the existence of such personalities or things. The existence of gods is proved by such Vedic texts. Finally (3) the texts which describe the nature of distinctionless Brahman are superior to perception, for their import in the absolute nature of Brahman has been deduced by six* helps (लिंग s) of interpretation. They can, therefore, supersede the experience of duality and not *vice versa* (सि. ले., page 53).

(*b*) The point is settled in a somewhat different way in the Vivaraṇa Vârtika:—

In the first place the view of Vâchaspatimiśra does not appear sound. He has laid down a rule that the Vedic text possessed of purport is superior to perception. But this proposition is not established after sufficient induction. There *are* some Vedic texts which are possessed of independent import and are yet made to yield such meanings as are consistent with perception. As for instance कृष्णलं श्रपयेत् (*i.e.*, one should boil golden beans in a particular ritual), the idea conveyed by the predicate forms the import, but owing to the impossibility which follows from the literal meaning of श्रपण,† we are obliged to assign a secondary sense to the predicate (*viz.*, that of mere heating). Similarly the very impossibility of the identity of the individual and supreme soul, which besets us in the interpretation of the famous text—"That art thou"—makes us adopt a course of secondary interpretation ‡ in spite of the Vedic point being in the

* *Vide* foot-note in the Introduction, p. v.

† It means literally, boiling in such a way that the first colour may be turned into a new one which in the case of gold beans is absurd.

‡ भागत्यागलक्षणा.

identity of the two souls. Thus we find that the existence of an independent import is not a safe criterion for settling the superiority of Scripture over perception.

Vivaraṇâchârya then proceeds to establish his own view. All S'ruti is by general rule superior to perception on account of its infallibility and of its being the final Court of Appeal for the ascertainment of truth. But perception which is thus subordinated by the sweeping authority of S'ruti is left no platform to work on. Anyhow the round of the world must be explained, for knowledge cannot proceed unless there be an object for it. Perception, which is dragged down from the high platform of truth by Scripture, is allowed to work in the ordinary world of relative reality and practical efficiency. So wonderful is the hold of perception, whether true or false, on human mind, that in the ordinary instance of error "This* is silver" the perception is supported by admitting the production of fictitious silver in the shell with which it is really one, in spite of the falsity of that perception being admitted on all hands. The reason of that admission is that the knowledge of silvery phenomenon in the shell cannot be accounted for by the total absence of a corresponding object. Similarly in the text 'यजमानः प्रस्तरः' perception which embraces the difference of the sacrificer from the stone will have no object left, if it be superseded by S'ruti. This want of sphere for operation of perception, if S'ruti were literally interpreted, makes us put aside the general rule of the superiority of S'ruti over perception, and interpret the text in conformity with perception according to the method establised in the Pûrvamîmânsa.

The same line of argument may be extended to the great text "That art thou." If the identity of the Supreme Being and Embodied Soul be literally understood, it would be impossible to account for the limited knowledge and power of Individual Soul, which are matters of ordinary experience. The S'ruti is, therefore, made to abandon the primary

* 'This' refers to the pearl-oyster.

senes of 'that' and 'thou,' and retain their secondary senses. Now when that course is adopted there is no difficulty left for asserting the identity of the Intelligence underlying the Supreme and Individual Soul. In the same way in order that perception may not be sphereless in its operation, secondary method of interpretation is adopted in texts like कृष्णलं श्रपयेत्. But if in any way some compass be left for the operation of perception, it is not proper to change the literal meaning of S'ruti.

Thus the doctrine of the superiority of Scripture over perception is quite consistent (सि. ले., pages 54–57).

Section III.

The Doctrine of Reflection.

In the preceding sections the fundamental doctrine of Vedânta, that the world is illusory, has been proved to be consistent with perception in a variety of ways. It has been implied there that the sole reality or existence *par excellence* belongs to Brahman. The world is not allowed to possess a kind of existence apart from that of Brahman. Brahman's light is sufficient to make the sense-world visible. An objector might here argue, what necessity is there for admitting the creation of the semblance of silver in the mother-o'-pearl? It is a common point of belief with all the Vedântins that* the silvery phenomenon is fictitiously created in the shell. The opponent argues that the presence of actual silver elsewhere is sufficient to account for the appearance of silver in the shell.

In reply to this objection it may be said that the actual silver existing far off cannot form the object of perception in the place where the error occurs. Now perception without an object is absurdity. We are, therefore, obliged to assume the indescribable creation of silver in the shell. Such

* *Vide* p. 52, *supra.*

is not the difficulty in the perception of the world, for everywhere Brahman—pure existence—is inherent. We are, then, justified in assuming that the world shines not of its own accord, but through the existence of Brahman.

This preliminary was necessary for the natural sequence of this section. The above reasoning leads us to another doctrine of Vedânta which owing to its connection with Brahman and Jîva is of vital importance.

According to the line of argument adopted, a semblance of face ought to be admitted as being created in the mirror, apart from the real face. For if there be no such thing as reflection existing apart from the object reflected, a man can see his own eyes without the help of a mirror. The fact that a man can not see his eyes and forehead on his actual face, whereas in the reflection they are distinctly observed causes the difference between the reflection and the thing reflected. The admission that the reflection is a thing different from the original is prejudicial to the chief doctrine of Vedânta that the individual soul is one with Brahman. Jîva is regarded as reflection of Brahman. Now if reflection be different from the original, Jîva must be different from Brahman and hence unreal.

(*a*) The difficulty is thus explained away by the followers of Vivaraṇâchârya:—

The vulgar opinion that the reflection and the original are one and the same is borne out by philosophical investigation. The erroneous appearance of the face has its substratum in the actual face, and is due to the presence of an adventitious thing like mirror. When the actual face is the basis of the error *viz* " the *face* is in the mirror, that *it* is in front of the person, and that *it* is different from the original," it is gratuitous to admit the mirror as the substratum of the error.

The objection against this theory of the identity of the reflection and the original is that the actual face ought to be

wholly perceived like its reflection. But some parts of the actual face are not perceived by our eyes. The reflection is, therefore, a distinct thing from the original.

The objection is rejected by laying down the rule that the beams of our eyes being struck by the reflector turn back and made the actual face wholly perceptible. The non-perception of some parts of the actual face by our eyes cannot be alleged as a reason in favour of difference between the original and its reflection. The optical rays which have got onward motion cannot comprehend the forehead &c., but when they are struck back by the surface of the reflector, the original face itself is perceived in its totality. Reflection is, then, not a distinct thing in the mirror, but the original itself comprehensible by the reverting optical beams.

Jîva, who is the reflection of Brahman, is therefore not a distinct thing from Brahman, but is absolutely one with it. This is one phase of the Doctrine of Reflection, which lays stress on the identity of the reflection and the original (बिंबप्रतिबिंबाभेदवाद*) (सि. ले., pages 60–61).

(*b*) another phase of the same doctrine is that the reflection is a fictitious (मिथ्या) object occurring in the reflector and is different from the original. The points of difference between the two views are :

(1) In the former reflection has its substratum in the original, in the latter the reflector (*i e.*, mirror) is the substratum ;

(2) In the former reflection is absolutely one with the original and hence real, in the latter it is distinct from the original and hence unreal.

The unreality of the individual soul which naturally follows from this theory is thus removed. Jiva is of three kinds: (1) real, (2) practical, and (3) fictitious (*vide* Chapter I, Section IV (*f*)). The first is no reflection of Brahman

* Page 20, para. 3, and view (*g*) on page 25. *sunra.*

and is thus absolutely one with it. The other two are mere reflections of Real Jîva and as such are unreal.

This aspect of the Doctrine of Reflection is called प्रतिबिंबाध्यासवाद, *i. e.*, the Doctrine of the fictitious creation of Reflection. Arguments for and against each aspect of the Doctrine of Reflection are omitted partly because they are foreign to the subject of the essay and partly because they are dry owing to the physical interpretation of the doctrine which S'ankara never dreamt of. Those who take interest in these metaphysical subtleties are referred to pages 62-66 of the Siddhânta Leśa. In its relation to Jîva and Brahman the doctrine has been fully discussed in Chapter I, Sec. IV.

Section IV.

The Theory of Dream.

In the last section we discussed the Doctrine of Reflection which plays a prominent part in the Vedântic conception of Jîva and Îśa. Now the inorganic or material nature is often compared in the Vedântic literature with dream. Even a superficial reader of an elementary treatise on Vedânta will hardly leave his book without being impressed with the idea that the world of his experience is as unstable and fictitious as dream. This simile for its thorough comprehension requires full discussion of the theory of dream.

We shall divide the subject of this section into two parts, note the doctrinal differences in their appropriate place, and prologue the next section with a rough outline of the resemblance between dream and the empirical world.

PART I.

Fictitious nature of the Dream-phenomena.

All the Vedântic thinkers are at one that the dream-phenomena are fictitiously existing in Self. But how they are fictitious is a matter of difference.

(*a*) The first view is that the material cause of the dream-phenomena is primitive Nescience, that the *complete** destruction, therefore, of them takes place after the rise of the knowledge of Brahman, and that their fictitious existence is due to their being the effect of faults like sleep, &c., which are other than ignorance †

An authoritative writer says that both the waking and the dream states are the effects of one and the same Nescience designated as the darkness of sound sleep. The world of the waking state is admitted by all to be the effect of primitive Nescience. The world of the dream state, therefore, follows to be the effect of the same Nescience (सि. ले., page 66).

(*b*) Another view is that the knowledge of the waking state dispels the dream-phonomena. Our conviction that the dream is a series of illusory phenomena, endorsed by S'ankara and Vivaraṇâchârya, is a sufficient proof of their fictitious character (सि. ले., page 66).

In both these views primitive Nescience is recognized as the material cause of the dream-phenomena. Their fictitious character is proved in the first view on the ground that they are generated by faults other than ignorance ‡ (*viz.*, sleep, &c.); in the second it is proved on the fact that they can be dispelled by the knowledge of the waking state which is distinct from the knowlege of Brahman.

---

*The word 'complete' distinguishes 'temporary subsiding' of the dream-phenomena in the waking state from 'utter annihilation' of them in the state of absolution.

†In this view ignorance (अविद्या) and primitive Nescience (मूलाज्ञान) are distinguished. The former is an aberration of mind; the latter is the primeval matter.

‡ *Vide* footnote just preceding. Ignorance is the efficient cause of the empirical world; the dream-world has sleep for its instrumental cause; primitive Nescience is in both the cases the material cause.

PART II.

The Substratum of the Dream-phenomena.

It is beyond the power of human mind to conceive an illusion without a substratum. The dream-phenomena, which are nothing but illusion, ought to have some substratum for their manifestation. All are conscious that the dream appears in themselves, *i. e.*, Self is the noumenon of it. But what kind of Self is the basis of that error is a subject which demands philosophical investigation. The reader is aware that Intelligence is the essential nature of Self. Intelligence is of two kinds: (1) unappropriated Intelligence (अनवच्छिन्नचैतन्य) and (2) Intelligence associated with egoism, &c. (अहंकाराद्यवच्छिन्नचैतन्य). The former is the real Self of all, the latter is the migrating soul different in different individuals. Now some Vedântins are of opinion that the first kind of Intelligence is the substratum of dream-phenomena. Others, on the contrary, maintain that the required substratum is the second kind of intelligence.

Objections against both the views may be thus summarised :—

If unappropriated Intelligence were the noumenon of dream-phenomena, the latter can exist even outside the Intelligence associated with egoism. In other words, dream-phenomena can occur outside the body. But none but a fool can say that the dream takes place outside his body. It is impossible, therefore, for the witnessing soul to illumine the dream-phenomena, which are located outside human organism, either with or without the help of the modifications of mind. Because in the first case the repose of the senses in sleep puts a stop to the modifications of inner sensory. In the second case the objects to be illumined ought to co-exist with the witnessing soul. But the latter is limited by the body, whereas the former are assumed to have existence even outside human organism. The dream-phenomena can in no way be illumined by the witnessing soul.

If the Intelligence associated with egoism be regarded as the noumenon, the dreamer should perceive all the dream-phenomena either as one with him or located in him. Because the proposed substratum and the dream-perception should either be in identical relation (तादात्म्यसंबंध) or relation of location and thing located (आधाराधेयभावसंबंध). The dream-perception, for instance, should either take the form "I am an elephant" or "I am possessed of an elephant." But the dreamer perceives that he sees an elephant on a particular mountain, that it is different from him and that it belongs to some one else. The proposed substratum is, therefore, unsatisfactory.

(*a*) In spite of the above objections, some admit the first view that unappropriated Intelligence is the substratum of dream-phenomena. There are two minor differences among those who uphold this view: (1) some say that unappropriated Intelligence standing as the *original* in primitive Nescience (*i. e.* Îśachetana) is the substratum; (2) others hold that by unappropriated Intelligence we are to understand that Intelligence which is *reflected* in Nescience (*i.e.* Jîvachetana).

(1) The upholders of the first thesis refute the objection raised before as follows:—

Only that portion of the Îśachetana which is outside the body is admitted to be the substratum. Thus owing to the impropriety of time and space the dream-phemomena are regarded as unreal. They* are illumined by the said Intelligence coupled with the modifications of mind, which are possible within the body even in the absence of outer senses whose presence is necessary when the mind tries to comprehend external objects. Thus just as ignorance, existing in the Intelligence appropriated by the idea of 'this' in mother-o'-

* It will be clear from this view that its advocates regard साक्षिचेतन (witnessing soul) as an aspect of the Supreme Being rather than of the individual soul (*vide* para. (2), page (40)).

pearl, when made manifest by the modifications of mind produced by the contact of the senses with the objects of the waking state, appears as silver, so ignorance residing in the Intelligence made manifest by the modifications of mind inside the body, appears as dream-phenomena, the variety of which may be accounted for by the diversity of impression awakened by merit or demerit on the occasion. Such in brief is the exposition of a Vivaraṇa passage by Bhâratîtîrtha (सि. ले., page 67).

(2) The advocates of the second sub-division are of opinion that it is a mistake to consider unappropriated Intelligence made manifest by the modifications of mind as the substratum. Because no modification of mind which is not produced by S'âstra can embrace unappropriated Intelligence, whether it be Îśachetana or Jîvachetana. All the ordinary modifications including that of the ego (अहंवृत्ति) refer to that Intelligence which is appropriated by egoism, &c. Hence the substratum sought for is the self-shinning (as opposed to that which is manifested by modification of mind) unappropriated Intelligence in the form of common Jîvachetana, the other kind (*i.e.* common Îśachetana) being cognisable through Vedic word only (सि. ले., page 68).

The points of difference are now clear. In the former, unappropriated Intelligence in the form of God made manifest by modifications of mind is the substratum. In the latter unappropriated Intelligence in the form of common* Jîvachetana in its self-shining character is the substratum. The objection that dream-phenomena can occur outside the body, since their substratum is all-pervading, is answered on the assumption that as much of the said Intelligence as is within the body becomes the stage of dream representations.

---

*By common Jîvachetana is meant the reflection of Intelligence in Nescience. Individualized Jîvachetana is the reflection in mind. *Vide* page (25), para. (4) *supra*.

(*b*) Those who hold the second theory that Intelligence associated with egoism (अहंकाराद्यवाच्छिन्नचेतन) is the noumenon refute the objections raised against it as follows:–

By calling Intelligence associated with egoism the substratum of dream–phenomena we do not mean to include egoism in the substratum. All that we wish to convey is that pure reflected Intelligence having egoism as mere adjunct (उपाधि) and not property (विशेषण) is the noumenon. Thus egoism not entering in the conception of the substratum, there is no possibility of the objection that the dream-perception should have an identical relation with the subject. In other words, it is not necessary that the dreamer should dream, for instance, that he is an elephant. He may assume the position of subject and dream-phenomena may appear as object.

Even in silver appearing in mother-o'-pearl, the example brought forward to prove identical relation between the noumenon and phenomenon, the Intelligence associated with the pure objective side (इदंत्व) of the shell, being common to all persons, is not the substratum of the error, but the reflection of that Intelligence in the modification of mind is the place where the error occurs. That reflection partakes of the nature of the modification which, when mixed with some error-producing circumstance like darkness, presents the pure object (shell) in a different light (silver). Thus the error belongs to a particular person and not to all (सि. ले., page 68).

The chief reason which led to the rise of the second theory is that no satisfactory explanation of indidual dream experience can be furnished by the first theory. Because both the kinds of unappropriated Intelligence are common to all egos, and consequently the dreams of all creatures should be the same. In the present theory individualized Jîvachetana (*i. e.* Intelligence appropriated by egoism) being the substratum, dream-phenomena differ in different individuals.

SECTION V.

Doctrine of Illusion.

The dream-world has been proved to be illusory. The sublation of dream-phenomena in the waking state establishes their fictitious character (प्रातिभासिकता). In like manner, the phenomena of the waking state being nullified by those of the dream state can fairly be regarded as fictitious. Again it has been noticed that both kinds of phenomena are the products of the same Nescience. They are on that account equally illusory.*

The world of the waking state was allowed empirical reality when the nature of the dream-world was discussed. One of the chief reasons which lead to the reality of the world of the waking state is that it is cognized by our outer senses. The dream-world, on the contrary, is totally an 'insubstantial pageant' generated by the disturbed nervous system; or to express the same thought in terms of the Vedânta psychology, pure self-consciousness (साक्षिचेतन) presents itself simultaneously as the seer, the seen and the means of seeing. The sense-perception (hearing, &c.) in the dream state is groundless.

Now when we go deep into the matter, we find that the experience of the waking state is no better than that of the dream state. The mind and its helpmates the so-called senses, which are the recognized sources of experience, are super-imposed upon self-consciousness, like dream-perception, *i. e*, neither objects nor their means of knowing have existence independent of self-consciousness. Take off consciousness (संवित्) from our multifarious experience (वृत्तिज्ञान) and the world is reduced to zero. 'As it is the light which reveals both itself and the darkness, so it is self-consciousness through which we know both itself and all other things.' The world of the waking state is, therefore, a series of waves of the ocean-like Intelligence

---

* *Vide* Mâṇḍûkya kârikâs for further points of resemblance between the two states.

(चित्समुद्रविवर्त), and in so far it resembles the dream-world which is an utter delusion.

This progress of idealism in Vedânta gave rise to a peculiar doctrine called *Drishtisrishtivâda*. It is of two kinds:–

(1) That in which the world is supposed as created anew at every operation of the senses, and

(2) that in which the world is regarded as nothing else, but conciousness.

We shall now take them in turn.

*PART I.**

दृष्टिसृष्टिवाद.

(*a*) That the world, including the phenomena of all states, is implanted upon Brahman, and is, therefore illusory (प्रातिभासिक) is an idea with which all the Upanishads are replete to saturation. Now all illusory phenomena (*e. g.* mirage) have existence as durable as their visibility. The world is, therefore, existent as long as it is visible, in other words their *esse* is *percepii*. The advocates of the theory argue that it is impossible to predicate existence to a thing before we cognise it. To infer that the thing existed before its contact with the senses is to ignore the fact that the very inference of its antecedent existence is totally dependent upon mind which is an inner sensory. Its pure objective existence, therefore, cannot be asserted. If the whole world is idealistic, one is naturally curious to ask, who is the idealizer or speculator ? The question can be answered in either of the following two ways: (1) The unconditioned or absolute Self, or (2) Self conditioned by ignorance. But neither of the two answers is feasible. For

---

* In the first sub-division the compound means दृष्ट्या सह समः समयो यस्याः सा दृष्टिसमसमया सृष्टिर्यस्मिन् वादे स दृष्टिसृष्टिवादः. In the other it means दृष्टिरेव स्वप्रकाशज्ञानस्वरूपमेव विश्वसृष्टिर्यस्मिन् &c.

in the first case the absolute Self is present even at the time of absolution. The ideal world, therefore, ought not to cease even then—a conclusion undermining the fundamental aspiration of a Vedântin. In the second case ignorance, the condition of the speculator, is no better than the world, that is, it is also a speculation, an idea. But the speculator must precede the speculated object which in the second alternative is not possible, because the speculator himself is environed by the speculated object, *viz.*, ignorance.

The solution of the problem, then, advanced by some is as follows:—

Every preceding soul conditioned by ignorance is the speculator of each succeeding ignorance; and as there is neither beginning nor end of this chain of speculators and speculated objects, there would not creep in confusion *ad infinitum.* If it be admitted that the first ignorance came into existence in some immeasurably remote time, it would be difficult to ascertain its speculator *viz.*, conditioned Self. But no such beginning is assigned to ignorance. Others, however, exempt ignorance from the operation of *Drishṭisṛishṭivâda.* They propose that ignorance is actually beginningless, and the rest of the world is created anew at every cognition.

The speculator of those things which are visible is now ascertained. But who is the speculator of the great orderly creation of the elements? *Drishṭisṛishṭivâda* can not be applicable, for that creation is not an object of our perception. Nor can it be set aside as unreal, for S'ruti describes it at great length. Thus if दृष्टिसृष्टिवाद takes within its limit the great creation of the elements, a speculator other than that established before should be mentioned.

The answer is that there is no speculator of the creation, *i. e.*, there is no creation of the elements. What is then the import of the Vedic texts which describe their creation? The reply is:—The rise of the consciousness of the identity of the Individual and Supreme Soul. Passages of the

Bhâshya and other works emphatically lay down that S'ruti tries to impress the devoted hearer with his identity with Brahman by the* method of super-imposition and negation. The Veda takes for granted the phenomenal world, explains it by the law of causation, proves it to be one with its primeval cause (Brahman), and ultimately decides the unity of the subjective and objective worlds. The attempt of the writer of the Brahma Sûtras to bring out consistency in the Vedic texts dealing with creation is simply to polish the intellect of the devout thinker, and thereby enable him to comprehend the truth. The writer assumes the world as real, and sets the mind of the truth-seeker replete with the thoughts of causation in the right path.

The validity of such Vedic texts as have no independent import is secured by their indirectly contributing to the main end of the holy lore, *viz.*, the comprehension of the identity of the Individual Soul and the Supreme Being.

Such, in brief, are the main features of the first kind of *Drishṭisṛishṭivâda* in which things have simultaneous creation with their cognition (सि. ले. pages 70 and 71).

(*b*) The other kind of *Drishṭisṛishṭivâda* propounds that Consciousness—Thought—itself is the world, for the latter never appears apart from the former Smṛiti also corroborates this view: "The foresighted view this world as Thought itself; they are shortsighted and deluded persons who perceive a distinct nature of external objects." The author of "Siddhânta Muktâvali" advocates this kind of *Drishṭisṛishṭivâda.*

PART II.

सृष्टिदृष्टिवाद.

Some philosophers, dissatisfied with both the kinds of दृष्टिसृष्टिवाद, propound a different doctrine called सृष्टिदृष्टिवाद (*i. e.*, the doctrine that the senses operate upon things already

* अध्यारोपापवादाभ्यां निष्प्रपंचं प्रपंच्यते ॥

created). They maintain that the world possessed of unknown existence (अज्ञातसत्तायुक्तम्) was created by God according to the order mentioned in the Veda, and that the perception of objects is accomplished by the operation of the organ of knowledge on them. In other words, the world was actually created by God, and the objects of it become perceptible when they come in contact with the senses. One should not fear a covert attack upon the common doctrine of Vedânta, *viz.*, the world is illusory, by the propagation of this special doctrine. Because although the world is not a mere collection of ideas (कल्पितत्वाभावेपि), but on the contrary, has beginning and end, as shown in the Veda, its reality connot result. Because the world satisfies the definition of an illusory (मिथ्या) object given in three ways :—

(1) An illusory object is that which can be sublated by the right knowledge. The world is sublated at the rise of the knowledge of Brahman; it is on that account illusory.

(2) That which is different from the existent and non-existent is called illusory. The world is neither existent like Brahman, nor non-existent like the horn of a hare. It is therefore illusory.

(3) That which is the counter-entity of the complete negation residing in the thing admitted to be the substratum of phenomena, is called illusory. The world, as it appears to the senses, is a counter-entity (प्रतियोगि) of its complete negation in Brahman, which is established by the Veda to be the substratum of it. It is consequently unreal (सि. ले., page 72).

To gather to a head the points off difference between the दृष्टिसृष्टिवाद and सृष्टिदृष्टिवाद, the world in both the sub-divisions of the former is regarded as apparently existing (प्रातिभासिक) in the latter as practically existing (व्यावहारिक) ; in the first it is unreal (मिथ्या) because of its apparent character (प्रातिभासिकता)

in the other it is unreal because of its fulfilling the threefold definition of unreality (मिथ्यात्व).

In this part of the section the *objective* world in spite of its not being a mere speculation, has been proved to be illusory or unreal. But why should the unreality of the *subjective* world, including egoism, &c., be deduced from their super-imposed character (प्रातिभासिकता)? Why should there be one method for proving the unreality of the objective world and another for proving the same in the case of the subjective world? Let egoism and its products be regarded as actually existing in Self like jar, &c., and let their unreality follow from their fulfilling the threefold definition of an illusory object. It follows, therefore, that the attempt of S'ankara and other commentators to prove the unreality of the subjective phenomena from their super-imposed character is purposeless, though not false.

The author of चित्सुखी holds that egoism is super-imposed upon Self, and therefore the attempt of former teachers to show the applicabitity of the three* causes of false attribution (अध्यास) to them is reasonable. Their unreality, however, follows from their super-imposed character consequent upon their being solely perceived by the witnessing soul. In other words, egoism, &c., have not an unknown existence, which is subsequently revealed by the enlightened modification of mind, as in the case of jar, &c., but are illumined by the witnessing soul himself, *i.e.*, they are not practically *real* but purely *ideal* (सि. ले., page 72).

Râmâdvayâchârya, on the contrary, is of opinion that the non-sublation of the subjective phenomena in the practical affairs of the world is a sufficient proof of their not being

* They are :—दोष or fault; (2) संप्रयोग or contact of the senses with the object; and (3) संस्कार or impression. In the case of a rope mistaken for a snake darkness is the fault, the contact of the sense of sight with the rope is the संप्रयोग and the impression of snake left by former experience is the संस्कार.

super-imposed. S'ankara and others, taking for granted their super-imposed character, tried to apply the rules of false attribution In point of fact, however, their illusory nature (मिथ्यात्व) can be established by the application of the foregone definitions. The passages of the Bhâshya, where the three causes of false attribution are delineated, have their ultimate import in Praudhi* Vada in which simply the actual reality of the world is denied (सि. ले., page 73).

PART III.

Illusory Objects can fulfil Practical Efficiency.

In the preceding theories of the world, its illusory nature has been vehemently upheld. A question here naturally arises : How can illusory objects fulfil practical efficiency ? How can they supply practical needs ?

(*a*) One answer is that the fulfilment of practical efficiency by illusory objects is possible as in a dream.

It may be objected that the fulfilment of practical needs by objects of dream is not real, for it is falsified by the experience of the waking-state. But the objector might be fairly asked-How is the fulfilment of practical needs in the waking-state real ? It is also nullified by the experience of the dream-state, *i.e.*, just as the experience of the waking-state does not persist in the dream-state, so the experience of the dream-state does not persist in the waking-state. Thus, reality is no essential point in the fulfilment of practical want. It is sufficient that the fulfilment should have the same kind of existence as the fulfilling objects themselves (सि. ले., page 73).

(*b*) The view of Advaitavidyâchârya on the matter is as follows :—

It is a false premiss to say that every fulfilment of practical efficiency in the dream-state is capable of being sublated

* The common doctrine of the Vedânta that the world is unreal and Brahman alone is real.

by the waking-state. Because contact of a woman or a serpent experienced in a dream, which in itself is false, perpetuates its effects (pleasure or fear as the case may be) even in the waking-state.

It follows, therefore, that pleasure, &c., experienced in the dream, are not unreal. On this assumption only, we can account for a person's desire to fall in a delightful dream and to avoid a painful one.

The rise of feelings which are caused by false incidents of a dream and which are perpetuated in the waking-state as practically real, is possible, for the inner sensory which is practically real, is admitted by these thinkers as undergoing numerous modifications.

The rise of real effects from unreal objects is not peculiar to the dream-state but is common to the waking-state. As for instance, a man coming from the glare of the sun into a small house possessed of moderate light, finds darkness, which he tries to dispel by means of a lamp, Here the false darkness, which appears to the man coming from the daylight, has the power of producing confusion, a real effect. Thus there is no wonder that this illusory world can supply our practical wants (सि. ले., page 73).

(*c*) A third view is to the following effect :—

Even the upholders of the reality of the world cannot admit the reality of things as a necessary cause of the fulfilment of practical efficiency. Because in the production of real effects, such as bathing, drinking, only the existence (सत्व) and not the reality (सत्यत्व) is needed. The reality of water is neither the cause nor the causal* characteristic of practical efficiency (*viz.*, bathing, &c.).

Thus, the world can fulfil practical purposes in spite of its unreality (सि. ले., page 74).

---

* कारणतावच्छेदक *viz* जलत्वादिस्वरुप.

SECTION VI.

The Conditions of Self.

In the foregoing section it was proved that the material side of the world is unreal. But the immaterial side of it, which includes all living creatures capable of bondage and freedom, is neither proved to be one with Brahman nor unreal. Unless the diverse immaterial aspect of the universe is proved to be one with Brahman or practically unreal the Vedânta texts cannot positively assert the absolute nature of Brahman.

The absolute identity of individual souls with Brahman, touched in the first Chapter, is not feasible. Because their visible difference is diametrically opposed to the desired identity. Their difference follows from the diversity of pleasure and pain in living beings.

The common reply of all the Vedântins is that the individual souls are all one with Brahman, and that their visible difference is due to the multiplicity of limiting conditions, which explain diversity of pleasure and pain.

It may be asked—How can the difference of limiting conditions explain the difference of pleasure and pain when the possessor is one throughout? The point of the question is that the difference of pleasure and pain, which reside in the soul, can be explained by the difference of their possessors (*viz.*, souls), and not by the difference of limiting conditions to which they do not belong.

(*a*) some advance the solution that pleasure and pain belong to mind (मनस्), not to soul. Minds are numerous and hence pleasure and pain differ in different bodies, in spite of the unity of Self. That the mind is the possessor of pleasure and pain, and, in short, the forger of our chains, is proved by the following Vedic text: "desire, intention, doubt, faith, disbelief, patience, irresolution, shame, intellect, fear—nay everything is mind. It is the mind which performs all actions" (बृ. उ. I. V. 3). Besides, texts like "This

soul is unaffected" prove the absolute witness-like position of the soul. When the mind is falsely conceived as one with Self all the properties (कर्तृत्वादिबन्ध *i.e.*, bondage in the form of being doer, &c.) of the former are supposed to belong to the latter. This false attribution is so paramount in consequence of the beginninglessness of mundane existence, that the relation* of subject and predicate between the properties of the mind on the one hand, and the soul on the other, excites no wonder. It is a vain objection to say that the soul is no longer a suffering entity as bondage is referred to mind only because by saying that the soul is in bondage, we mean nothing more than that he is the substratum of the false identity with egoism (a phase of mind), the basis of mundane existence (सि. ले. page 76).

(*b*) In spite of the unity of Self among all creatures, the diversity of pleasure and pain was accounted for in the preceding view by the multiplicity of mind to which the whole mundane existence belongs. Another view is that mind, being material, cannot properly be said to be bound. *But the reflection of intelligence in mind* (*i.e.* अन्तःकरणादि-प्रतिबिंबितचेतन) being itself intelligent, is the proper basis of all mundane phenomena. In short, the phenomenal Self, the doer and enjoyer in every individual, is that intelligent reflection to which mundane existence belongs.† The phenomenal Self is distinct from the one noumenal Self, and is therefore unreal. All individuals have their own phenomenal Selves, which are the bases of individual pleasure and pain.

It may be objected that in the present view the phenomenal Self is supposed to be the world-suffering soul, and the noumenal Self to be the permanently liberted soul. Now, when the knowledge of Brahman is produced, the phenomenal Self disappears and the noumenal Self shines

---

* सामानाधिकरण्य.

† *Vide* Brahma Sû[illegible]

in its native freedom. This comes to mean that bondage and freedom do not belong to one and the same soul. He who suffers from mundane existence need not endeavour to regain his liberation, for on the point of realising it he will be completely annihilated. The solution of the difficulty is that the noumenal Self–the real soul–is the substratum of the phenomenal Self, the unreal soul. The first which is existent at all times is connected primarily with absolution, and secondarily with the worldly state on account of its being the substratum of the error of identity with the unreal suffering soul. Thus, the same being is practically (व्यवहारत:) connected with the two states (सि. ले., page 77).

(*c*) A third view is that pleasure and pain should be referred to *the Intelligence associated with mind, body and senses* (*i.e.* विशिष्टचेतन). Associated Intelligence being different, the diversity of pleasure and pain is accounted for.

Here also the former objection, that bondage and freedom belong to different souls in one and the same individual, is untenable. Because the associated soul, who is chained by the shackles of the world, is recognised to be the same as the unassociated soul who is permanently free (सि. ले., pase 77).

(*d*) A fourth view is that *pure Intelligence* (*i.e.*, केवलश्चेतन:) may be supposed as the basis of *samsâra*. The point will be illustrated by an example. A crystal which in itself is white assumes a kind of redness through the vicinity of a red flower. In the same way pure Intelligence, which in itself is free, assumes a semblance of bondage owing to the proximity of either the mind or the associated soul, the really suffering ego.

The unity of pure Intelligenco, the basis of *samsâra*, gives rise to the possibility of confusion of individual pleasure and pain. But the confusion is set aside when we take into account the limiting conditions which are different in different creatnres. It may further be questioned :—

How can the variety of pleasure and pain which refer without exception to the pure Intelligence, be accounted for by admitting difference in limiting conditions? It may be replied that pure Intelligence, coming in contact with particular condition, is supposed to be bound, and in the absence of another condition is supposed to be free. In other words, particular environments make one portion of Intelligence happy, and other set of circumstances makes another portion of it unhappy. Thus the common Intelligence may be supposed as the basis of checkered lives like a tree which may simultaneously be supposed to be connected and disconnected with a monkey* (सि. ले., page 77).

(*e*) The last and the fifth view is that if diversity of condition accounts for variety of pleasure and pain in one and the same Intelligence, it is not unreasonable to justify that variety by admitting phenomenal difference in pure unconditioned Intelligence which seems to be conditioned by mind, &c. Thus the difference in pleasure and pain, which is advanced as a reason against the theory of the unity of Self, is explained away on the variety of condition of conditioned Soul. Now the conditions which prevent the comprehension of each other's pleasure and pain in spite of the unity of Self are, according to some, abode of experience,† either connected or disconnected; according to others, bodies, minds, or individual ignorances (सि. ले., page 78).

---

*When a monkey is sitting on a branch of a tree the whole tree may be said to be connected with that monkey through that branch, and disconnected with respect to its roots. This is the stock-example of the Naiyâyikas to prove the partial inherence (अव्याप्यवृत्ति) of union or संयोग.

†Abode of experience is what is called भोगायतन; connected abode of experience is संयुक्तभोगायतन and disconnected abode, &c., is विश्लिष्टभोगायतन, *e, g.*, severed hand. A body necessarily means the whole organism, while an abode of experience may refer to a connected or disconnected member of it

The world of spirit is as shown above, really identical with Brahman and the world of nature has been already proved to be unreal. The Vedânta-texts, are therefore, quite right in establishing the distinctionless character of Brahman, the Absolute.

The absolute character of Brahman was enunciated in the first Chapter. It has been demonstrated in this Chapter by the removal of all possible objections. Let us now turn to the means of realizing Brahman, whose picture is indirectly presented to our mind.

CHAPTER III.

MEANS OF REALISING BRAHMAN.

" Doubt of any sort cannot be removed except by action. Therefore, do the duty which lies nearest thee, which thou knowest to be a duty. Thy second duty will already have become clearer. 'Love not pleasure, love God'—this is the everlasting yea, wherein all contradiction is solved, wherein whoso walks and works it is well with him. 'Let duty, not happiness, be the ideal.' " (Carlyle).

कर्मण्येवाधिकारस्ते मा फलेषु कदाचन । भ. गी. ॥

" Make thy claims to wages a zero; then thou hast the world under thy feet. Well did the wisest of our time write : 'It is only with Renunciation that life, properly speaking can be said to begin." (Carlyle).

त्यागेनैकेऽमृतत्वमानशु : ॥

SECTION I.

Holy Duties.

PART I.

Their Usefulness.

It has been proved that the material world is false, and the immaterial world is identical with Brahman. This truth which has been arrived at by means of argument is said to be indirect (परोक्ष), and is a stepping-stone for the direct (अपरोक्ष) knowledge of Brahman. The direct knowledge or intuitive consciousness of our identity with Brahman is the means of absolution. What service, then, do religious duties render to the ultimate aim of human aspiration ?

The answer of all the host of Vedântins is that Brahman, the object of aspiration, is not really an attainable object in

consequence of its eternal identity with the Self of the inquirer, but is merely to be realised as one with Self. Now this realisation, which simply requires the removal of Ignorance, can only be accomplished by correct knowledge. Religious actions are, therefore, not directly useful to absolution. They, however, indirectly render service to the main end by purifying the mind of the inquirer. Do they render any direct service? Two answers are given: (1) They are useful inasmuch as they produce the desire of knowing Brahman, and (2) they are serviceable to knowledge itself.

(*a*) Vâchaspatimiśra maintains the first view. A Vedic* text lays down that sacrifices, &c, generate the desire of knowing Brahman, which is requisite for knowledge. There are two reasons why actions have no direct connection with knowledge: (1) The desiderative termination in the text alluded to is more prominent in sense than the root itself; (2) S'ankara is of the same opinion when he says that self-restraint, tranquillity, &c., are adjacent means of absolution on account of their connection with knowlege while sacrifices, &c., owing to their connection with the desire of knowing Brahman, are remote means of it.

A mild desire of knowing Brahman may be antecedent to the performance of sacrifices, &c. But the ardent wish of knowing it, which is considered here as the effect of the performance of daily and incidental religious duties, is subsequent to it. Thus though through the purity of mind derived from the performance of holy duties in past births a man feels confidence that the Veda is the source of true knowledge, and is anxious to attain the *summum bonum* through knowledge, yet he is drifted here and there in objects of pleasure, being influenced by the latent impressions of evil. This attachment to worldly things, which acts as a barrier in the attain-

* तमेतं वेदानुवचनेन ब्राह्मणा विविदिषन्ति यज्ञेन दानेन तपसाऽनाशकेन (बृ उ. IX. 4-22), *i.e.*, Brâhmans desire to know that Self through the study of the Veda, sacrifices, charity and wholesome austerities.

ment of Truth, is crushed down by the performance of holy duties in this life (सि. ले., page 85).

(*b*) The followers of Vivaraṇa hold the other view.

The general rule of Vâchaspatimiśra, that the sense of a termination is more prominent than that of the root, gives way to the exception that where desire and its fruit are mentioned in the same proposition, the fruit (*i.e.*, the object of desire) should be given prominence. As for instance in the Vedic text स्वर्गकामो ज्योतिष्टोमेन यजेत (*i.e.*, he who is desirous of Heaven should perform Jyotishṭoma sacrifice), the performance of the sacrifice has for its effect Heaven and not the desire of it. In like manner in the Vedic text referred to above, the knowledge of Brahman, and not the desire of it, is the result of the performance of holy dnties It may be objected that according to the present view renunciation of action is of no avail in the rise of knowledge, for actions are enjoined to be performed until Gnosis is produced. The injunction of renunciation is, therefore, meaningless.

The key to this difficulty is that actions should be performed until perfect purity of mind and the consequent keen desire of knowing Brahman, are generated, and that they may be renounced afterwards. Such is the teaching of the Gitâ and Naishkarmyasiddhi.

Here arises a question–When in both the views the performance of actions is sanctioned till the rise of the desire of knowledge, what is the material difference between the two?

The answer to this question is that in the second view, although the performance of *active* duties ceases after the rise of the desire of Gnosis, *passive* religious duties are perpetuated until Gnosis is produced. When a keen desire of Gnosis arises through the performance of active duties, the aspirer under initiation from a philosophic teacher is required to attend to certain other duties even in the stage of renunciation, *e.g.*, unimpeded study and contemplation, which are admitted to be results of active actions. The rise of Gnosis

is therefore certain. Whereas in the first view actions altogether vanish after the rise of the *desire* of Gnosis. The rise of Gnosis itself is then left to chance (सि. ले., page 86).

PART II.

What holy duties are useful in the production of Knowledge?

In the first part we came to the conclusion that religious duties are directly or indirectly serviceable to Gnosis. Now it is inquired whether all kinds of holy duties are useful, or some are especially reserved for that purpose. In other words, what actions are enjoined for the rise of Gnosis by the Vedic* text alluded to in the first part ?

(*a*) some reply that only the actions connected with the three stages of life (आश्रमकर्म,) are enjoined by the Vedic text. The words (1) 'study of the Veda,' (2) 'sacrifice and charity,' and (3) 'wholesome austerity,' respectively imply the holy duties of a bachelor, householder, and hermit (सि. ले., page 86).

(*b*) The author of Kalpataru is of opinion that not only the actions of the three stages, but those which are connected with castes (वर्णधर्माः) *i. e.*, all professional duties of the learned, heroic, mercantile and servile people are also useful. Because in the Brahma Sûtras III. iv. 36 and 38, Bâdarâyaṇa and S'ankara have emphatically proved that actions such as the muttering of holy *mantras*, bathing in sacred waters, performed by those who are in no stage of life (*e. g.*, widower, women of the first three castes) do render service to knowledge. The Vedic text should, therefore, be so interpreted that caste duties may be included therein.

Here occurs a minor difference of opinion. (1) The author of Kalpataru maintains that only those duties which are daily

---

**Vide* footnote on page 76.

(नित्य) are serviceable to Gnosis. Kâmya duties (*i.e.*, those which are performed with the intention of deriving reward in this or next life) are useless. Because the destruction of sins, the fruit of daily duities, is requisite for the rise of knowledge; heaven, material prosperity, &c., the reward of Kâmya duties are not in the least required by knowledge for its production.

(2) Sarvajña Muni, the author of Sankshepasâriraka, however, holds that both the daily and Kâmya duties are enjoined for the rise of knowledge. The Vedic text does not specify that only the daily sacrifices, &c., should be performed. There is no reason to put restriction on the plain and liberal interpretation of the text. He, no doubt, admits that the daily duties are more efficacious in producing purity of mind than Kâmya duties (सि. ले., page 87).

PART III.

Persons qualified for the performance of holy duties. and attainment of knowledge.

It has now been sufficiently ascertained that holy duties are useful in the production of knowledge. Now the qualifications for their performance ought to be investigated.

The Vedic text, which was under discussion in the first part of this section, mentions Brâhmans as performers of holy duties. A narrow-minded opponent concludes therefrom that only Brâhmans have a right to perform sacrifices, &c., for the attainment of knowledge. He further asks—How will, then, the text* of the Gitâ that Janaka, a Kshatriya prince, obtained his end through action only, be justified ? It can be justified only in one of the following two ways: (1) We must admit that action alone is the cause of absolution, or (2) that the actions performed by a Kshatriya or Vaiśya are

---

कर्मणैव हि संसिद्धिमास्थिता जनकादयः ॥ भ. गी. III. 20.

useful for the rise of Gnosis, the sole direct cause of beatitude. The first alternative is not desired by the Vedântin, for he has already proved that action by itself cannot lead to salvation. It is knowledge that has power to liberate the soul. The other alternative contradicts the spirit of the Vedic text referred to above, where it is said that *Brâhmans* desire to know Brahman through the study of the Veda &c., *i.e.*, Brâhmans alone are qualified for the performance of holy actions serviceable to Gnosis.

To escape from this dilemma the Vedântin replies that the world 'Brâhman' in the Vedic text is typical of the other two twice-born castes. Hence the passage of the Gîtâ means that Janaka obtained knowledge by means of actions, and finally realised the *summum bonum*. That this is the purport of the Vedic text is proved by the interpretation given to it by the ancient teacher Sureśvara.

The point of the Vedic text is that he who is desirous of getting knowledge may perform sacrifices, &c. Now the performance of sacrifices, &c., is allowed by the first portion of the Veda to the first three twice-born castes. The same ritual is recognised in the present text occurring in the second portion of the Veda. The word 'Brâhman,' therefore, signifies that all twice-born people have a right to perform sacrifices with the intention of getting the knowledge of Brahman.

So far we have determined the privileges of the first three twice-born castes with respect to ceremonial, a necessary antecedent to knowledge. It is clear that the Vedic text does not force all the twice-born people to perform sacrifices, &c. It simply declares that they have a right to Vedic ritual, the performance of which is left to their option. Now the qualifications requisite for the privileged classes are (1) anxiousness to attain, and (2) capacity to retain the knowledge of Brahman. Here arises a prominent question in Vedic theology which as puzzled many an orthodox teacher. Have the S'ûdras a right to perform holy duties with the

intention of getting the knowledge of Brahman? The qualifications for the attainment of Gnosis settled above may be found even in a S'ûdra. He is therefore qualified to perform holy duties.

(*a*) But this conclusion is not admitted by some orthodox teachers. They mainatin that the qualification for the performance of Vedic ritual is that the person ought to have studied the Veda according to prescribed rules, and at the same time he should be possessed of the knowledge of the ritual. Now S'ûdras, to whom the study of the Veda is denied by Smṛiti-texts, can have no knowledge of the Veda, and hence can have no curiosity for Gnosis. The capacity which is talked of is not a mere physical or mental capacity, but a kind of moral capacity derived from Vedic ceremonial. They are, threrefore, barred from the Vedic ritual and knowledge (सि. ले., page 89).

(*b*) Others who sympathise with the poor S'ûdras defend their right for the performance of holy duties. They are of opinion that although the study of the Veda and Vedic ritual are denied to them, the muttering of a holy *mantra* (*e. g.* नमः शिवाय= a bow to S'iva) which is allowed to all persons of whatever caste or creed, the performance of austerities, and the daily sacrifice in the form of cooking for one's own use and others, giving of alms and similar others holy duties are legitimate means for the S'ûdras to attain purity of heart which is requisite for the rise of Gnosis. It is not necessary to suppose that Vedic sacrifices are the only means of getting knowledge, for charity, &c., are incorporated in the Vedic text which determines a man's competency for Gnosis.

It is a mistake to suppose that S'ûdras can have no curiosity to know Brahman. Because although the knowledge of the Veda is prohibited his curiosity for Gnosis can be awakened by the comprehension of the passages of Purâṇas and Itihásas, wherein the qualifications of persons of all the four castes are described at length, includ-

ing the advantages of Gnosis. The Smriti text, which says that no knowledge should be imparted to a S'ûdra, implies that knowledge of such Vedic ceremonials (*e.g.*, Agnihotra) as are not meânt for his performance need not be given. It in no way prohibits the imparting of knowledge of such holy duties as the S'ûdra is qualified to perform. If all kinds of knowledge be denied to him, it would be a sheer mockery to lay down rules of morality, such as that he should be truthful, calm, etc., for who would listen to these duties ? Thus though the S'ûdra is not allowed to move in the precincts of Vedic ritual, he has full right to perform other holy duties capable of giving rise to knowledge. S'ankara too, is of the same opinion when he says, at the close of his Bhâshya on I. iii. 38, that the S'ûdra can achieve the knowledge of Brahman through Purâṇas and such other works. Just as persons of the first three castes are entitled to perform duties connected with the knowledge of Qualified Brahman with a view to their attaining absolution by gradation of births in superior spheres, so the S'ûdras can perform religious duties with a view to their attaining Gnosis through a series of births in the first three classes which have the privilege of hearing the Upanishads at first hand. The Vedic* text then, opens for one and for all the gateway for the knowledge of Brahman, through the performance of holy duties either Vedic or Paurâṇic (सि. ले.,- page 90).

SECTION II.

Renunciation.

PART I.

Its Service to Gnosis.

So far we have dealt with the active side of Vedic religion, which is serviceable to Gnosis, inasmuch as it brings about purity of mind. The passive side, which is meant for a man of the fourth stage of life (*i. e.*, Sannyâsin), is based

---

* विविदिषावाक्य, *vide* foot-note, page 76 *supra*.

upon renunciation of active religious duties. As to qualification for renunciation, a man should have attained perfect purity of mind, stability of intellect, discrimination between nature and spirit, disgust towards worldly pleasures of all kinds, six kinds of moral riches, and keen desire of liberation. Unless a man has attained these qualifications, renunciation of active duties of life does not produce the desirable effect. There is, however, one exception. If a man has reached 75 years of his age, he is allowed to renounce the world notwithstanding the want of these qualifications. But even there his old age is a sufficient guarantee of his never falling a prey to the pleasures of the senses. He may pass his ending days peacefully in contemplation and obtain a new life of better ethical development. For the rest of the world the Vedic religion provides a kind of inward renunciation which is of direct service to Gnosis. The first kind of renunciation, which consists in abandoning all active duties and pleasures of the senses, is subdivided into two classes—(1) विविदिषासंन्यास, *i.e*, renunciation with the intention of knowing Brahman, and (2) विद्वत्संन्यास, *i e.*, renunciation for the knower of Brahman. The second kind of renunciation is open to all. When a man has realised his identity with Brahman, he is entitled to renounce the world not in pursuance of Vedic injunction, but in conformity with the absolute nature of Self. Now it is proposed to investigate the nature of the service which the renunciation for an aspirer (विविदिषासंन्यास) renders to Gnosis.

(*a*) Some are of opinion that sins which prevent the rise of knowledge are of two kinds—(1) those which can be destroyed by the performance of holy duties, and (2) those which can be dispelled by their renunciation. Thus both are necessary for attaining purity of mind. It must be assumed here that the purity of mind which precedes renunciation ought to be of a different nature, because ardent love of sensual pleasures, dishonesty, and such other vices, which are condemned by the science of ethics, lose their soverei-

guty over the migrating ego in consequence of the destruction of the latent impressions of evil, which form, as it were, a second nature, by the honest and straight-forward performance of the active duties of life.

Tranquillity, recognition of our innate freedom, self-sacrifice and such other superior virtues are the results of renunciation. Thus both action and inaction in their accurate sense are serviceable to Gnosis through the same channel, *viz.*, purity of mind.

The upholders of this view see the utmost necessity of renunciation and consequently presume that Janaka, etc., who have been regarded as liberated even in their life of perpetual activity, ought to have renounced the world in some antecedent life (सि. ले., page 91).

(*b*) Others, however, hold that renunciation is useful to Gnosis, not because it produces purity of mind essential for the rise of knowledge, but because it is one of the essential qualifications of an aspirer for absolution enunciated by the word उपरत (absolutely calm) in the Vedic text* prescribing the qualifications of the contemplator of Brahman.

(*c*) A third view is that no kind of secret merit, which the Mîmânsakas call अपूर्व, either in the form of purity of mind or calmness, results from renunciation. Perfect knowledge requires incessant hearing, consideration and contemplation, which can only be secured in the fourth stage of life. Thus when a visible (दृष्ट) use of it (*viz.*, the furnishing of perfect leisure) is found, the suppositon of an invisible (अदृष्ट) merit resulting from it is purposeless.

If it be objected that householders, in spite of the pressure of private and public, lay and sacerdotal, business

---

*The Vedic text referred to runs as follows :—

शान्तो दान्त उपरतस्तितिक्षुः समाहितो भूत्वात्मन्येवात्मानम् पश्यति (बृ. आ. उ. IV. 4-23).

can attain knowledge by hearing, etc., gone through in a few leisure hours, the upholders of this view go so far as to make the Vedic injunction for renunciation a नियमविधि which then restricts hearing etc., to those only who have renounced the world.

PART II.

Who are privileged to renounce the world.

It has been proved that renunciation is useful to Gnosis either in an invisible or visible way. In the former its secret merit may be in the shape of purity of mind or absolute calmness; in the latter it provides an aspirer with perfect leisrue. In both the views it is a necessary antecedent of hearing. etc., the direct means of Gnosis. Now क्षत्रिय s and वैश्य s have no right to renounce the world and are therefore disqualified for hearing, etc., and consequently for Gnosis. But they have been already allowed the privilege of attaining the knowledge of Brahman. They must, therefore, be allowed to renounce the world or to hear, etc., in spite of the absenc of renunciation. The Vedic text which bars the क्षत्रिय and वैश्य from abandoning the world runs as follows:—

'A Brâhmana feels disgust for the world, retires and abandons actions as soon as possible' (बृ. उ. III. 5. 1). Sures'vara in his Vãrtika makes a note, while commenting on the explanatory Bhâshya on this text, that the mention of the word 'Brâhmana' implies that he alone is entitled to renounce the world.

(*a*) The difficulty is thus solved by some thinkers:—

The use of the word "Brâhmana" in the present text is typical of all the people of the first three twice-born castes as in the injunction of holy duties. There are other Vedic* texts which enjoin renunciation without mentioning

---

* *e. g.*, the following text of the जाबालोपनिषद्:—यदहरेव विरजेत् तदहरेव प्रव्रजेत् गृहाद्वा वनाद्वा॥

the name of 'Brâhmana.' The real sense of this second kind of Vedic texts in which none is specified is comprehended by the help of Smṛiti texts, which declare clearly that a Brâhmana, Kshatriya, or Vaiśya may renounce the world from the first, second or third stage of life. The first kind of Vedic text, then, should be supposed as using the word Brâhmana as significant of the other two twice-born castes. The Vârtika-text alluded to above simply gives the meaning of the Bhâshya. The real intention of Sureśvara becomes clear in a subsequent stanza, in which he says that the word Brâhmana implies the members of the other two castes.

Thus Kshatriyas and Vaiśyas are qualified for renunciation. They can, therefore, hear, consider and meditate upon the Vedânta text and ultimately attain the knowledge of Brahman (सि. ले., page 91).

(*b*) Others hold the contrary view. Kshastriyas and Vaiśyas are not entitled to renounce the world. Their right to Gnosis, however, is not lost, for they can hear, etc., even without renunciation. The reasons for denying their right to renunciation are the following :—

In the first place, the majority of Vedic texts which enjoin renunciation make use of the word "Brâhmana". The only exception is the text of the Jâbâlopanishad alluded to in the first view. But its meaning ought to be determined by the other Vedic texts rather than by Smṛiti texts It should be presumed that the Jâbâlopanishad entitles Brâhmanas alone to renunciation.

Secondly, the very Jâbâlopanishad in one of the subsequent *mantras* describes the nature of a perfect ascetic (*i.e.*, विद्वान् as opposed to विविदिषु), and questions how the same person who formerly bore a sacred thread can be called Brâhmana by caste when he has thrown it off. This means that the perfect ascetic must have been a Brâhmana by caste before he renounced the world.

Thirdly, the Smṛiti text referred to in the first view ought to be rejected as unauthoritative according to the rule* of the Pûrvamîmânsâ, that those Smṛitis which are opposed to the existing Vedic texts in meaning ought to be set aside.

Fourthly the first Vârtika text does not simply give the meaning of the Bhâshya on the Vedic text, but embodies also Sureśvara's own opinion that renunciation for an aspirer (विविदिषासंन्यास) is only reserved for the Brâhmana. The other Vârtika text, which the advocate of the first view alleges to be the conveyor of Sureśvara's real opinion, allows, in fact, to the members of all the other two twice-born castes, not the first kind of renunciation which is a means of knowledge, but the second kind (*i.e.*, विद्वत्संन्यास) which is reserved for a perfect theosophist of whatever caste and creed. All restrictions of qualification are cut off for the person who has realised the truth.

To gather to a point all that has been said above, renunciation (*i.e.*, विविदिषासंन्यास) is a help-mate of hearing, etc., for Brâhmanas alone; Kshatriyas and Vaiśyas can hear, etc., even without renouncing the world.

Though in this view Kshatriyas and Vaiśyas are said to have the privilege of hearing, etc., their right is of secondary importance. The primary right belongs to the Brâhmana who has renounced the world. The Vedic as well as Smârta texts which lay down rules for hearing, etc., make it a point that the life of the aspirer should be incessantly employed in meditating upon the same subject. Now complete engrossment in questions relating to Brahman is not possible for those who are not in the fourth stage of life. The Brâhmana who has renounced the world is, therefore, better qualified for hearing, etc., than the Kshatriya and Vaiśya, who have to spend their lives in worldly duties, being forbidden to renounce the world for the attainment of knowledge (सि. ले., pages 92–93).

---

* विरोधेत्वनपेक्षं स्यादसति ह्यनुमानम् ॥ पू. मी. I. ३३.

SECTION III.

Methods of realizing Brahman.

All qualifications for an aspirer of absolution have now been determined. Now what further steps should he take for realizing his identity with Brahman? The answer is that he should take one of the following two ways :—(1) सांख्यमार्ग or the way of philosophical investigation, and (2) योगमार्ग or way of contemplation.

(*a*) The first is the royal road and is described in every practical treatise of Vedânta. The point of starting is the hearing of Vedânta texts from a profound and sympathetic teacher. It is only the Upanishads that can give accurate knowledge of Brahman. The proper hearing from beginning to end will convince the hearer that the ultimate import of all the holy texts is in establishing the identity of Individual Soul with Brahman. The doubt as regards the validity of the Vedânta texts (*i.e.*, प्रमाणगतसंदेह), the recognized source of Gnosis, is removed by hearing. The second step is ratiocination of what is heard. Reason is allowed to examine from all sides the import of the Vedânta texts. All possible doubts with respect to the nature of Brahman, the subject of inquiry (*i.e.*, प्रमेयगतसंदेह), are set aside by ratiocination. The conviction of the absolute nature of Self brought about by hearing and ratiocination is verified by experience based upon deep meditation (निदिध्यासन) of Self. Constant meditation does away with all forms of perverse knowledge and obstructions, (विपरीतभावना) in the form of impressions of actions, and reveals the true nature of Self. The moment the absolute character of Self is realised, the phenomenal world subsides together with its generating cause, Mâyâ. The destination is now reached and the aspirer becomes the perfect ascetic. 'When seeing Brahman as the highest and the lowest everywhere, all knots of our heart, all sorrows are split, all doubts vanish and our works become nothing' (Muṇḍaka, III, ii. 8) (सि. ले., pages 93–94).

(*b*) The same goal can be reached by contemplation of Brahman devoid of qualities.

Bhâratitirtha in his Dhyânadîpa spares no pains to prove that this method of knowing Brahman is no innovation of subsequent writers. Holy texts like the following evidently show that contemplative devotion to the Absolute is another means of liberation.

'That cause can be comprehended by reflection over its nature through Vedânta texts as well as by contemplation of its absolute nature' (श्वे. उ. VI. 13). 'The goal which is reached by philosophical inquirers is also attained by contemplators' (भ. गी. IV. 5).

Again, contemplation of Brahman as devoid of qualities should not be rejected as an impossibility. Because Praśnopanishad, Tâpanîya, Kathavalli, etc., elaborately treat of its method. Bâdarâyaṇa, in a chapter of Brahmasûtras which deals with the nature of qualities of Brahman, mentions positive attributes like joyful, intelligent, etc, as well as negative ones like measureless, colourless etc. Both kinds of attributes are referred to the Absolute and yet the contemplation of such Brahman can be called निर्गुणोपासना or meditation of conditionless Brahman. The chief distinction between the contemplations of conditioned and unconditioned Brahman is that in the former the devotee looks upon it as really connected with those attributes, while in the latter positive and negative qualities are not viewed as essentially connected with it, but as suggesting its absolute nature. Hence joyful, etc., do not enter into the essence of the contemplated Brahman but act as a gateway for grasping its true nature. In the contemplation of the conditioned Brahman those and similar other properties form a part of the contemplation.

The S'ruti text which denies the contemplation of Brahman should be understood in the sense that Brahman as such is impossible to contemplate. In like manner, the text, which

shows the impossibility of knowing it, means that it can never become the object of knowledge in its absolute nature. All the methods of knowing and contemplating Brahman are based upon that aspect of Brahman which is quite close to the Absolute. That aspect vanishes when the knower or contemplator ceases to exist as an indepenent entity.

Thus after showing the authoritativeness of the method of contemplative devotion to the Absolute, and removing the stigma of its impossibility, Bhâratîtîrtha proceeds to describe the nature of the aspirer who travels by that road, and of his spiritual guide. No sharp intellect is required of the aspirer. It is sufficient if he be perfectly moral, self-controlled and devoted to his teacher. The teacher, too, need not be as learned and profound as in the first case. He must be pure in conduct and thoroughly conversant with the traditional lore. A perfect sage of the first method, both learned and moral, can give lessons in philosophy and contemplation to his two disciples of different mental calibre.

It may be noticed in conclusion that though contemplation is a means of liberation, it is not as efficacious and prominent as philosophical investigation, because a man whose obstructing sins are washed off realises Brahman by the latter more easily than by the former An aspirer for realising Brahman who works through contemplation is advised to proceed by the scientific method of Patañjali (सि. ले., pages 95–96).

Section IV.

Instrumental cause of the realization of Brahman.

In the treatment of our subject we have followed the wise remark of Lord Bacon that " the truth of direction must precede severity of observance." The direction leading to absolution has been determined. Now the aspirer is required to make a steady progress in that line with the help of some instrument of realization. A traveller cannot reach his

destination unless he utilizes his own legs or some conveyance. In like manner the aspirer, after taking the proper course should employ some instrument in the production of the desired effect, *viz*, realization of Brahman.

(*a*) Some say that meditation–series of thoughts–on the same object called प्रसंख्यान is the required instrumental cause. In the first method it corresponds to निदिध्यासन which consists in the unbroken flow of ideas with respect to Brahman. In the second it is the ardent contemplative devotion to the object of search or love (समाधि or योगभक्ति).

The following are the reasons to assume meditation as the instrumental cause of Gnosis :—

(1) A Vedic text declares that a man sees Brahman by the unceasing flow of thought (*i e.*, meditation).

(2) In a somewhat similar perception of his beloved by a lover in her actual absence, meditation is admitted to be the instrumental cause. Because senses in the absence of the object cannot operate; and mind, too, has no freedom to move outside the body. Why the perception of the absent woman is imaginary, and that of Brahman real, will be explained later on.

(3) Bâdarâyaṇa has proved in the Brahma Sûtras that meditation is an instrument by which the conditioned Brahman is realized. The rule holds good in the realization of the unconditioned Brahman

The objection that meditation, being not regarded as an instrumental cause of right knowledge, cannot produce the correct knowledge of Brahman, is thus answered :—

Just as the modification of Mâyâ makes God comprehend the true nature of things in spite of its not being included in the list of instrumental causes of right knowledge, so meditation may enable a person to comprehend the true thing. The object cognized in both the cases being never sublated, the correctness of knowledge cannot be gainsaid. It matters

little if meditation or modification of Mâyâ be not regarded as a means of knowledge in the ordinary sphere of experience.

As a matter of fact, however, the meditation of Brahman is based upon Vedânta texts—which are admitted to be the means of right knowledge—either carefully comprehended or casually perused, and consequently the knowledge of Brahman which follows from it is the result of the operation of the means of right knowledge. In the first method of knowing Brahman, meditation is based upon the thorough comprehension of the Vedânta texts; in the second, upon a partial comprehension of them. Thus meditation is in itself a correct means of Gnosis in consequence of its dependence on the Vedânta texts (सि. ले., page 96).

(*b*) Others maintain that meditation by itself is not the instrumental cause, for it being a perpetual stream of ideas flowing from mind is unable to grasp the thing when cut off from its source. Mere mind, too, is not the instrument, for without the streams of ideas it is incompetent to environ the object of knowledge. Thus mind, accompanied by an unceasing flow of ideas of Brahman, is the required instrumental cause. A Vedic* text also corroborates this theory:—'This minute Self is to be known by means of mind which is made sharp by meditation.' Even in the analogous instance of the presentation of an absent woman, mind, associated with meditation and not the latter alone, is the instrumental cause. But that presentation is said to be an offspring of imagination as the object is absent; whereas the cognition of Brahman is said to be real, because its object is present everywhere, and because meditation to which that cognition is due is based upon the solid foundation of Scriptures (सि. ले., page 97).

(*c*) A third view is that the great sentence 'That art† thou' is the instrumental cause. The following Vedic texts make Brahman the exclusive object of Word: Sages‡ who have determined the nature of things by knowledge accruing

---

* दृश्यते त्वग्र्यया बुद्धया सूक्ष्मया सूक्ष्मदर्शिभिः (काठक I. iii. 12).
† तत्वमसि (छा. vi.). ‡ मुण्डक III, ii. 6.

from Vedânta, &c.'; 'I ask* you about that Being who is realised by means of the Upanishads.'

Again, the text that Brahman is not thought by mind expressly denies its instrumentality in the realization of Brahman. A similiar text where Word is rejected as a means of knowing Brahman should not be advanced as detrimental to the present theory.† Because even those who regard mind as the instrument must admit Word to have the power of giving indirect knowledge of Brahman, Thus the burden of reconciling that Vedic text is on both. The rational explanation of the text is that Brahman in its absolute character cannot become the object of the primary power of Vedânta words; it *does* become the object of their secondary power.

The objector might here retort that other texts‡ such as—"It should be observed by mind alone"—would, according to the above theory, turn out to be meaningless. To this it may be replied that fixity of mind is undoubtedly required for the realisation of Brahman. But this requirement does not prove the sole instrumentality of mind, for however fixed the mind may be Brahman will not be revealed unless the mind is directed in the path described by the Vedânta sentence—"That art thou." The direct instrument is therefore, that great sentence to which substantial service is rendered by mind and meditation. Thus there is a kind of unity in difference of opinions, *i. e.*, all are at one that the great Vedânta text, mind and meditation help one another in the realisation of Brahman (सि. ले., page 98).

Section V.

Dispeller of Ignorance.

It has been shown that those who are labouring under fickleness of mind are incompetent to realise the nature of Brahman. The remedy to cure that mental disease is medi-

---

* बृ. उ. ix. 26. † केनोपनिषद् I. 4 and 5. ‡ काठक IV. 11, &c..

tation admitted in both the methods of realization. When the aspirer has attained perfect stability of mind, the great Vedic text produces consciousness of his identity with Brahman. No sooner is this consciousness produced than primitive Ignorance, the foundation of this phenomenal world, subsides.

Now the law of the removal of Ignorance is that the same thing concealed by Ignorance ought to be the object of knowledge. In the system of Vedânta all things are mere appearances, brought about by Ignorance, of pure Intelligence, which is the same as pure Being. In every act of knowledge the thing loses its covering, as it were, of Ignorance, and appears as existent through the pure existence of Brahman.* One of the doctrines of Vedânta is that Brahman—Pure Existence—which is the object of primitive Ignorance, is revealed by knowledge in the form 'I am Brahman.' The opponent here argues that there is no necessity of attaining that kind of knowledge for the removal of primitive Ignorance, because any other knowledge, say, of a jar, does not refer to the material jar, but to the underlying Intelligence, which has been hidden by the power of Ignorance. Thus one and the same substance (*viz.* Intelligence) is the object of Ignorance and Knowledge. The latter can, therefore, dispel the former. The opponent then tries to refute all possible objections against his conclusion, and ultimately decides that the knowledge of any external thing is, like the knowledge of Brahman, capable of dispelling primitive Ignorance. There is therefore, no use of endeavouring to secure the knowledge of Brahman through Vedânta.

*It should be thoroughly borne in mind that Ignorance in Vedânta does not mean absence of knowledge, but a positive substance incapable of existing apart from Brahman or Intelligence. External objects are so many transformations of that world-evolving Fiction, which are brought to light by the underlying Intelligence made manifest by the modification of mind which goes by the name of knowledge, As long as that modification is not produced, the thing remains environed by its cause, *viz.*, Ignorance. Every act of knowledge, then means the removal of the environing Ignorance and the manifestation of the underlying or, to speak technically, the thing-limited Intelligence.

(*a*) Advaitavidyâchârya refutes the adversary's position, and ascertains the conditions of the removal of Ignorance in the following way :—

The opponent's reasoning is based upon the assumption that the knowledge of a jar in the form of the modification of mind has for its object not the material jar but the pure Intelligence limited by it, which is also the object of primitive Ignorance. This assumption consequently led to the conclusion that the knowledge of something like a jar had the power of removing primitive Ignorance. With this conclusion the Vedânta philosophy, notwithstanding its divine origin and accurate reasoning, loses all its worth.

But the assumption of the opponent which has led to this disastrous conclusion has no foundation. Because the modification of mind, which passes for the knowledge of a thing, has not for its object Intelligence, but the material thing itself. That the knowledge of an external thing does not refer to the underlying Intelligence follows from the Vedic text:—'His (Self's) form is imperceptible, and hence none sees him with his eyes: the Self-born has given an external bias to the senses, which in consequence thereof perceive external things and not the internal soul' (काठक. IV. I).

The text* of Vârtika, which declares that Brahman becomes perceptible in every act of cognition, means that on the rise of every modification of mind, which accompanies each cognition, the Ignorance, associated with the object of perception, loses its concealing power, and consequently the Intelligence shines of its own accord as pure existence together with the thing. The text does not lay down that the Intelligence is objectively referred to by the modification.

The material thing like a jar stands as object of knowledge, which dispels its environing Ignorance and brings it to light. It was objected that material things, on account of their very materiality or non-intelligent nature, cannot form objects of

---

* सर्वप्रत्ययवेद्ये वा ब्रह्मरूपे व्यवस्थिते ॥

Ignorance. In other words, material things being themselves the products of Ignorance do not require any other principle to hide them; it is only Intelligence which can be said as being enveloped in Ignorance. This objection, however, is not well founded. We do admit that Ignorance properly envelopes Intelligence; but at the same time we hold that material objects, on account of their invariable association with Intelligence, appear as if hidden by Ignorance *i e.*, they are admitted to have an unknown existence (अज्ञातसत्व) in the empirical world. Thus material things are secondarily, though not primarily, objects of Ignorance. The jar, for instance, being thus secondarily enveloped by Ignorance becomes visible when primarily referred to by the modification of mind.

To summarise the view of Advaitavidyâchârya, Ignorance is of two kinds: (1) Primitive (मूलाज्ञान) and (2) secondary (अवस्थाज्ञान). The former has for its object Brahman, the pure unlimited Intelligence; while the latter has its primary object in limited Intelligence, and secondary object in material things which limit and appear, as it were, one with the underlying Intelligence. Now the knowledge of any external thing actually refers to that thing and thereby dispels its concealing secondary Ignorance. The thing then shines through the light of Intelligence. This knowledge does not refer to Intelligence either limited or unlimited, and is thus unable to destroy primitive Ignorance, which has reference to that Intelligence It is only destroyed when the knowledge has for its object Brahman, which is different from primitive Ignorance and its effects, and is hidden by that Ignorance (सि. ले., pages 99–101).

(*b*) The general rule that material or non-intelligent objects cannot be referred to by Ignorance was adhered to both in the case of primitive and secondary Ignorance in the preceding view. Secondary Ignorance was, however, allowed a mediate power of hiding material things which shine as one with Intelligence, its immediate object.

Another view is that the rule holds good only in the case of primitive Ignorance. That is to say, the immaterial principle is the only object of that Ignorance. In consequence, the knowledge which can remove that Ignorance must refer only to Brahman.

Secondary Ignorances have only material things for their object. No Intelligence can stand in an objective relation to those Ignorances. For let us suppose the Intelligence limited by a piece of sandalwood to be the object of the modification of mind coming through the sense of sight. Now if that Intelligence, and not the material piece of wood, were the object of secondary Ignorance, the said modification should simultaneously make the piece of wood and its fragrance perceptible. Because the secondary Ignorance, which has for its substratum and object the said Intelligence, is entirely destroyed by the said modification, so that the material thing which is imposed upon that Intelligence, should be made manifest with all its properties. If it be said, in order to escape from this difficulty, that the said modification does not reveal the sandal-limited Intelligence, it would follow that the piece and its colour, too, cannot be made perceptible by that modification.

Thus by making the limited Intelligence the object of secondary Ignorance, any modification of mind connected with the thing would be expected to lay bare all its properties. It is a futile objection to say that the Intelligence limited by the fragrance of sandalwood is not made manifest by the modification which comes through the sense of sight, and consequently the fragrance is not cognised. Because Intelligence being without parts cannot exist in a twofold character in one and the same material thing. That is to say, properties of a material object cannot be the limiting adjuncts of Intelligence independent of that object, because all of them are equally inherent in the substance. Hence the moment the limited Intelligence of the sandalwood is made manifest

all the properties of that wood, *viz.*, fragrance, &c , should be made cognizable. But such is not the case in ordinary experience.

Secondary Ignorances have, therefore, material things for their object.

The present view then establishes the following principle :—

Every material substance or property has its own secondary Ignorance, which is removeable by that modification of mind which refers to its (*i. e.*, of ignorance) object, *viz.*, substance or property. Thus when a piece of wood is referred to by the modification coming through the sense of sight, that secondary Ignorance only which enveloped the form and colour of that wood is withdrawn, and consequently only the form and colour are cognised.

The original objection that the knowledge of any external thing is capable of removing primitive Ignorance on account of its referring to pure Intelligence, which is also the object of that Ignorance, is refuted in this view by the falsity of the middle term. The knowledge of an external thing has not got Intelligence for its object, but the thing itself which is also the object of secondary Ignorance (सि. ले., page 102).

(*c*) Another method of solving the problem is as below:—

The knowledge of an external thing *does* refer to the limited Intelligence, which, being essentially one with the unlimited Intelligence, is the object of primitive Ignorance. But that knowledge cannot dispel primitive Ignorance, because the Vedic text—Self is to be heard, &c.—lays down a restriction that, although all kinds of knowledge evidently refer to pure Intelligence, only that knowledge which is produced by the Vedânta text, and accompained by the religious merit accruing from the carrying out of the said injunction, has the power to remove primitive Ignorance which hides Brahman (सि. ले., page 103).

(*d*) The last view is that primitive Ignorance hides the identity of the Individual and Supreme Soul, *i.e.*, the object of that Ignorance is the said identity and not Brahman as such. Consequently the knowledge resulting from the great Vedânta text "That art thou," which refers to that identity, dispels the said Ignorance. All other knowledges, which have for their object pure Intelligence, have, therefore, no power to destroy primitive Ignorance.

Here an objector argues that if the identity be different from the pure Intelligence, the Vedântin should give up his position that Brahman is the only principle existent ; and that if the identity be the same as Intelligence, the so-called knowledge of an external thing, which refers to that Intelligence, ought to refer to that identity, and consequently should destroy primitive Ignorance which hides the identity.

The plain answer to this objection is that in the above theory, the phrase "knowledge of identity" does not mean that the object of that knowledge is something different from Brahman. On the contrary, we do maintain that the knowledge of identity is essentially the same as the knowledge of Brahman. In other words, the object of the said knowledge is one and the same thing, *viz* , Brahman. But the difference lies in the productive materials. Both the knowledges, so to say, of the jar and the identity of the Individual and the Supreme Soul refer to the pure Intelligence, but the former is generated in such a way that the identity is not at all touched by it, whereas the latter, on account of its dependence on the direct or primary senses of the words ' that ' and 'thou,' their recollection, the adjectival relation between the two things, the contradiction in their literal identity, the comprehension of the secondary senses of those words, and the final residuum in the form of identity, is produced with a touch of oneness of the so-called two principles—Jîva and Îśa. To illustrate this, let us take the complex (विशिष्ट) knowledge of a man with a staff. Here the knowledge refers to the same things as are touched by the analytical (विशेषण)

knowledge, *i.e.*, the man and the staff are the objects both of the complex and analytical knowledges. The difference, however, lies in the mode of attaining them. The analytical knowledge takes into account those terms, while the complex knowledge embraces the very terms in a special relation. In like manner, though the knowledge of the jar refers to pure Intelligence, the object of the knowledge of identity, it is altogether silent with respect to the identity which is hidden by primitive Ignorance. But the knowledge of the identity, owing to the peculiar force of its producing circumstances mentioned above, touches the very identity, and dispels the Ignorance which covers it (सि. ले., page 103).

SECTION VI.

The ultimate fate of the last modification of Mind which embraces Brahman.

We have now come safe out of the labyrinth of abstruse metaphysics of Vedánta. Let us, then, breathe the free atmosphere of common sense. It has been shown that the last modification of mind that is generated by the Vedic text 'That art thou' or 'I am Brahman' annihilates primitive Ignorance, and through it the whole phenomenal world. This modification or, in other words, the direct knowledge of Brahman, ought to subside in order to leave Brahman in its native secondless character. What is, then, the cause of the destruction of that modification? We are at a loss to determine its destroyer on account of the absence of all things other than itself.

(*a*) Some answer the question as follows:—Just as the powder of Kataka fruit, when thrown in impure water, carries down all its impurity and at the same time goes itself to the bottom of the vessel, so the knowledge of Brahman, while dispelling the whole phenomenal world, also dispels itself (सि. ले., page 104).

(*b*) Others explain away the difficulty by the following illustration :—A drop of water thrown on a red hot iron ball quells the heat of it to a certain extent and disappears of its own accord. In like manner, the knowledge of Brahman simultaneously brings about the destruction* of the whole world and its own nature (सि.ले., page 104).

(*c*) A similar illustration is given by others in the solution of this problem. Fire after burning a heap of grass, is extinguished of itself, so the knowledge of Brahman having destroyed the whole world also destroys itself.

In all the preceding views the principle on which the destruction of the knowledge of Brahman takes place is the same, *viz.*, it becomes the cause of its own destruction. To follow out in detail the arguments which establish this principle of self-destruction would be beyond the scope of the present volume (सि. ले., page 104).

(*d*) Another view is that the knowledge of Brahman in the form of the modification of mind is not the destroyer of primitive Ignorance and its effects, for Ignorance can only be destroyed by the light of Intelligence. The modification of mind being itself non-intelligent cannot destroy that Ignorance. The intelligent aspect of the modification is due not on account of its essential intelligent nature, but is derived from pure Self-consciousness which is the noumenon of all things. Hence Self-consciousness, which in its generic form is not hostile to Ignorance as it proves its very existence, is destructive to it when it specially shines in the modification embracing the Absolute or the Indivisible Homogeneous element. This fact may be illustrated by the rays of the sun, which, though in their ordinary character illumine grass, &c., actually burn them when reflected on them through a sun-stone. Again, just as fire catching a

* "Destruction" here means not the physical annihilation, but the metaphysical non-being.

small shrub burns the whole forest together with the shrub, so the light of Intelligence or Consciousness reflected in the modification of mind destroys the whole phenomenal world, together with that modification which is called the knowledge of Brahman (सि. ले., page 105).

(*e*) In the last preceding view the cause of the destruction of the knowledge of Brahman was thought to be the light of Intelligence in its reflected character. The fifth view is that the final modification of mind embracing Brahman, which goes by the name of knowledge, is destroyed after Ignorance is destroyed. In other words, the destruction of the latter becomes the cause of the destruction of the former. Knowledge destroys Ignorance ; this destruction of Ignorance brings about the destruction of the modification of mind.

It is a rule that a direct contradiction subsists between knowledge and Ignorance and not between knowledge and the products of Ignorance. But when Ignorance, the material cause of the world, is destroyed, the world can no longer exist. The knowledge of Brahman in the form of modification of mind falls within the world and is destroyed subsequent to the destruction of Ignorance.

The world does not turn-out to be real from its non-destruction by knowledge, *i. e.*, all things that are not destroyed by knowledge are real; the world is not destroyed by knowledge; therefore it is real. This conclusion is not valid, for the destruction of the world is indirectly due to knowledge. The knowledge of Brahman puts down the world-evolving Fiction ; the destruction of that Fiction leads to the destruction of the world. Thus the knowledge of Brahman being at least the indirect cause of the destruction of the world, the latter is undoubtedly unreal.

There is one advantage in the admission of the rule that a direct contradiction subsists between knowledge and

Ignorance only. If the knowledge of Brahman be admitted to be the destroyer both of Ignorance and its products, the theory of liberation in a living state would be inexplicable. The perfect sage, on the opposite theory, should be totally unconscious of his body and mind, since they are annihilated by knowledge. But when knowledge is the direct opposite of Ignorance only, body, &c., may appear in a semblance-state to the released soul in consequence of the presence of fructescent works, which sustain his life till they come to an end. The state of a released soul in a living body is described in Vedânta with its usual fertility of metaphors. Fire burns a piece of cloth, which continues to exist in a semblance-state for a short time; so a liberated being seems to have been encaged in a mortal frame until fructescent works come to an end.

CHAPTER IV.

Liberation.

The regenerate saves himself and the groaning creation: and yet affirmation still continues, even after he has found the way out of the circle. Also this world for ever and aye will exist, will affirm, will suffer, but again all time in the light of denial is nothing and all that it contains fades away as the shadow-play on the wall for the Will when it has turned.

(Deussen)

SECTION I.

The residuum of Ignorance, the sustainer of liberation in a living state.

The sham appearance of body and its activity of a released soul can only be accounted for by the admission of a portion of Ignorance, which subsists for a while even after the rise of knowledge. When the influence of fructescent works comes to an end, that appearance also ceases and the liberated sage is merged for ever in the illimitable ocean of pure Thought, Being and Bliss. The former state is called Jîvan-mukti or liberation in a living body; the latter Videha mukti or liberation after the destruction of body. The difference between the two kinds of liberation is rather in name than in essence, for the identity of the Individual Soul with the Supreme being which transcends all difference is vividly manifest in both the states. Even fructescent works, the sustainer of the body and its activity, do not exist apart from Brahman in the eye of the released soul. They explain, however, the harmless activity of the perfect sage to the unreleased beings. Vidyâraṇya, therefore, in his Jîvan-muktiviveka does away with all distinction between the two kinds of liberation. In the present section we assume the existence of a portion of ignorance which keeps us the active life of the released sage and try to investigate its nature

(*a*) Some are of opinion that Primitive Ignorance, which is possessed of the two powers of concealing and projecting, retains a little of the latter after the rise of knowledge owing to the presence of fructescent works. This degree of the projecting power of Primitive Ignorance explains the possibility of liberation in a living body (सि. ले., page 106).

(*b*) Others maintain that the impression of Ignorance which survives the destruction of Ignorance is the sustainer of *Jîvan-mukti*. That such an impression is possible to exist even after the removal of the substance of which it is the impression is proved by the scent of garlic coming out of the vessel which has been thoroughly cleansed (सि. ले., page 107).

(*c*) A third view is that Primitive Ignorance itself which exists in a lifeless state like a burnt piece of cloth is the cause of *Jîvan-mukti* (सि. ले., page 107).

(*d*) Sarvajñâtmamuni, however, throws off the burden of explaining the nature of the portion of Ignorance which keeps up *Jîvan-mukti* by distrusting that kind of absolution. He is of opinion that the moment the essential unity of Intelligence is comprehended, the world, including body and its activity, ceases to exist in the eye of the released soul. The sage is no longer existing in the ordinary sense of the term. He is all Existence and Bliss. Thus there is only one kind of absolution in which everything is reduced to Brahman (सि. ले., page 107).

Section II.

Cessation of Ignorance (अज्ञाननिवृत्ति).

In one of the sections of the third Chapter it has been shown that knowledge has the power to dispel Ignorance. It is now proposed to inquire into the nature of the cessation of Ignorance.

(*a*) The author of Advaitabrahmasiddhi holds that cessation of Ignorance is identical with Self. The futility of

knowledge which results from the eternal character of that cessation of Ignorance consequent upon the permanence of Self with which it is identical, is put aside in the following way:—

Nescience, the cause of evil, exists till knowledge is produced ; and the evil subsists as long as its cause endures. The attempt of attaining knowledge is, therefore, not futile inasmuch as it destroys Nescience and thereby evil.

It should not be objected that the above answer presupposes a beginning of the cessation of Ignorance which is contradictory to the original assumption that the cessation is identical with Self, *i e.*, without beginning and end. Because it may be replied that accomplishable objects (साध्यवस्तु) are of two kinds : (1) Those which have a beginning, *e. g.*, jar, and (2) those which have no beginning. Those which are brought into new existence are accomplishable objects of the first kind, such as all tangible products of the world. Those which have no beginning and are yet said to be accomplishable are such as appear in the next moment following the presence of something else and disappear in the absence of that thing. The cessation in question is an accomplishable object of the second type, for it is manifested in the form of Self when the knowledge of Brahman is present and disappears in the absence of that knowledge, *i.e.*, when ignorance, its counter-entity, comes into play. Thus manifestation of Self is what is to be understood by the cessation of ignorance, and in this sense both Self and cessation of Ignorance are said to be identical (सि. ले., page 107).

(*b*) Ânandabodhâchârya, however, maintains that it is not one with Self. It is not an absolutely existent thing like Self; it is not a mere non-entity like the horn of a hare; neither is it possessed of existence and non-existence, nor is it an indescribable entity like Nescience. The reasons why it does not fall in one of the four predicaments are the following:—

If the cessation of Ignorance were an absolutely existent thing like Self, there would result duality; it cannot be com-

pletely non-existent, for it is beyond the power of knowledge to bring about real non-existence. Knowledge is incapable of generating an actual non-entity. It has merely the power of dispelling a sham existence which has been regarded as real like the appearance of silver in the mother-o'-pearl. The cessation, again, cannot be existent and non-existent at one and the same time on account of the *prima facie* contradiction. Finally it cannot be an object of indescribable existence like Nescience for two reasons: (1) All indescribable objects that have a beginning have Nescience for their material cause. The cessation of Ignorance which exists at the time of absolution—a state free from Nescience—cannot be due to Nescience. (2) if it be indescribable, and hence unreal or illusory, it must be capable of being removed by knowledge.* But such a knowledge is not possible in the state of liberation where knowledge-producing circumstances such as mind, &c , are absent. In point of fact, liberation is always accompanied by cessation of Ignorance. Knowledge is then incapable of removing it.

Thus the cessation of Ignorance is an object of the fifth kind, since it is incapable of being included in the absolutely existent, non-existent, both existent and non-existent, and indescribable objects (सि. ते., page 107).

(*c*) In the opinion of Advaitavidyâchârya, the cessation of Ignorance is indescribable. The first objection against this view was that the cessation which is supposed to continue in the state of absolution ought to be comminged with its material cause, Nescience. And if this is conceded it would follow that there can be no absolution which is a state free from Nescience. Secondly, it was objected that the cessation ought to be removeable by knowledge, which in liberation cannot arise again. In reply to these objections the upholder of the present view says that the cessation is not a continuous change in Ignorance. Just as beginning is a positive

* Knowledge means —

change in the causal substance occurring at the first moment of the rise of effect, so end or cessation is a positive change in the effect taking place in the last moment. In other words beginning and cessation are, truly speaking, positive ideas having a momentary existance. If cessation were a continuous idea, a jar for instance, which has been broken long since would be spoken of as undergoing destruction now, *i. e*, vanishing at the present moment.

Thus the cessation in question is a positive change occuring in the next moment after the rise of Knowledge and vanishing in the same moment. Its continuity in absolution is impossible and consequently the objections raised are wide of mark. It is indescribable inasmuch as Ignorance to which it refers and knowledge through which it is acomplished precede it (सि. ले., page 108).

Section III.

Conception of the Summum Bonum.

The opponent at this stage of our inquiry might argue that if cessation of Ignoranee be a momentary condition and not a continuous state, absolution would not be a permanent end of life. In other words, absolution consists in absence of Ignorance; now this absence must be continuous; else absolution would not be an eternal freedom from mundane existence.*

(*a*) It may be replied that the cessation of Ignorance by itself does not constitute the chief end of life, because it is neither absence of pain nor attainment of bliss. It is the complete destruction of worldly pain and the realization of unceasing bliss that is regarded to be the main end of life.

---

* That absolution consists in absence of Ignorance is not an imaginary objection of the opponent. If was the fundamental tenet of one of S'ankara's direct disciples, Padmapâda, who concludes his long argument as regards the nature of liberation with the sentence तस्मान्मिथ्याज्ञाननिवृत्तिमात्रं मोक्षः *i.e.*, Absolution consists solely in the cessation of false knowledge (*vide* Panch Pâdikâ, page 91).

The cessation of Ignorance is, no doubt, useful inasmuch as it results in the absence of all pain and realization of all bliss (सि., ॐ., page 109).

(*b*) Chitsukhâchârya proceeds one step further. He holds that not only the cessation of Ignorance, but even the absence of all pain does not constitute the end of life. The *summum bonum* consists only in the realisation of all bliss, which is a synonym for Self-bliss. The absence of pain is an invariable antecedent of the manifestation of Self-bliss, just as the cessation of Ignorance invariably precedes the absence of pain. He establishes his own theory by the following arguments:—All kinds of human activity are directed towards only one end, *vie.*, attainment of happiness. Now happiness is the essential nature of Self, which is hidden by pain, the result of Nescience. The absence of pain which follows the destruction of Ignorance means the absence of that which prevents the manifestation of happiness, which forms the essence of Self. Thus the absence of pain is coveted in so far as it leads to the manifestation of bliss. In other words, the absence of misery is subordinate to happiness, because it is desired not for itself but for the realisation of happiness.

The converse of Chitsukha's theory–that the absence of pain is coveted for itself and the attainment of bliss is subordinate to it–is untenable. If the cessation of pain were the sole end of human activity, the gratification of sexual appetite, for instance, would be coveted by none. Because that apppetite, if it be unlawful, would be mingled with numerous cares and anxieties which none would undergo had the cessation of pain alone been the sole end of the activity to gratify it. But as the momentary pleasure accruing from the gratification of lust, though fraught with excessive cares, is sought for with the utmost eagerness and vehemence by some bestial persons, it follows that they set before their eye, not the mere absence of pain, but the attainment of pleasure as the end of their activity. The momentariness of this pleasure does not in the least show the

is a positive idea and consequently admits of increase and decrease. The individual may, therefore, voluntarily suffer a number of anxieties for attaining a state replete with joy. The vicious person, therefore, sets a high value even upon the momentary pleasure, and hence willingly undergoes all kinds of trouble. If absence of pain were the end of human activity, variety of miseries would not be voluntarily accepted for that ultimate absence of pain which cannot outweigh the antecedent miseries.

It should not be supposed, however, that Vedânta sets the pleasures of the senses, either lawful or unlawful, as the chief end of human life. For it condemns even intellectual pleasures, which are finer than those of the senses, when compared with the immeasurable bliss of Self. 'It is the essence of moral weakness that it forms a mistaken estimate of presend good, and a want of proportion will, therefore, be found of necessity between the objects of desire and the means employed to obtain them.' The Upanishads teem with the idea that the highest phenomenal pleasures realisable in the world of Brahmâ are mere drops when compared with the ocean of Self-bliss in which a released soul fearlessly swims. It is with the view of raising the ideal of happiness that Vedânta lays so much stress upon the moral culture of the aspirer. The bliss of Self is noumenal and has no bounds.

Thus the cessation of worldly pain does not, like the cessation of Ignorance, constitute the chief end of human life. The realisation of pure Self-bliss is and ought to be the guiding principle of our activity (सि. ले., page 110.

Section IV.

Attainment of Self-bliss.

Now the question is—what are we to understand by the attainment of illimitable Self-bliss or the joy of Brahman?

(*a*) In the first place, it may be objected that the illimitable Bliss, being the essential nature of Self (प्रत्यग्रूपतया)

is always attained. The attainment of what forms the very nature of the attainer is a logical absurdity.

In reply to this objection some maintain that the illimitable Bliss, though one with Self, is concealed by Nescience, and thereby appears, as it were, unattained. When that Nescience, the mother of all evil, is annihilated by the knowledge of Brahman, the illimitable Bliss shines forth in its native purity. This manifestation of innate joy, which already exists, is called its attainment. Such an attainment is illustrated by the recognition of a golden necklace on the neck which was thought to have been lost (सि. ले, page 110).

(*b*) In the above view, the attainment was thought to be secondary (गौण). There are others who are of opinion that although the illimitable Bliss is the essence of Self and consequently its absence is inconceivable, we are obliged to admit a kind of fictitious absence (काल्पनिकाभाव) of it in order to account for the popular belief that such joy is never experienced in the state of mundane existence. This notion of the men of the world continues till the destruction of Nescience. The cessation of Nescience is followed by the removal of that belief of the non-existence of the illimitable Bliss. Knowledge of Brahman, which brings about the cessation of Nescience, gives rise to the innate joy which was non-existent in the state of Ignorance. The attainment of the Bliss in question is, therefore, of primary character (मुख्या प्राप्ति :). It may be noticed that the illimitable Bliss as it now exists, is not the chief end of life, but the direct *comprehension* of it deserves to be styled the highest aim of life (सि. ले., page 111).

Section V.

Nature of the Released Soul.

It will not be amiss here to take a restrospective view of the progress we have made. The chapter commenced with

the truth that Gnosis alone drives away Primitive Nescience. The removal of Nescience is followed by the cessation of all pain and realisation of all bliss. This is the destination, the remote goal, for the arrival at which the aspirer takes all pains to abandon his love for worldly pleasures and attachment to his subjective environments like body, mind, &c. He commences his journey with the belief that all the differences with which he is encompassed derive their meaning from his absolute existence. This belief is verified when he realises the goal. His view is now unlimited, for it originates from the pinnacle of the Absolute. Let us imagine a person, who has realised this ideal state of life by treading patiently the practical path of Vedânta. We are not in a position to fathom his conditionless character, being tied down by the limitations imposed upon us by the forms of our intellect. But although a young bird which tries its wings cannot soar high like its parents, it can form a distant idea of the expansive sky in which its parents delightfully roam. Thus, in the absence of our direct experience, we shall try to form an idea, however remote it may be, of the state of the released soul, by the help of our two wings, the Scriptures and Teacher.

There are only two possible alternatives ; either he becomes totally absorbed in Brahman, unconscious of his individuality, or becomes one with God-Qualified Brahman—and attains omniscience, omnipotence, &c. It should be borne in mind, however, that in the second alternative the released soul, though possessed of all divine powers, is not unconscious of his essential oneness with pure Brahman.

(*a*) Now, those who hold the doctrine of one Jîva are obliged to admit the first alternative, for the whole phenomenal world including God and Jîva subsides at the rise of knowledge* (सि. ले., page 111).

---

* *Vide* page 31 *supra*.

(*b*). Those who undertake to explain bondage and freedom on the theory of plurality of soul are of opinion that that phenomenal world which is due to the Ignorance of a particular individual soul subsides on the cessation of it. But the world including God and Jîvas continues to exist in the eye of other souls that are not released owing to the presence of their individual Ignorances. The reader may be reminded of the two minor doctrinal differences in the above thinkers. (1) Some maintain that both Jîva and Îśa are species of reflection, while (2) others hold a triple division, as it were, of Intelligence. Jîva is a kind of reflection of Îśa, the original; pure Brahman is that Intelligence which underlies both Jîva and Îśa.*

(1) The released soul in the first view ought to become identical with pure Brahman, which casts its reflection in the reflectors of both Îśa and Jîva. Because when one thing (बिंब) is reflected in many reflectors, the destruction of one reflector causes its own reflection absorbed in that original thing. If that reflection were to become another reflection, and not the original, there is no reason why it should be absorbed in a particular reflection and in no other *i e.*, if one Jîva–a reflected Intelligence–were to become one with Îśa, who is no better than Jîva as far as his reflected nature is concerned, wat arguments have we got to show that it cannot turn into another Jîva—a reflection? Thus to assume that the released soul becomes indentical with Îśa–the omniscient reflection–would naturally lead to similar assumption of his again falling into the state of bondage—a hypothesis detrimental to Vedânta. Consequently, the released soul should be admitted as becoming one with pure Brahman, which stands as the original of both Îśa and Jîva.

(2) The upholders of the triple conception of Intelligence ought to hold the divine transformation of the liberated soul. Before proceeding to adduce arguments in favour of this

* *Vide* Chapter I, Sec. IV (*a*) to (*f*) and (*g*).

view, it would be advisable to determine the meanings of Jîva, Îśa and pure Brahman, used here.

Jîva is a complex principle consisting of (1) the underlying pure Intelligence or Brahman, (2) the reflector either in the form of Avidyâ or mind, and (3) the reflection of Îśa. Îśa represents a complex idea of pure Intelligence plus his relative character as the original (बिंब) of Jîva in Mâyâ, in which capacity he is omniscient and omnipotent. Pure Brahman is that which is the noumenon of the said two principles.

Now, when one Jîva has attained the knowledge of pure Brahman, his reflecting condition, *viz*, Avidyâ or mind, is destroyed. The reflection which it contained no longer exists apart from the original, *viz*., Îśa. In other words, when the reflecting condition of Jîva is annihilated, the residuum is the same as Îśa. Here, too, the principle of absorption is the same as in the first case, *viz*., the reflection ought to be absorbed in the original and in no other thing. When a single face is reflected in many mirrors, the removal of one mirror causes the absorption of its reflection in the face standing as the original (बिंबभूत), but not in the face as such. Because the face is not devoid of its character as the original until all the mirrors are removed. In like manner Îśa, who is the original and is essentially the same as pure Brahman becomes the place of absorption of the released souls. When all the adjuncts are destroyed, Îśa ceases to exist as Îśa, and all the released souls regain their essential identity with Brahman.

The orthodox Vedânta, however, does not admit of a total end of *Samsâra*, the cycle of metempsychosis. The adjuncts of the released souls are mixed into the function of Mâyâ from which they rose. At the commencement of a new æon these adjuncts evolve out of Mâyâ, contain new reflections of Intelligence and migrate a new egos in the phenomenal world. There is therefore, no scope for the reincarnation of the released souls.

The objection that the released soul, who is free from Mâyâ, the source of all divine powers, cannot be one with the omniscient Being, is untenable. For the very Îśa is possessed of supernatural powers, not through his own Mâyâ, but through the Avidyâ of other creatures. The released souls being totally one with that Îśa can be said to possess divine powers. It may be questioned–what is, then, the difference between the perfectly released souls and the devotees of Qualified Bsahman? Those devotees are also declared as undergoing a similiar transformation into Îśa. When the reward of devotion be the same as that of knowledge, the pursuit to attain the latter would turn out to be futile.

The problem is solved by the following differences :—

(1) The devotees are quite unconscious of the all-pervading noumenon—pure Brahman, and are not free from Ignorance and its effects, egoism, &c.

(2) As the concealing power of Nescience is not destroyed in their case, they do not enjoy unceasing Bliss.

(3) In the Brahma Sûtras it has been proved that they are equal to God in point of enjoying phenomenal pleasures, but they have not the power to create, preserve and destroy the universe which is solely possessed by God. The released souls being totally absorbed in God, possess both the divine powers and pleasures, and are thoroughly aware of their essential intelligent nature. They are, however, not engrossed in the phenomenal pleasures and powers, as the noumenal Self-bliss is shining for ever within them.

Let us answer another trivial objection to this theory, and bring to a close this section with the evidence of Śruti, Sûtras and Bhâshya.

When the released souls become one with God, they should undergo the same fate as He. God is declared as undergoing incarnation, and is therefore liable to the fate of ordinary mortals. In point of fact, His fate in the incarnation of Râma was lamentable. The identity with God is, then, not a happy condition covetable by Jîvas.

The plain answer to this objection is that God voluntarily accepts mortal conditions in order to keep faith with the laws of regulating the world which have been established by himself. The pleasure and pain which He is represented as experiencing are quite apparent, for He is cognisant at all times of His utter blissful nature. It is like an actor that He performs all actions in His mortal incarnations. They do not in the least touch His pure nature. The released souls have therefore no change of being re-born in the ordinary sense of the term.

This doctrine of the divine transformation of the released soul is endorsed by Appayadîkshita on the strength of the Vedânta texts, Sûtras and Bhâshya passages pointing to the same conclusion.

The Brahma Sûtras I-iii 15-21 undertake to determine the sense of the word दहराकाश (literally, ether in the heart) occurring in the 8th chapter of the Chhândogya. The opposite party takes the word either as actual ether or Jîva. The right or the ultimate view is that the term means the Supreme Being. Many reasons are advanced in support of the final doctrine, such as the persuasive sentence of the same passages and eight* divine properties which point to the Omniscient Being. It is needless here to enter into minor details. Suffice it to say that the closing section of the said chapter of the Chhândogya puts forth the Self, possessed of eight properties, as the object of inquiry. To illustrate such purity and divinity of Self three † physical states are examined, and the unity of the seer is established. In the fourth ‡ stage which is so called in comparison with three preceding fictitious states, the individual soul is represented as attaining his essential nature, *viz.*, Self possessed of the said eight properties.

---

*They are:—Freedom from (1) sins, (2) old age, (3) death, (4) sorrow, (5) hunger, (6) thirst, (7) unfailing desire, and (8) motive.

† Waking, dream and sleep.

‡ Known as Turîya.

It will be found that the Self taken up as the subject of inquiry in this section is that which is free from mundane existence. Thus, though the section deals with the individual soul, the final result is that his individuality (bondage) is illusory and his universality as self possessed of eight divine properties (*i. e.*, as the Supreme Being) is the reward of knowledge. In other words, the section of the Chhândogya, which is compelementary to the दहराकाश section, emphatically lays down the eight divine properties of Jîva not in his individual character, but in his universal character as Supreme Being *i. e.*, as released soul.

The Sûtrakâra shows the connection and meaning of the said chapter of the Chhândogya in the above manner, and S'ankara, too, explains the aphorism in the same spirit. To quote S'ankara's own sublime words on I. iii. 19 :—

"Therefore the individual soul, leaving aside his individual form which is unreal being put forth by Nescience, and which on account of its being impure through faults like attachment, hatred, conviction as doer and enjoyer is commingled with numerous evils, attains through knowledge his divine form possessed of freedom from sin &c.,–properties which are contradictory to the above-depicted faults of Jîva."

* In the second chapter of the Brahma Sûtras, the Supreme Being and individual soul are represented as standing in the relation of the whole and its part, for the former is the casual agent, while the latter, is the actual doer, and hence the former, a helper, and the latter, helped. Now, when they stand on the said relation, it is objected that God ought to be miserable when Jîva is suffering from pain. When a member of our body is suffering, our whole body feels the pain. Thus the Supreme being inevitably liable to the variety of pain belonging to individual souls, identity with him is not a desirable state.

---

* *Vide* B. S. II. i–34 and II. iii–43 and 50.

In refutation of the above objection, the Bhâshyakâra's reply is interpreted by Vâchaspatimiśra and others in the following way :—

God and Jîva are not like body and its members. The relation of the whole and its part established between them, means that God is the original, of which various Jîvas are so many reflections in portions of Nescience. Thus, God being the sole life, as it were, of Jîva, He is looked upon as the whole and Jîva as his part. Now a reflection is dependent both upon the reflector and the original for its properties. The impurity, &c., of the reflection do not in the least affect the normal state of the original. The relation of the whole and its part subsisting between God and Jîva being of the above type, the pain of the latter does not make the former miserable. Jîva, the reflection, attains the nature of God, the original, on the removal of Avidyâ which kept up the false distinction.

* In the third chapter, again, the Sûtrakâra and Bhâshyakâra admit that Jîva becomes identical with Îśa when released. There it is stated by an adversary that dream-phenomena ought to have been created by some intelligent being in the absence of other sentient agent Jîva is supposed to be the author of those phenomena. These phenomena being described in the Veda and owing their existence to Jîva, an intelligent being possessed of divine powers on account of his being a part of God ought to be regarded as real. So far, the argument of the opponent.

In reply it is said that the dreamy phenomena cannot be real. Because all that S'ruti lays down need not be real. S'ruti describes things as they are; she is silent as regards the reality or unreality of worldly things. Jîva also has not the capacity to create extraordinary phenomena without adequate causes. The superhuman powers of Jîva, alleged

* B. S, III ii-1 and 5.

by the disputant in favour of their actual creation, are hidden in the state of Ignorance. These phenomena are therefore illusory.

In a further Sûtra it is proved that the divine powers of Jîva, which are concealed on account of Ignorance, can be revealed by contemplation of the Supreme Being. This opinion of the Sûtrakâra is elucidated by various examples by S'ankara. Thus the divine transformation of the released soul is no innovation.

* In the fourth chapter, too, the nature of the released soul is inquired into. Jaimini maintains that the soul attains complete identity with the Supreme Being, and hence partakes of all divine attributes such as freedom from sin, &c. *Audulomi*, on the contrary, holds that the soul whose essential nature is Being, Thought and Bliss (*i. e.*, pure Brahman) becomes totally absorbed in pure Intelligence devoid of all dualistic conceptions. The final and correct view, then, is a compromise between the preceding two views. Both the antecedent views are correct inasmuch as the released soul being conscious of his essential nature is one with pure Brahman, and being absorbed primarily in the Qualified Brahman is possessed of all divine powers. This compromise is endorsed by Bâdarâyaṇa with his own name S'ankara too agrees with the Sûtrakâra, for he has not advanced a single objection against the doctrine of Bâdarâyaṇa. Bhâmatî and other commentaries explain the Bhâshya thereon in the same spirit, without a note of dissent.

Appayadîkshita emphatically declares that so many pages of clear import cannot be regarded as proving the divine character of the released soul on a mere hypothesis (*i. e.*, on an assumed premiss) as is supposed by Sarvajñâtmamuni.

---

* *Vide* B. S. IV 5–7.

One of the chief faults which attach to the doctrine, which maintains both God and Jîva as reflections, is that the divine character of the released soul cannot be logically deduced. That Jîva ought to posses divine powers follows from the consistent and cogent testimony of the above S'rutis, Sûtras, and Bhâshya texts. So, if the evidence of those texts is to be relied on, the doctrine which regards God as original and Jîva as reflection should be preferred to that wich considers both of them as reflections.

The conclusion of this view, then, is that released souls become one with God, and enjoy all the divine powers which are not inconsistent with their essential intelligent nature and which owe their existence to the conditions of other souls.

Conclusion.

We have now finished our survey of the whole field of the Vedânta philosophy as taught by S'ankara. His followers, while giving logical coherency to his system, have not departed from its fundamental principles. The differences which have arisen in the doctrinal side of Vedânta are developments from within brought about by the healthy application of logic. They are not extra additions antagonistic to the original organism of Vedânta, as is frequently shown in body of the essay. They concentre to the same focus, and ultimately meet the same goal, as streams to the ocean. We commenced our subject with the hypothetical unity of Being, roamed in phenomenal differences, and ultimately arrived at the same unity realisable by the liberated soul. For the verification of its ultimate truth the sublime philosophy of Vedânta appeals to the pure intuition of every rational and moral being.

APPENDIX A.

Technical terms of Vedânta used in the body of the Essay.

1. Ajñâna.—*Vide* Avidyâ.
2. Avidyâ.—Ignorance or Non-Intelligent principle which is sometimes regarded as one with Mâyâ and sometimes as different from it. It forms the condition of the Individual Soul and is otherwise called Ajñâna.
3. Âtman.—Self.
4. Ânandamaya—Beatific aspect of Jîva manifested in sound sleep; this is also regarded by some as a phase of God.
5. Brahman.—The Intelligent principle which consists of pure Being, Thought and Bliss, and which in its relation to the world is its omniscient and omnipotent lord.
7. Dṛishṭisṛishṭivâda-*Vide* Chapter II, Section VI, Part I.
8. Hiraṇyagarbha, Sûtrâtmâ, Prâṇa, &c.—The immanent deity of the totality of subtle bodies.
9. Îśa or Îśvara.—God, Supreme Being.
10. Jîva.—Individual Soul, migrating spirit.
11. Kâmya (Karma).—Religious duty, which is performed with the intention of achieving some worldly good.
12. Kûṭastha.—That aspect of the Individual Soul, which is unchanging like an anvil, and which is absolutely one with pure Brahman.
13. Mâyâ.—The world-evolving Fiction; non-intelligent cause of the world often rendered as Nature, Nescience, Ignorance.

14. Moksha.—Liberation, Salvation, Absolution.

15. Niyamavidhi.—An injunction the object of which is to restrict the performance or ommission of the action embodied therein.

16. Pradhâna.—The material cause of the world in the Sânkhya philosophy, corresponding to Mâyâ in Vedânta. It, however, differs from Mâyâ in the following points:—It is real, while Mâyâ is unreal or phenomenal; it is independent of spirit, while Mâyâ is dependent on God.

17. Pratiyogin—Anuyogin.—A thing to be distinguished is called Anuyogin, while that from which it is distinguished is said to be प्रतियोगिन् or opposite.

18. Prâjña.—Individual Soul connected with the state of sound sleep.

19. Prâṇas.—The aggregate of the subtle senses, which is typical of the whole of the subtle world.

20. Prauḍhivâda.—*Vide* footnote on page 68.

21. Prakṛiti.—*Vide* Mâyâ.

22. Sansâra.—The cycle of transmigration, the series of mundane existences.

23. Sâkshin.—That aspect of the Individual Soul which passively observes the actions of body, mind and senses.

24. Sûtra.—An aphorism of the Vedânta system of Bâdarâyaṇa.

25. Smṛiti.—Works of law-givers like Manu, which are inferior to tho Veda-S'ruti in point of religious authority. It includes Bhagvadgîtâ also.

26. Sṛishṭidṛishṭivâda.—*Vide* Chapter II, Section V, Part II.

27. S'ruti.—The Veda, the revealed scriptures of the Hindus.

28. Taijasa.—Individual Soul connected with the state of dream.

29. Turîya, or Pratyagâtman.—The Fourth the noumenal Self of creatures which transcends all conditions and states; the same as Kûṭastha.

30. Upâdhi.—Condition; limiting adjunct of Self.

31. Vijñânamaya.-The conscious ego of the waking state.

32. Virâṭ or Purusha.—The immanent deity of the totality of gross bodies.

33. Viśva.—Individual Soul connected with the waking state.

34.—Vivartopâdâna.—A material cause which does not undergo the slightest substantial change in the production of the effect, but presents in itself an inseparable phenomenal effect. It is opposed to the Pariṇâmi Upâdâna, which is actually transformed into he effect.

35. Yogin.—One who observes occult psychological practices for attaining unity with the deity.

APPENDIX B.

List of Works and And Authors consulted and referred to in the compilation of the Essay.

WORKS.

1. Advaitabrahmasiddhi.
2. Bhagvadgîtâ.
3. Bhâmatî.
4. Brahmasûtras with S'ânkara Bhâshya.
5. Bṛihadâraṇyaka.
6. Chitsukhî.
7. Chhândogya.
8. Dṛigdṛiśyaviveka.
9. Haristuti.
10. Jîvanmuktiviveka.
11. Kaṭhavallî.

12. Kalpataru.
13. Kârikâs of Gauḍapâda.
14. Nyâyasudhâ.
15. Padârthatattvanirṇaya.
16. Pañchadaśî :—

    (*a*) Tattva Viveka.
    (*b*) Chitradîpa.
    (*c*) Nâṭakadîpa.
    (*d*) Kûṭasthadîpa.
    (*e*) Dhyânadîpa.

17. Pañchapâdikâ Vivaraṇa.
18. Prakaṭârtha.
19. Praśnopanishad.
20. Pûrvamîmânsâ.
21. Sahasrâksha.
22. Sanatsujatîya.
23. Sankshepa S'ârîraka.
24. Siddhântaleśa.
25. Siddhântamuktavali.
26. S'vetâśvatara.
27. Tattvapradîpikâ.
28. Tattvaśuddhi.
29. Vârtikas of Sureśvara on Bṛihadâraṇyaka.
30. Vedânta Kaumudî.

AUTHORS.

1. Advaita Vidyâchârya.
2. Ânandabodhâchârya.
3. Appaya Dîkshita.
4. Bâdarâyaṇa.
5. Bhâratîtîrtha.
6. Bhâskarâchârya.
7. Chitsukhâchârya.
8. Gauḍapâda.
9. Jagannâtha.
10. Jaimini.

11. Madhusûdana Sarasvatî.
12. Râmâdvayâchârya.
13. Râmânuja.
14. Sadânanda.
15. S'ankara.
16. Sarvajjnâtmaguru.
17. Sureśvara.
18. Vallabhâchârya.
19. Vâchaspatimiśra.
20. Vidyâraṇya.

European Authors.

1. Bacon.
2. Deussen.
3. Carlyle.
4. Hume.
5. Huxley.
6. Shakespeare.

APPENDIX C.

Remarks of the Judges of the Sujâa Gokulji Zâlâ Vedânta Prize Essay for 1894.

"The author of the essay has acted properly in rendering into English the account given by Appaya Dîkshita in his *Siddhântabhedârthasamgraha* ordinarily known as *Siddhântales'a*. In some places the writer gives a close translation of passages in Appaya's work and in others a substance of what he says, while portions that go into uninteresting details involving fine subtleties are passed over. He seems to have verified for himself Appaya's quotations from Upanishads, S'ânkarabhâshya and a few commentaries, copies of which are available, but the large majority

of the works referred to by the Sanskrit author have not been consulted; nor was it necessary in the present case. The essay does contain 'an account of the doctrinal differences among the followers of S'ankara,' though it is made up by rendering into English the greater portion of Appaya Dîkshita's work and thus meets the requirements of the University notice. And the account is excellent. The author has properly understood the different points and brought them out well in English. I am of opinion, therefore, that the essayist fully deserves the prize fixed for essay. The essay should be published, and I would suggest that, to increase its usefulness to students of the Vedânta, the author should, at the end of each paragraph, give a reference to the passages of the Siddhântalesa in such an edition as that in the Vizianagram Series, the translation or substance of which is contained in that paragraph."

(Signed) R. G. BHÂNDÂRKAR.

29th May 1901.

"I agree with the remarks contained in the above. The essayist well makes out the differences he has to describe and may be fully awarded the prize fixed for the essay At the time of carrying the essay through the press transliteration will have to be attended to with care, and it is hoped that amendments will be made where doubtful places are marked in pencil. The main part of the composition is very well made up and the prize richly deserved."

(Signed) ÂBÂJI V. KÂTHAVATE.

16*th December* 1901.

CENTRAL ARCHAEOLOGICAL
New Delhi